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Chapter 1: In many settings, it is natural to think of limited consideration
exhibiting spillovers: attention paid to a particular alternative may “spill over” to
another alternative based on shared characteristics, complementarities, features of
the choice environment, etc. However, it is not straightforward whether, given choice
data, a) preferences among alternatives can be revealed, or b) the network of con-
sideration spillovers can be revealed. Using a novel laboratory experiment, I test a
deterministic Network Choice model proposed in previous work and find a plethora
of violations thereof, even at the individual level. I then propose a stochastic model,
Random Network Choice, and analyze its properties regarding the formation of con-
sideration sets. When applied to the laboratory data, I find considerable consistency
with the general Random Network Choice model. Armed with a model of network
choice consistent with my experimental data, I consider one application in the realm
of advertising to show that such a generalization of so-called “positive spillovers” in
attention is necessary to avoid misleading welfare analysis.
Chapter 2: This paper experimentally investigates the effect of introducing un-
available alternatives and irrelevant information regarding the alternatives on the
optimality of decisions in choice problems. We find that interaction between the
unavailable alternatives and irrelevant information regarding the alternatives gen-
erates suboptimal decisions. Irrelevant information in any dimension increases the
time costs of decisions. We also identify a pure “preference for simplicity” beyond
the desire to make optimal decisions or minimize time spent on a decision problem.
Our results imply that the presentation set, distinct from the alternative set, needs
to be a part of decision making models.
Chapter 3: To what extent does positive reciprocity extent to environments with
uncertainty? In order to answer this question, we propose a new game, the Stochas-
tic Gift Exchange game (SGE), that extends the standard sequential deterministic
Gift Exchange game (DGE) into an environment with uncertainty. SGE shares
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with DGE wherein no players trade,
leading to a suboptimal ex-ante allocation. However, contrary to DGE, leading
models of reciprocity do not predict departures from this equilibrium in the direc-
tion of positive giving. When we conduct SGE in a laboratory experiment, we find
positive Wages and Effort, indicating the presence of an ex-ante reciprocal motive.
Moreover, Wages are lower in SGE than in DGE, indicating both that ex-post recip-
rocal motives also matter and that laboratory studies of gift exchange, which have
been exclusively conducted with DGE, may overestimate the amount of positive
reciprocity in the real world. Finally, we conduct two alterations of the SGE to
investigate to what extent the source of uncertainty matters for reciprocal giving.
Results from these treatments indicate that a) the source of uncertainty does not
matter for Wage and Effort determination, but that b) there is evidence of an en-
dowment effect in the ex-ante vs ex-post fairness domains. When endowed with the
ability to affect the ex-ante (ex-post) allocation, ex-ante (ex-post) reciprocal motives
dominate. Such a phenomenon runs contrary to the additive separability of ex-ante
and ex-post motives, a common assumption in leading models that incorporate both
risk and social preferences. Our results suggest new directions for future theoretical
explorations of ex-ante reciprocity.
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Chapter 1: Random Network Consideration:
Theory and Experiment
1.1 Introduction
In decision environments with a large number of alternatives, decision mak-
ers (DMs hereinafter) may structure search according to a network of connections
between these alternatives. For example, a shopper on Amazon.com utilizes a list
of “suggested items” to navigate between available goods. The network of connec-
tions between options need not be exogeneously provided by some firm, however.
Consider a DM who is considering donating to some charity from the set {Animal
Shelter in DC, Animal Shelter in NYC, Homeless Shelter in NYC}. Then a DM who
initially considers donating to the Animal Shelter in DC may subsequently consider
donating to the Animal Shelter in NYC because of the shared attribute of being an
Animal Shelter. Similarly, the same DM may then consider the Homeless Shelter in
NYC because of the shared geographic location with the Animal Shelter in NYC.
The DM will eventually consider both the Animal Shelter in DC and the Home-
less Shelter in NYC, even though the two charities share no common attributes. If
attention “spills over” between options in this manner in some decision making en-
1
vironment, it would be important for firms to be able to properly elicit the network
from the choices of DMs and attention data, if observable.
Indeed, there is evidence from the marketing body of literature to suggest
that DMs exhibit such attention spillovers. Shapiro (2018) shows that Direct-To-
Consumer advertising exhibits positive spillovers in the case of pharmaceutical anti-
depressants: sales of a given drug increase by about 1.6% in response to the adver-
tisement of a rival drug. Sahni (2016) provides experimental evidence that suggests
that these positive spillovers are indeed attention-based by studying the response
to online advertising in the restaurant market. Advertising a particular restaurant
online can increase sales leads1 to a competing restaurant by round 4%. Finally,
Lewis and Nguyen (2015) show that online advertisements can lead to an increase
in online searches for competitors’ brands by up to 23%.
These marketing studies on attention spillovers have been focused on brand or
product categories: the advertisement of a particular good has an effect on consid-
eration of all goods in the same category as that which is advertised. However, two
stylized facts suggest that this implicit modelling restriction may be too strong: i)
Shapiro (2018) finds a variety of advertising elasticities between goods even in the
same defined “category,” and ii) Sahni (2016) finds differential effects of rival adver-
tising based on features of the firm (e.g. firm age, aggregate review scores, etc.). A
general model of attention spillovers would then need to represent such spillovers as
operating on a network of connections between options, with this category-specific
1Sales leads are defined in Sahni (2016) as the consumer searching for the restaurant’s phone
number, which is observable in his dataset.
2
treatment as a special case.
Beyond the importance that a model of such network consideration has for
firms, a precise model of network consideration is important for welfare analysis.
Indeed, a common refrain among these marketing studies of attention spillovers is
that these positive externalities lead to an under-allocation of advertising relative to
the social optimum; Shapiro (2018) presents a supply-side model to make this case.
However, if consideration is modelled as following a more general network structure,
this is not necessarily true. I show this much in the Section 3.4.
In this work, I present the results of an experiment designed to test the con-
sideration set properties of several nested models of network consideration. To my
knowledge, this is the first experimental study of a decision (i.e. non-strategic)
environment with a network structure. First, the deterministic special case, stud-
ied previously by Masatlioglu and Suleymanov (2017) and which I’ll call “Network
Choice” (NC hereinafter), is leveraged to structure the parameterization of the lab-
oratory experiment. NC also serves as a deterministic baseline model against which
to test the elicited attention data. The consideration set properties of NC are quite
strong and I find evidence that attention, even at the subject level, is not consistent
with NC in the observed data. In light of the pervasiveness of violations of NC, I
suggest a more general stochastic model, which I’ll call Random Network Choice
(RNC hereafter). This model shares several features with NC. First, it exhibits
limited consideration whereby the DM only considers a subset of the available set
of alternatives. It also possesses a form of status quo bias where the status quo or
“starting point” of the DM determines the set of alternatives that are reachable ac-
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Figure 1.1: Example random graph on four options
cording to the random network structure. However, RNC utilizes a general random
product network structure, as opposed to a deterministic network, as is assumed
in NC. The generalization to a random network structure allows for more general
consideration set mappings and better fits the experimental data. To preview how
this model works, consider the following example:
In the above example, the options {w, x, y, z} are connected to one another
in a random graph structure. The random graph is represented as a distribution
over the set of all possible graphs on these four options. In Figure 1.1, the graph
g1 occurs with probability
1
3




possible graphs occur with probability 0. Consider a DM who starts at option x and
considers options according to RNC. Then with probability 1
3
, the network g1 is in
effect, in which case attention spills over from option x to option y, then from option
y to option z. Let Γx(T | S) be the probability that set T is considered when S is
available and the starting point is x. Since there are no other networks that connect
4
the set {x, y, z}, Γx({x, y, z} | {w, x, y, z}) = f(g1) = 13 . Notice that, similarly,
Γx({w, x, z} | {w, x, y, z}) = f(g2) = 23 . The RNC model works as follows: given a
starting point x and an available set S, the DM forms stochastic consideration sets
according to some distribution over possible networks. From each consideration set,
the DM chooses the option that is maximal according to some partial order . The
NC deterministic model is a special case of RNC where f(g) = 1 for some network
g, and f(g′) = 0 for all other networks g′.
Given some dataset that is consistent with RNC, the properties of RNC are
such that it may admit an infinite number of representations. In some settings, this
may not be a desirable property. For this reason, I then consider a special case of
RNC, which I dub the “Pseudo-Markovian RNC” model (PM-RNC hereinafter) due
to its proximity to “Markov networks,” common in the network analysis body of
literature.2 Under PM-RNC, I show that the PM-RNC representation of some set of
stochastic choice data must be unique (up to permutations of preferences between
alternatives for which preferences cannot be revealed with the given dataset). I
present an additional necessary consideration set mapping property for PM-RNC,
Binary Separability, and take this to the experimental data. I find mixed evidence
of consistency with Binary Separability, suggesting that there is likely a family of
RNC special cases between the most general RNC model and PM-RNC that i) adds
structure beyond RNC in the direction of PM-RNC, but ii) is similarly consistent
with my experimental data. An exploration of such classes of models is beyond the
scope of the current work and would make for a fruitful next step in the study of
2See Frank and Strauss (1986) for a discussion of Markov networks.
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network consideration.
This paper proceeds as follows. Related literature, both theoretical and exper-
imental studies, are reviewed in Section 1.2. The experimental design and results
of tests of NC are presented in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. Section 1.5 presents the RNC
and PM-RNC models which are tested in Section 1.6. These results are discussed
in light of an application to advertising in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
1.2.1 Experiments
The experiment contained herein is most closely connected to a growing body
of literature in economics on experimental investigations of limited attention. Firstly,
this experiment elicits data regarding consideration sets in a manner complementary
to earlier work. Reutskaja et al. (2011) rely on eye-tracking technology to infer the
consideration and search behavior of subjects.3 Caplin et al. (2011) elicit choice
process data as defined previously in Caplin and Dean (2011). Instead of directly
observing consideration through eye-tracking technology, Caplin et al. (2011) in-
centivize the revelation of the path of present-best options at each point in time
during which the subject is evaluating a set of options. Geng (2016) studies the
impact of a status quo on attention allocation as measured by decision and consid-
eration time. Finally, Gabaix et al. (2006) use the MouseLab coding language to
investigate subject attention in a setting with attribute-level information regarding
3See Orquin and Loose (2013) for a review of eye-tracking studies in decision making.
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available options.
Several studies of attention and information acquisition have been devoted
to testing, estimating, or informing theoretical models. Dean and Neligh (2017a)
present a set of experiments regarding the rational inattention model of Sims (2003;
2006), generalized in Caplin and Dean (2015), where they document consistency with
a generalized model beyond the Shannon case. Chadd et al. (2018) show that the
presentation of irrelevant information can affect the consideration set in a manner
not predicted by extant models of limited attention. The aim of this experiment
is similar to these previous studies in that it seeks to determine consistency with a
model of network consideration formation.
The experimental body of literature on networks is often focused on environ-
ments where the nodes on the network are optimizing agents and not feasible options
to be considered by a central DM. A number of studies exist of network games, where
agents are connected to one another via a network structure (See Charness et al.
(2014) for a canonical example and Choi et al. (2015) for a thorough survey of such
experiments through 2015). In a similar vein, more recent studies have been focused
on dynamic network formation, in which agents enter a network sequentially and
choose to connect themselves to a subset of extant nodes (agents) in the network.
Neligh (2017) shows that entrants to a network “vie for dominance” by connecting
to many extant nodes in a manner consistent with forward-looking behavior.
While the experiments above on network formation and network games are
at least nominally related to the experiment contained herein insofar as they are
explorations of “networks” in economic settings, their connection to the current
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experiment ends there. All of the above are game-theoretic explorations of behavior
in network structures, whether they be exogenously determined or endogenously
determined in equilibrium. RNC and PM-RNC are both decision theoretic models
and involve no strategic interaction between multiple agents.
1.2.2 Theory
The proposed RNC model contained herein is closely related to several models
of path-dependent attention and choice. Masatlioglu and Suleymanov (2017) present
a model of Network Choice (NC hereinafter) where attention spills over between op-
tions in a given deterministic network. In the realm of stochastic path-dependent
models of limited consideration, Suleymanov (2018) presents a Path-Dependent
Consideration model that is also similar to RNC, in that consideration follows a
path of connections between available options according to some stochastic process.
Suleymanov (2018) assigns probabilities in this model to paths with some initial
starting point, where RNC assigns probabilities to more general networks. Further,
Suleymanov (2018) builds on earlier work contained in Masatlioglu and Nakajima
(2013) where new elements are added to the consideration set only when they dom-
inate everything that has already been included in the consideration set. RNC does
not share this feature, instead allowing consideration sets to evolve stochastically,
independent of the preference relation. The same approach is used in NC, though
for a deterministic setting.
Several other models of limited consideration are based on stochastically de-
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termined consideration set mappings. Manzini and Mariotti (2014) first explore con-
sideration sets that are stochastically determined. In contrast to RNC, the model
of Manzini and Mariotti (2014) focuses on consideration of individual options in
the feasible set where each feasible option is considered with some fixed probabil-
ity. This results in choice probabilities that violate a regularity condition of Luce
(1959), where adding an element to the feasible set should not increase the choice
frequency of a given element previously available. In more recent work, Cattaneo
et al. (2017) present a “Random Attention Model” (RAM hereinafter), that actually
relies on violations of the Luce regularity condition to reveal preference. They apply
a monotonicity condition on attention rules of the following form:
For any a ∈ S − T , Γ(T | S) ≤ Γ(T | S − a).
where Γ(T | S) is the probability that the set T is considered when S is available.
In Section 1.5, I show that RNC satisfies a starting-point contingent version of this
monotonicity condition. This allows me to directly connect the revealed preference
approach in Cattaneo et al. (2017) to that in RNC.4
RNC also shares features with a number of models that exhibit status quo
bias. Note that, in accordance with the distribution over networks of options, a
change in the starting point may change both consideration probabilities and, sub-
sequently, choice in RNC. In this way, RNC exhibits a form of status quo bias akin
to that explored in Masatlioglu et al. (2005), Masatlioglu and Ok (2013), and Dean
4Manzini and Mariotti (2014), Suleymanov (2018), and Cattaneo et al. (2017) are not the
only examples of random attention models. See Cattaneo et al. (2017) for a full review of random
attention models and their connection to RAM, of which RNC is a starting-point contingent special
case.
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et al. (2017). However, in the models presented in Masatlioglu et al. (2005) and
Masatlioglu and Ok (2013), the status quo affects what is considered by the DM
according to whether the status quo dominates an option, with only undominated
options being considered. The status quo rules out consideration of certain options
more generally in Dean et al. (2017). In contrast, the status quo (or starting point)
of RNC simply affects which networks of connections may feasibly be followed in
the DM’s search - an assumption that is independent of preferences and which is
undefined in the absence of a status quo (starting point).
1.3 Experiment
In order to test the deterministic NC model, we construct a laboratory en-
vironment with several goals. First, the environment must mimic a choice setting
where distinct options are linked to one another via a product network. Second, the
environment must induce the subject to behave as if they were in the real world ana-
logue to the laboratory environment - that is, choice must be properly incentivized.
Finally, we err on the side of creating an overly restrictive environment in order to
test the NC model where it is most likely to succeed. That is, if NC fails in this
context, it is not likely to succeed in a real world analogue with more complicated
considerations or fewer restrictions.
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1.3.1 General Environment
A total of 107 undergraduate subjects at the Experimental Economics Labora-
tory at University of Maryland, College Park participated in this experiment across
eight sessions. On average, subjects earned $23.63 for approximately 90 minutes of
time spent in the lab.5
It is helpful to consider the experimental environment from the perspective of
a given subject. The subject faces 31 distinctive extended problems, each defined by
a starting point x and a set of available options, S, just as in the theory. For each
extended decision problem (x, S) the subject’s task is to select the option with the
highest value among the ones they consider. For each extended decision problem,
the subject’s payoff is simply the value of the option they have chosen, converted
to cash. While subjects make decisions in each of 31 extended decision problems,
they are only paid for one, which is chosen randomly at the end of experiment.
Subjects do not know which extended decision problem will be chosen when making
decisions, so they are incentivized to treat each decision as if it is the one for which
they are paid.
Each option is described by four separate attributes: Shape, Pattern, Size,
and Number. The value of an option is simply the sum of the value of its attributes,
denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). Each attributes can take on
5A single pilot session was conducted with 16 subjects in order to test the experimental software
and receive feedback regarding clarity of the instructions used. A few minor changes were made
to the design and instructions following this pilot experiment, including, but not limited to, the
use of extended decision problem unique option labels. These subjects are not included in any of
the analysis contained herein.
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Option X
Shape Pattern Size Number
SMALL 5
Table 1.1: Option Example
one of 5 values, from 1 ECU to 5 ECU, resulting in 625 distinct possible options,
with values ranging from 5 to 25 ECU. A full table of attribute values can be found
in Appendix A.8. For clarity, consider the following option described by these four
attributes:
Option X in Table 1.1 is described by 4 attributes: Square, Two-Bar Pattern,
Small, and 5. These each pay off 2 ECU, 3 ECU, 2 ECU, and 5 ECU, respectively.
Then the value of Option X is 13 ECU (= 2 + 3 + 2 + 5). Deciding which option
has the highest value in any extended decision problem is thus non-trivial, since it
requires i) associating an attribute with its value per the payoff table provided in
the instructions and ii) calculating the resultant option value from the sum of its
attribute values.
At the start of each extended decision problem, the subject is first shown
information for the starting point and no other available option. This information
includes an option identification label, unique at the extended decision problem level
(i.e. “Option 5” is displayed at the top of the screen when information for Option
5 is presented), attribute information for the displayed option, as well as two lists
of information (explained below). In addition, the interface displays information for
the subject’s provisional choice at all times (explained in detail in Section 1.3.2).
In order to navigate to information for another option, the subject can utilize
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two lists on their screen: i) a list of “Linked Options” and ii) a list of “Options
Already Viewed.” The list of “Options Already Viewed” simply lists the options
within the available set for which the subject has already viewed attribute informa-
tion (defined as having navigated previously to the option information page for that
option). To see information for an option other than the one currently displayed,
the subject may simply click on the option label in one of these lists and then click
a box labelled “View the Selected Option” pertaining to that list. At that time, all
relevant information on the screen will update to reflect information for the option
to which the subject has navigated.
The list of “Linked Options” displays a list of options that are said to be
“linked” to the currently displayed option. An option is said to be “linked” to
another if the two share two or more attributes. Thus, for Option X in Table 1.1,
if another available option also had the Shape attribute “Square” and the Number
attribute “5,” it would be included in this list of linked options for Option X. An
option that only shared one attribute, but no more, with Option X would not be
included in this list. It is through this method that the design induces an exogenous
network structure on the set of available options.
This system of “linking” options to one another was chosen for two reasons.
First, in order to mimic a real-world environment where NC may be an appropriate
model, the experiment necessitated an exogenous network of some form. Second,
this particular exogenous network structure was chosen over a more conservative
alternative in order to avoid potential subject confusion or experimenter demand
effects. In an alternative design where “links” between options are simply agnostic
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of characteristics of said options, subjects may ask themselves why providing the
network structure is necessary in the first place. This may lead to the perception of
some deception on the part of the subject or general confusion. The chosen network
structure is both easy to understand and mimics real world scenarios where we might
believe that NC is the correct model for individual choice.
It is through this navigation process that I argue the current design properly
incentivizes revelation of the consideration set for each extended decision problem.
In effect, navigating from one option to another “uncovers” hidden information in
the extended decision problem regarding the attribute information for each option.
Other experiments, both in psychology and experimental economics, use similar
designs. I view the design used herein as complementary to approaches incorporat-
ing MouseLab, eye-tracking, and choice-process elicitation procedures discussed in
Section 1.2.1.
In the baseline version of this experiment, “linked” options were displayed in
a list without any additional information regarding these options. For robustness, a
variation of this display method was used for half of the sessions. In this variation,
the full list of “linked” options was split into four lists, one for each attribute.
The option linked to the currently displayed option was then displayed in the lists
for the attributes that it shared with the currently displayed option. The goal of
using this variation is to determine whether consistency with NC was dependent
on arguably minor features of the laboratory environment. In all of the following,
whenever statistical tests are conducted separately based on this variation, I use
“Baseline” to refer to the original context-less display and “Context” to refer to
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those observations that came from the variant with more context provided as to the
source of the link between options.
Each extended decision problem has a time limit of 75 seconds, and the subject
can choose to stop viewing information at any time prior by clicking a “Stop” button
located at the bottom of the interface. If this is done, the subject may not view any
additional information for options and may not further alter their provisional choice.
Stopping the extended decision problem does not allow the subject to immediately
move on to the next extended decision problem, however; they must wait for the
entirety of the 75 allotted seconds to pass before moving on. This design was chosen
to disincentivize haphazard choices on the part of the subject in the interest of
finishing the experiment early.
At the end of the experiment, one of the 31 extended decision problems was
chosen at random (with each extended decision problem chosen with equal likeli-
hood), and subjects were paid for that single choice only. Once these extended
decision problems were completed, they were asked a set of demographic questions
on age; gender; self-reported ACT, SAT, and GPA scores; native language; and
major of study. They were also given the opportunity to explain their decisions
and indicate whether they felt they sufficiently understood the instructions to the
experiment.
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1.3.2 Choice Process Data
The experimental design elicits choice process data a la Caplin et al. (2011)
in the following manner. Choices in each extended decision problem are treated as
provisional, in that choosing a new option does not end the current period. This
simply updates the subject’s provisional choice, allowing the subject to make a
number of switches between provisionally chosen options within a single period. At
all times, information regarding the subject’s provisional choice was displayed in
the upper-right portion of the experimental interface, including the option label (e.g
“Option 12”) for the provisional choice and attribute information. This information
was provided as a reference for the subject to avoid concerns of imperfect recall
during the option evaluation process.6
At the end of each period, a “decision time” was chosen randomly from a
uniform distribution from 2 to 75 seconds. The provisional choice held by the
subject at the realized decision time was then treated as the final choice for the
extended decision problem and subjects were paid the value of the option held at
that time.
In each period, while subjects were initially shown the information for the
starting point, they did not initially have any option provisionally chosen. They
must then choose some option to serve as their initial provisional choice (usually the
6It should be noted that, while the appearance of this information differs between the design
used herein and that used in Caplin et al. (2011), the two share the feature of always displaying
the subject’s provisional choice. In Caplin et al. (2011), the provisional choice is indicated by
a selected row in a list of continuously displayed available options. In the experiment contained
herein, this information is contained in a portion of the interface that simply updates when the
provisional choice is altered by the subject.
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starting point itself). For this reason, the lower end of the decision time support
was 2 seconds, giving the subject time to choose an initial provisional choice and
thus minimizing the number of observations for which the subject might be paid
nothing for a given extended decision problem.
1.3.3 Data Generation Process
For each extended decision problem, both the set of available options and
the starting point were chosen intentionally to create explicit tests of properties
of consideration sets in NC. This design was chosen to ensure that there would
be a sufficient number of tests of each consideration set property. One alternative
design would have randomized the extended decision problems presented to subjects.
With four attributes, each taking on one of five different values, the grand set of
alternatives is of size 625, with 2625 − 1 unique non-empty subsets. With such a
large dataset over which to randomize, it would be highly unlikely that the final
dataset would end up with a sufficient number of tests of the properties of NC using
a reasonable number of laboratory subjects. Extended decision problems were thus
chosen such that the observations gleaned from each would constitute, at minimum,
one test of some axiom of NC.
1.3.3.1 NC: Upward Monotonicity
The first property of consideration sets in NC that I utilize to create extended
decision problems is Upward Monotonicity. For some extended decision problem
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(x, S), let Γx(S) be the set of all options in S which are considered when x is the
starting point. Then the NC property of Upward Monotonicity is as follows:
B1. Upward Monotonicity: Γx(T ) ⊆ Γx(S) for all T ⊆ S
In essence, this property describes the process of aggregation across nested
extended decision problems. Under the deterministic NC model, if the DM faces
(x, T ), they will consider all of those options which are “reachable” from the starting
point x and are also in T .7 Then when the DM is confronted with (x, S) for T ⊆
S, it should be clear that all those options which were reachable from x and in
T remain reachable under (x, S) (i.e. nothing about the underlying connections
between options has been changed). Moreover, since T ⊆ S, these options are also
still available and therefore should still be considered under (x, S).
In order to test this property in the lab, I define five extended decision problems
that are “nested” within one another. Let δi = (x,Ai) be one of these five extended
decision problems. Each Ai was then chosen such that A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ ... ⊆ A5. The
starting point x was chosen such that x ∈ A1. A violation of Upward Monotonicity
would then look like Γx(Ai) 6⊆ Γx(Ai+1). From these five extended decision problems,
we then have 10 separate tests of Upward Monotonicity per subject, or 1070 in total
across 107 subjects.
7Masatlioglu and Suleymanov (2017) say that y is “reachable” from x if there exists a path




The next property of NC to be tested concerns the “undirectedness” of how
products are connected in NC. By the definition of “reachable,” it should be clear
that if y is reachable from x, x is also reachable from y. This is simply the result
of consideration spilling over in either direction of a connection between options,
regardless of the origin. This has a clear implication for how consideration sets
should compare across the same available set, but given distinct starting points,
which is captured in the NC Symmetry property:
B2. Symmetry: If y ∈ Γx(S), Γx(S) = Γy(S) for all S.
To test the Symmetry Axioms of NC, I repeat the available sets in each of
δi above, letting γi denote one such extended decision problem. These Symmetry
extended decision problems use a distinct starting point y 6= x, with y ∈ A1. A test
of these Symmetry Axioms would then involve a comparison between consideration
sets in δi and γi. Then, in total, these ten extended decision problems create a
maximum of five tests of Symmetry for each subject. However, notice that the
Symmetry property only applies if y ∈ Γx(S), which may not be born out in the
data for a given subject. The actual total number of tests of Symmetry will then
be endogenously determined by consideration behavior of subjects.
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1.3.3.3 Path Connectedness
The final property of NC to be tested concerns the impact of an option that
uniquely provides a connection between two other options. This property, Path
Connectedness, essentially states that the revelation that some option y is required
to make z reachable from x should also reveal i) that y is reachable from x in
the absence of z and ii) that z is reachable from y in the absence of x. Formally,
Masatlioglu and Suleymanov (2017) write this property as follows:
B3. Path Connectedness: If z ∈ Γx(S) and z 6∈ Γx(S \ y), then y ∈ Γx(S \ z)
and z ∈ Γy(S \ x)
This property is best understood through a simple example. In Figure 1.2,
clearly z ∈ Γx({x, y, z}), but z 6∈ Γx({x, z}); the only connection between x and z
passes through y. Path Connectedness essentially identifies the fact that this tells
us two things. First, y must then be connected to x, independent of z. Similarly, y
must then be connected to z, independent of x. So, we can then say i) y ∈ Γx({x, y})
and ii) z ∈ Γy({y, z}), as stated in the property above.
This property utilizes four separate extended decision problems: (x, S), (x, S \
y), (x, S \ z), and (y, S \ x). Further, note that the hypothesis of the property,
similar to that of the Symmetry property, is going to be endogenously determined
by subject consideration data: it may be the case that we present both (x, S) and
(x, S \ y), to the subject and that their behavior does not satisfy the hypothesis of
this statement. In order to increase the probability that there is a sufficient number
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Figure 1.2: Example graph with three options
of observations where the hypothesis is satisfied, two separate options for y and z
in the above are presented to each subject, holding x and S fixed. There are thus
four possible tests of Path Connectedness for each subject, constructed using seven
extended decision problems. The actual number of tests conducted are a function
of the consideration set data.
In total, these three properties of NC lead to the creation of 17 extended
decision problems to be used in the laboratory experiment. The remaining 14 (out
of 31) were constructed to test axioms on choice data of NC, along with the choice
axioms of a related model contained in Suleymanov (2018). The results of these
tests are not included, as the focus of the main body of the paper is an exploration
of consideration set formation in NC.
1.4 Results: NC
The results of tests of consistency with NC are presented below. Given data
on both choices and consideration sets, one can check for consistency in two sepa-
rate ways: simultaneous and sequential. Under a simultaneous test, one would test
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whether the resultant choices were consistent with some NC representation. This
is, in general, the approach taken when consideration sets are unobserved and con-
sistency with some decision theoretic model can only be tested using choice data.
In this experiment, consideration sets are elicited, so one can take a sequential
approach, paying more attention to the consideration set formation process. In a
sequential test consistency with NC is separated into two questions. First, in each
extended decision problem, does the subject choose a money-maximizing element of
the consideration set? Second, is the formation of random consideration set map-
pings consistent with an NC representation (i.e. do consideration sets satisfy Upward
Monotonicity, Symmetry, and Path Connectedness)? Subsection 1.4.1 presents gen-
eral experimental results and demographic information. Subsection 1.4.2 answers
the first question on optimality of choice. Finally, Subsection 1.4.3 reports tests of
the NC properties.
1.4.1 General Results
In all of the below, statistical tests were conducted on aggregate data, pooled
across the Baseline and Context displays, except where explicitly mentioned. Tests
of differences between the two displays that were omitted in the main text can be
found in Appendix A.7. Upon completion of the experimental task, subjects filled
out a brief demographic questionnaire which asked questions on Age, self-reported
SAT and ACT scores (if any), self-reported GPA, and Gender. Results are presented
in Table 1.2.
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Table 1.2: Demographic Information
Age SAT ACT GPA Female
mean 20.68224 1810.833 30.11429 3.363364 .4485981
sd 1.551616 324.1159 3.946491 .438533 .4996913
min 18 1100 20 2 0
max 27 2360 36 4 1
count 107 84 35 107 107
In order for data on self-reported GPA, SAT, and ACT to be used in sub-
sequent analysis, responses were normalized as in Cohen et al. (1999), Filiz-Ozbay
et al. (2016), and Chadd et al. (2018): Let j be the variable under consideration
with j ∈ {GPA, SAT, ACT}, µji be the value of variable j for subject i, µjmax be
the maximum value of j in the subject population, and µjmin be the minimum value
of j in the subject population. Then let µ̂ji , the normalized value of variable j for






such that µ̂ji can be interpreted as the measure of j for subject i, normalized by
the distribution of j in the subject population. Some subjects were missing one or
more measures for j ∈ {GPA, SAT, ACT}, since these measures were self-reported
(and some subjects could not recall their scores on one or more of these measures).
Additionally, some responses were outside the range of feasible scores (for example,
an SAT score of 20). All subjects could reliably self-report a feasible GPA from the
range of 2 to 4, so µ̂GPAi will be used for any subsequent analysis involving cognitive
ability. Normalized scores are reported in Table 1.3 along with an additional measure
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for Cognitive Score. For some subject i Cognitive Score is taken to be µ̂SATi if the
subject reported a feasible SAT score and µ̂ACTi if the subjects did not report a
feasible SAT score and reported a feasible ACT score. Cognitive Score is lower than
µ̂GPAi and has higher variance (likely due to more imperfect recall of SAT/ACT
scores relative to GPA).











For the purposes of testing “choice optimality,” I say that a subject chose a
“highest-valued option” in a given extended decision problem when the option that
was last chosen by the subject before the end of the period (i.e. before 75 seconds
elapsed) led to the highest possible ECU payoff among those options that the subject
considered. Note that this, in general, is not equivalent to standard mistake rate
analysis conducted in Caplin et al. (2011) and Chadd et al. (2018), for example.
Here, we only say that a “mistake” was made when the subject ended up choosing
a lower-valued option than one that was actively considered in the current period.
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Note: we view an option as having been “considered” if the subject navigated to its
information at some point in the period. Since we are testing for choice optimality
in the context of NC, which says that a DM will choose the optimal option in the
DM’s consideration set, it is natural to define “mistakes” as described above.
Subjects chose the highest-valued option in 85.675% of extended decision prob-
lems (Wilcox p < 0.001 for H0 : µ = 1). Given that the overall mistake rate is non-
trivial, I further investigate the determinants of choice optimality through several
logistic regression specifications. In Table 1.4, the dependent variable is Correct, a
binary variable that takes the value 1 if the subject chose the consideration set op-
timal option in the extended decision problem and 0 otherwise. Context is a binary
variable used to indicate whether the observation came from the Context display.
Period goes from 1 to 31, indicating the period in which the extended decision prob-
lem was completed. CSεN is the residual generated from an OLS regression of CSN
onto Period and N . Both the size of the available set (N) and the period in which
the extended decision problem is conducted affect the size of the consideration set.8
These residuals are the portion of CSN left unexplained by N and Period, and they
are used in both models to estimate the effect of consideration set size on choice
optimality separately from the effects of N , the size of the available set. Female and
GPA are defined as above (i.e. GPA is normalized according to the POMP proce-
dure described in Subsection 1.4.1). In both model specifications, marginal effects
from a logistic regression are reported, along with robust standard errors clustered
8An interested reader can find these results in the Appendix A.7. I replicate a version of the
results contained in Reutskaja et al. (2011), that additional available options lead to more options
being considered by the DM.
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at the subject level.
From Table 1.4, we can see that the prevalence of sub-optimal choice can
partly be attributed to learning: each additional period increases the probability
that the choice will be consideration set optimal by 0.1 percentage points, resulting
in higher rates of sub-optimal choice in earlier periods. Further evidence of this
can be seen by looking at the final period only, where 94.33% of observations are
consideration set optimal. Additionally, the size of the available set matters; for
each additional element added to the set of available options, the probability that
the chosen element will be consideration set optimal decreases by 0.953 percentage
points. Somewhat surprisingly, the size of the consideration set itself matters - an
additional option considered (holding N and Period fixed) decreases the probability
of consideration set optimal choice by about 1.3 percentage points. Note that in
neither specification do Context, Female, or GPA matter. This brings us to our first
two results on consideration set optimality of choice:
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Table 1.4: Determinants of Optimal Choice















Standard errors in parentheses
Marginal effects from logit regression specifications
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Result 1. Consideration set choice optimality in the aggregate is broadly consistent
with NC:
• 85.675% of choices are consideration set optimal
Result 2. There is a non-trivial number of observations where choices are not
consideration set optimal in a manner not predicted by NC:
• larger consideration sets decrease the likelihood of consideration set optimality
• larger available sets decrease the likelihood of consideration set optimality
1.4.3 Property Tests
In Subsections 1.4.3.1 - 1.4.3.3, we consider subject-level data to test the de-
terministic consideration set properties of NC.
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1.4.3.1 Upward Monotonicity
The five extended decision problems constructed to test Upward Monotonic-
ity, when repeated twice (in order to test Symmetry - results in Subsection 1.4.3.2)
comprise 20 tests of Upward Monotonicity per subject. In the aggregate, 79.8% of
these observations were inconsistent with Upward Monotonicity, as seen in Table
1.5. Moreover, an analysis of the CDF of the proportion of Upward Monotonicity
violations per subject, displayed in Figure 1.3, reveals that nearly 50% of subjects
had more than approximately 80% of their observations in violation of Upward
Monotonicity. No subjects had fewer than 20% of their observations in violation of
Upward Monotonicity. Taken together, these results suggest that Upward Mono-
tonicity may be too strong an assumption on how consideration sets are formed in
the presence of an exogenous network, even at the individual level.





p < 0.001 for aggregate test of H0 : µ = 0
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Figure 1.3: Cumulative of Mean Monotonicity Violations by Subject
Given the prevalence of violations of Upward Monotonicity, we ask what char-
acteristics of extended decision problems and the choice environment affect the like-
lihood of observing a violation. First, note that Upward Monotonicity does not take
into account the “distance” between the sizes of the relevant available sets. At first
glace, this appears as if it should not matter. If set Γx(T ) is considered when T is
available, then this indicates that option x is connected to elements in T through
some combination of paths. When S ⊇ T is available, these same paths are still
present, so at least all of the elements in T should again be considered. However,
if there is some probability that the DM switches from one path or sub-network to
another when encountering a new extended decision problem with the same starting
point, then the size of S \ T may matter.9 As S \ T gets larger, the number of sub-
9Note that, in NC, the probability that the DM “switches” consideration sub-networks across
identical or nested extended decision problems is implicitly 0. We mention this switching behavior
as an empirical possibility in the environments NC is modelling, not as behavior that is consistent
with the MS model itself.
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networks on S relative to T also gets considerably larger, leading to an increased
likelihood that the DM follows some sub-network that is distinct from the one they
follow when T is available. We may thus expect that the likelihood of observing a
violation of Upward Montonicity to be increasing in |S \ T |. We see that this is the
case in Figure 1.4 below. For extended decision problems (x,Ai), for Ai ⊆ Aj, we
define the Distance between Ai and Aj to be equal to |Aj| − |Ai|. In Figure 1.4, we
see that as Distance increases, so too does the likelihood of observing a violation
of Upward Monotonicity (though there is considerable overlap in 95% Confidence
Intervals for these categories).
Figure 1.4: MV by |Aj| − |Ai|, Ai ⊆ Aj
To further investigate the determinants of Upward Monotonicity violations in
our data, Table 1.6 reports the results of several logistic regressions. In each model,
Context is a dummy variable used to indicate whether the observation came from the
Context display, and Female, GPA, and Age are as they were defined previously.
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Reported coefficients are marginal effects from logistic regressions and standard
errors are robust and clustered at the subject level. From Table 1.6, it initially
appears that Distance increases the likelihood of Upward Monotonicity violations
by approximately 0.93 percentage points, per the reported marginal effect in Model
1. However, the entirety of this effect in the aggregate is driven by the tests of
Upward Monotonicity involving A1 ⊆ A2. These available sets are of size 5 and 10,
respectively. Thus, it appears as if Upward Monotonicity violations are ubiquitous
regardless of Distance, provided that the available sets involved are sufficiently large.
Table 1.6: Determinants of Monotonicity Violations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Distance 0.00927∗∗∗ 0.00241 0.00241 0.00241
(0.00153) (0.00178) (0.00178) (0.00178)











Observations 2140 2140 2140 2140
Standard errors in parentheses
Marginal effects from logistic regressions reported
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.4.3.2 Symmetry
Recall that extended decision problems were constructed such that the five
nested available sets, A1 ⊆ A2... ⊆ A5, were each used in two extended decision
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problems: (x,Ai) and (y, Ai), x, y ∈ A1. This results in ten possible tests of sym-
metry for each subject: for each (x,Ai)− (y, Ai) pair of extended decision problems,
we can write two statements of Symmetry to be tested in the data:
y ∈ Γx(Ai) =⇒ Γx(Ai) = Γy(Ai) (1.1)
x ∈ Γy(Ai) =⇒ Γy(Ai) = Γx(Ai) (1.2)
These two conditions are clearly interrelated. If both the hypothesis and implication
of condition 1.1 are satisfied for some observation, then so will those of 1.2, and vice
versa. However, if the hypothesis is not satisfied in one, it is possible that the other
test may fail. In order to rule out double-counting successes (and failures), in all of
the following we exclude tests of condition 1.2 unless condition 1.1 is satisfied only
trivially (i.e. y 6∈ Γx(Ai)). We will thus only include a maximum of five tests of
symmetry per subject.
Out of a possible maximum of 535 tests of deterministic symmetry, there were
401 observations where the hypothesis of this axiom was satisfied. In the aggregate,
84.29% of these observations violated symmetry (Wilcox sign rank p < 0.001 for
H0 : µ = 0). Table 1.7 presents aggregate summary statistics. Hypothesis is a
dummy variable indicating whether the observation satisfied at least one hypothesis
contained in conditions 1.1 and 1.2, Symmetric is a dummy variable indicating
whether the implication in the relevant condition is satisfied (conditional on the
hypothesis being satisfied), and Violation is simply equal to 1 - Symmetric.
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Table 1.7: NC Symmetry Summary Statistics
hypothesis symmetric violation
Mean .7495327 .1571072 .8428928
SD .4336877 .3643564 .3643564
N 535 401 401
At the subject level, we also examine Symmetry violation counts and rates. Of
a total of 5 possible tests of Symmetry per subject, subjects satisfied a hypothesis
of conditions 1.1 or 1.2 for 3.75, on average. Notably, the maximum number of
symmetric observations for a given subject is 3 (out of 5 tests). We can further
examine the distribution of Symmetry violation rates in Figure 1.5. Notably, more
than half of subjects violated MS Symmetry in 100% of their valid tests.
Table 1.8: NC Symmetry Subject Level Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max N
Hypothesis N 3.748 (1.237) 0.000 5.000 107.000
Symmetric N 0.589 (0.672) 0.000 3.000 107.000
Violation N 3.159 (1.175) 0.000 5.000 107.000
Figure 1.5: Cumulative Mean Symmetry Violations per Subject
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We conjecture that one reason Symmetry may fail in this context is that little
information is available regarding an individual option prior to its consideration.
The deterministic MS Symmetry axiom requires much of the DM: conditional on
arriving at some node in the network, the DM follows the same pattern of search for
a given available set. If a given subject then follows different paths of consideration
starting at, say, option y in (x,Ai) and (y, Ai), then their consideration set will
not satisfy symmetry. In the Baseline environment, no information is available to
the subject regarding an individual option prior to its consideration. Thus, if we
make some information available to the subject prior to an object being considered,
this may increase the likelihood of symmetry consideration paths across extended
decision problems. We test this hypothesis by comparing the rate of violations of
Symmetry in Table 1.9. In the Context environment, 81.9% of observations violated
symmetry compared to 87.4% in the Baseline, which runs counter to this hypothesis.
However, this difference is not statistically significant (Wilcox p > 0.10).
Table 1.9: Symmetry Violations by Context
Baseline Context
Mean 0.819 0.874
Std Error 0.026 0.025
N 227 174
Wilcox p > 0.10 for H0 : µBaseline = µContext
While a simple analysis of aggregate Symmetry violations is helpful, it is il-
luminating to consider subject-level mean violations of symmetry. Recall that we
may be including a maximum of five tests of Symmetry for a given subject. Ta-
ble 1.8 presents summary statistics for subject-level data on the number of tests
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per subject (Hypothesis) and violations of MS Symmetry at the subject level. Fur-
ther, from Figure 1.5 we can see that nearly 50% of all subjects violated Symmetry
in each observation where the hypothesis was satisfied. When we decompose this
cumulative distribution function by informational environment, we can see that a
larger proportion of subjects have a 100% Symmetry violation rate in the Context
environment than in the Baseline (42.11% vs 58.33%; Mann-Whitney p < 0.10).
Therefore, on the whole, subjects tend to exhibit behavior more consistent
with Symmetry in the Baseline than when Context is provided, though behavior in
both is largely inconsistent with Symmetry.
Figure 1.6: Cumulative of Per Subject Mean Symmetry Violations by Context
1.4.3.3 Path Connectedness
With 107 subjects and four possible tests of Path Connectedness per subject,
we have a maximum of 428 tests. In the aggregate, only about 23% of possible tests
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were such that the hypothesis of the MS Path Connectedness axiom was satisfied,
making for 99 total tests used, across 67 subjects. Of these 99 tests, roughly 45.5%
were consistent with with Path Connectedness, as reported in Table 1.10.





Wilcoxon signed-rank p < 0.001 for aggregate test of H0 : µ = 1
Thus, taken together, the experimental results pertaining to consideration set
data largely reject the NC deterministic model at the subject level. This leads me
to the next result:
Result 3. Consideration set probabilities are largely inconsistent with the determin-
istic NC model in the experimental data:
• Nearly 80% of observations violate Upward Monotonicity
• Approximately 84% of observations violate Symmetry
• 45.5% of observations violate Path Connectedness
1.5 Random Network Choice
Given that the experimental data is largely inconsistent with the determinis-
tic NC model, I propose a stochastic generalization to be tested against the same
dataset. First, I propose the most general Random Network Choice (RNC) model
and discuss necessary properties that this model imposes on stochastic consideration
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set mappings. These properties are directly related to the deterministic properties
of NC. The RNC model has a feature that leads to an infinite number of representa-
tions for a given set of choice data that is consistent with this model. Guided by the
notion that eliciting a unique network structure from choice or consideration set data
may be desirable in many applications, I present a special case, Pseudo-Markovian
Random Network Choice (PM-RNC hereinafter) which does have a unique repre-
sentation.
I should note that the following section is meant only to provide suitable
modeling alternatives to the NC model that may be consistent with the experimental
dataset contained herein. While the NC model of Masatlioglu and Suleymanov
(2017) is an axiomatic characterization of choice in the deterministic setting, such an
axiomatic characterization of RNC and PM-RNC is beyond the scope of the current
work. Instead, I focus on necessary conditions of consideration set mappings to be
tested against the experimental data.
1.5.1 Random Network Consideration
Let X be a finite set of alternatives with Ω = 2X \∅ as the set of all non-empty
subsets of X. I consider random networks on X. To that end, let g = [X,E, ψ] be
a network consisting of a set of nodes (alternatives) X, edges E, and an incidence
function ψ such that ψ(i, j) ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether nodes i and j have an edge
between them (ψ(i, j) = 1) or not (ψ(i, j) = 0). I restrict ψ to be such that
ψ(i, i) = 1 for all i ∈ X and ψ(i, j) = ψ(j, i). In other words, I restrict attention in
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this model to undirected networks on X. In slight abuse of notation, I’ll use gij to
refer to the value of ψ(i, j) associated with network g, such that gij = 1 indicates
that nodes i and j have an edge between them under g (and vice versa for gij = 0).
Let G be the set of all possible networks on X. Finally, let F be a distribution on
G where I denote the probability that network g occurs by f(g).
To consider subsets S ∈ Ω, I must restrict attention to only those nodes that
are in S. Abusing notation slightly, let g[S] be a node-induced sub-network of g
such that g[S] = [X,E[S], ψ[S]] where E[S] is simply the edge-set E minus all edges
that involve any nodes i 6∈ S and ψ[S] is defined as follows:
ψ[S](i, j) =

ψ(i, j) {i, j} ⊆ S
0 otherwise
(1.3)
Given a network g, i and j are connected under g if there exists an i − j
path in g. That is, they are connected if there exists a sequence (x0, x1, ...xn) with
x0 = i and xn = j where gxk,xk+1 = 1 for all xk and xk+1. Using this terminology,
the definition of what it means for a given subset of nodes to be connected under
some network g directly follows:
Definition 1. A network g ∈ G is said to be T - Connected for some set T ∈ Ω
if
1. t and t′ are connected under g for all t, t′ ∈ T with t 6= t′
2. t and t′ are not connected under g for each t ∈ T and t′ ∈ X \ T
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In other words, a network g is T−Connected if all of the elements in T are
connected to one another under g and no element of T is connected to a path that
leads out of T .
Given an extended problem (x, S) which consists of an alternative set S and
starting point x ∈ S, the DM forms a consideration set stochastically. I begin by
defining a general starting-point contingent random consideration set mapping that
gives the probability that the consideration set is T , given that the starting point is
x under alternative set S:
Definition 2. A function Γx : Ω×Ω→ [0, 1] is a starting-point contingent random
consideration set mapping if the following is true:
Γx(T | S) =

1 if {x} = T = S




Γx(T | S) = 1.
For any given DM, Γx(T | S) gives the probability that set T is considered
when S is available and the DM starts at option x. However, if the DM follows
the specific network consideration procedure explored in this model, these con-
sideration probabilities will have more structure and will be explicitly related to
the distribution F and network of connections g. To this end, I define a random
network consideration set mapping, denoted Gx(T | S). For ease of notation,
let GST = {g ∈ G | g[S] is T-Connected}. The definition of a random network
consideration set mapping is as follows:
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Definition 3. Given a distribution F on G, a random network consideration
set mapping is a function Gx : ΩxΩ→ [0, 1] such that the following is true:
Gx(T | S) =

1 if {x} = T = S
∑
g∈GST
f(g) if {x} ⊆ T ⊆ S
0 otherwise
(1.4)
The extreme cases, where {x} = T = S, where x 6∈ T , or where T 6⊆ S are
trivial. For the non-trivial case, a random network consideration set mapping can
be thought of as being constructed according to a sequential process. First, given
S, restrict attention of networks to g[S]. This is done to include those networks
in Gx(T | S) that are not T-Connected only due to some element t′ ∈ X \ S.
Second, among all g[S] ∈ G, consider those that are T-Connected, further restricting
attention to GST ⊆ G. Finally, given these networks that connect set T under available
set S, the probability that T is considered is simply the sum of the probabilities of
each network occurring.
1.5.2 Necessary Properties
We first look at a natural implication of the definition of T-Connectedness for
some network g[S]. Consider both g[S] and g[S ∪ {a}], for a 6∈ S. A network g[S]
that is T-Connected for some T ⊆ S may or may not stay T-Connected for the same
set under S ∪ {a}. The new element a may be connected to some t ∈ T or it may
not. What is certain, however, is that all of the elements in t remained connected to
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one another when this new element is added. This is formally stated in the following
Lemma. All proofs for this section are contained in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. For any g such that g[S] is T-Connected for some T ⊆ S, g[S ′] is




GS′T ′ for all S ⊆ S ′.
This leads us to our first characteristic of random network consideration set
mappings:10






That random network consideration set mappings should satisfy this condition
should be obvious. If a network with attention restricted to S leads to set T being
considered (i.e. it is part of the sum that makes up Gx(T | S)), then by Lemma 1,
that same network is T ′-Connected for some T ′ ⊆ S ′ with S ⊆ S ′. Then that same
network will appear as part of the sum that makes up some (unique) Gx(T
′ | S ′).
In short, if a network is included on the left-hand side of A1, it will show up on
the right-hand side as well. To see why this expression does not hold with equality,
consider the following example network:
Then when S = {x, y, z} is available, the set T = {x, y, z} is considered with
probability f(g1) when the starting point is x. However, when S
′ = {w, x, y, z} is
available, the probability that T ′ is considered is f(g1) + f(g2). Under g2, node z is
10Note that each of these properties of RNC will be written for general starting-point contingent
consideration set mappings, denoted Γx(T | S). Random network consideration set mappings
(Gx(T | S)) are one particular instance of starting-point contingent random consideration set
mappings and they satisfy the general properties proposed in this section.
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Figure 1.7: Monotonicity Example
connected to x and y through node w. When w is removed, z cannot connect to x
or y under g2, resulting in f(g2) being included on the right-hand side of the RNC
Upward Monotonicity axiom, but not the left hand side when T = {x, y, z}. Notice
that, in this example, had we considered T = {x, y}, the expression would have held
with equality.
This property is clearly a stochastic generalization of the Upward Monotonicity
property of Masatlioglu and Suleymanov (2017). When we restrict attention to
Γx(T | S) ∈ {0, 1}, A1 is equivalent to B1. This, along with the relationship
between other properties of RNC and NC, will be further explored in the proof to
Proposition 1.
I now consider what the effect of changing the starting point might have on
the probability of a given subset being considered. First, it should be clear that
comparing Γx(T | S) to Γy(T | S) for some y 6∈ T is essentially trivial. If x ∈ T , y 6∈
T will imply that T cannot be considered from y, and so Γx(T | S) ≥ Γy(T | S) = 0.
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But this is not informative, since Γx(T | S) ≥ 0 by definition. However, when
switching from x to y while both are in T, we reveal a fundamental characteristic
of random network consideration:
A2. RNC Symmetry: Γx(T |S) = Γy(T |S) for all {x, y} ⊆ T ⊆ S
This comes from the straightforward observation that GST does not depend on the
starting point and will be the same for all t ∈ T . Thus, in the non-trivial case in
Definition 3, which is satisfied by both x and y (since {x, y} ⊆ T ), we are summing
over the same set of networks, resulting in the same consideration probabilities for
each t ∈ T as the starting point.
In a similar fashion to the RNC Upward Monotonicity property above, RNC
Symmetry is a generalization of NC Symmetry in the deterministic case. In the
Symmetry property for NC, the inclusion of y in Γx(S) indicates that y is connected
to x when S is available. When we change the starting point to y, this connection
remains. Contrary to A2, Symmetry in NC restricts the DM to follow the same sub-
network of consideration on S in both extended decision problems (x, S) and (y, S),
such that not only x, but the entirety of Γx(S) must be considered in (y, S), since
we know that y and x exist on the same sub-network. In RNC, it is not required
that the same sub-network be followed by the DM to construct the consideration set
in both extended decision problems. The only requirement is that the probability
of a given sub-network occurring does not depend on the starting point, conditional
on the starting points being included in that sub-network.
Finally, we explore what this random network structure implies about the
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connectedness of certain options. Consider the following: there exists some T ⊆ S
with z ∈ T where Γx(T | S) > 0. This then implies that there exists some network
that connects x to z when S is available which occurs with positive probability. Now
consider the removal of some element y ∈ S. If there still exists some T ′ ⊆ S \ {y}
with z ∈ T ′ and Γx(T ′ | S \ {y}) > 0, we do not learn anything additional about
how x, y, and z are connected, other than that y is not required for there to exist
a path between z and x. However, if there exists no such T ′, we learn that y is
required for there to be a path between x and z. This information illuminates direct
relationships between x and y and between y and z and it leads us to our final
necessary property of random network consideration set mappings:
A3. RNC Path Connectedness If ∃T ⊆ S with z ∈ T such that Γx(T | S) > 0
and 6 ∃T ′ ⊆ S \ {y} such that z ∈ T ′ and Γx(T ′ | S \ {y}) > 0, then the
following must hold:
(a) ∃T ′′ ⊆ S \ {z} with y ∈ T ′′, such that Γx(T ′′ | S \ {z}) > 0
(b) ∃T ′′′ ⊆ S \ {x} with z ∈ T ′′′, such that Γy(T ′′′ | S \ {x}) > 0
The hypothesis, as mentioned previously, reveals that y is required to establish a
connection between z and x. In other words, all such paths that have x and z as
terminal nodes must include y as an intermediate node. Then we can break up
one such path into its x-y and y-z sub-paths. The x-y sub-path survives when z
is removed, which means y is considered with some positive probability when z is
removed (the first implication of the above). Similarly, the y-z sub-path survives
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when x is removed, so z is considered with some positive probability when x is
removed and the starting point is y.
Again, RNC Path Connectedness is a stochastic generalization of Path Con-
nectedness in the deterministic NC model. Thus far, I have claimed that each of A1
- A3 are stochastic generalizations of consideration set properties of NC. The fol-
lowing Proposition captures this notion, with the proof contained in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. If Γx(T | S) is a random consideration set mapping such that i)
Γx(T | S) ∈ {0, 1} for all x ∈ T ⊆ S and ii) Γx satisfies A1 - A3, then Γx(S)
satisfies B1 - B3 where Γx(S) = T for Γx(T | S) = 1.
Finally, it should be clear at this point that RNC consideration set mappings
necessarily exhibit all of the above properties. Proposition 2 captures this idea.
Proposition 2. If a random consideration set mapping has a random network con-
sideration set mapping representation, it satisfies RNC Symmetry, RNC Upward
Monotonicity, and RNC Path Connectedness.
Proof. Suppose a random consideration set mapping Γ has a random network con-
sideration set mapping G:
RNC Symmetry Consider any T ⊂ S with {x, y} ⊆ T and x 6= y. If
Gx(T | S) > 0, then there exists some network g[S] that is T -Connected. Since
y ∈ T , g[S] will also be included in Gy(T | S). Therefore, Gx(T | S) ≤ Gy(T | S).
Gy(T | S) ≤ Gx(T | S) by the same logic. Finally, if Gx(T | S) = 0, then there are
no y ∈ G such that g[S] is T -Connected. This will hold regardless of the starting
point in T , so Gy(T | S) = 0 as well. Then RNC Symmetry holds
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RNC Upward Monotonicity Given Lemma 1, the proof is trivial. With }[S]T ⊆⋃
T ′⊆S′:T⊆T ′
GS′T ′ for all S ⊆ S ′, the statement follows directly from the definition of
Gx(T | S).
RNC Path Connectedness Let T be such that z ∈ T with Gx(T | S) > 0. Then
there exists some g[S] ∈ GST where f(g[S]) > 0. Since 6 ∃T ′ ⊆ S \ {y} with z ∈ T ′
such that Gx(T
′ | S\{y}) > 0, then every path that connects x to z under g[S] must
include y as an intermediate node. To see why this is the case, consider some x-z
path in g[S] that does not include y as an intermediate node. When y is removed
from S, this path remains (since y was not on this path under g[S]) and Gx(T
′ |
S \ {y}) > 0 for T ′ = {j | j is connected to some node on this x-z path in g[S]}
since f(g[S]) > 0. Since there exists an x-y-z path in yS, we can consider each
sub-path independently.
Consider the x-y sub-path. When z is removed from S, this path survives, and
if we let T ′′ = {j ∈ S \ {z} | j is connected to some node on the x-z path in g[S]},
then Gx(T
′′ | S \ {z}) > 0, since f(g[S]) > 0.
By similar logic, Gy(T
′′′ | S\{x}) > 0 for T ′′′ = {j ∈ S\{x} | j is connected to some node on the y-z path in g[S]}.
1.5.3 Choice Rule
The DM is also endowed with an antisymmetric and transitive preference
relation, . Given the consideration set T ⊆ S, after the realization of the random
network process, the DM chooses the  −maximal element of T . We thus define a
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Random Network Choice (or, abusing abbreviations, RNC) as follows:
Definition 4. A choice rule π is a random network choice (RNC) if there
exists a set of networks G on X, a probability distribution over these networks F ,
and an antisymmetric, transitive preference relation  on X, such that:
πy(x | S) =
∑
{x,y}⊆T⊆S
1{x is -best in T}Gy(T | S) (1.5)
where G is a random network consideration set mapping.
1.5.4 Revealed Preference
In general, it may be possible for there to be multiple RNC representations of
a given π. Suppressing notation for X and G, we denote a given RNC representation
using only the distribution over networks and the preference relation, (F,). Given
some choice rule π, we denote the set of possible RNC representations as (F π,π
) = {(F 1,1), ..., (FN ,N)}. Following Masatlioglu et al. (2012) and Lleras et al.
(2017) and erring on the side of being conservative in assessing revealed preference,
we say that “x is revealed preferred to y” (denoted x  y) if x i y for all i such
that (F i,i) ∈ (F π,π).
With the possibility of multiple RNC representations for a given π, under what
conditions can we guarantee that x  y for each representation? It turns out that
a very simple condition captures all aspects of revealed preference.
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Lemma 2. For any RNC π, x is revealed preferred to y if ∃S ⊆ X such that:
πy(x | S) > 0 (1.6)
Given this method to reconstruct  for an RNC π, we then ask whether this
condition is sufficient to reveal preferences completely. We first define the following
binary relations to assist in exploring this idea:
Definition 5. Let P be a binary relation X2 such that xPy if ∃S ⊆ X such that:
πy(x | S) > 0 (1.7)
Further, let PR be the transitive closure of P on X
2.
We utilize this binary relation to obtain the following helpful result:
Lemma 3. For some RNC π, x is revealed preferred to y if, and only if, xPRy.
1.5.4.1 Connection to RAM
As mentioned previously, the random network consideration set mappings of
RNC satisfy a starting-point contingent version of the monotonicity condition laid
out in Cattaneo et al. (2017). We call this condition “Starting-Point Monotonicity”
and it is as follows:
Starting-Point Monotonicity: Γx(T | S) ≤ Γx(T | S \ {a}) (1.8)
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for a 6∈ T . It should be clear that, provided Γx has an RNC representation, it will
satisfy this Starting-Point Monotonicity condition. If an element a is removed from
S that was not in T , we can now include networks in Γx(T | S \ {a}) that were
not T-Connected exclusively because of the element a. Cattaneo et al. (2017) show,
albeit with no starting-point contingent attention, that if some random choice rule
has a RAM representation, preferences can be revealed in the following manner.
Under RAM, x is revealed preferred to y if, and only if, the following holds:
∃S such that πz(x | S) > πz(x | S \ {y}) (1.9)
One might surmise that since RNC satisfies Starting-Point Monotonicity, that pref-
erences could also be revealed using condition 1.9. In this case, we may be missing
some revealed preferences by only considering PR as defined above. Lemma 4 shows
that this worry is unfounded: under RNC, if x and y satisfy condition 1.9, (x, y) ∈ P
as defined above.
Lemma 4. Let π be an RNC and let x and y be such that there exists some set
S ⊇ {x, y, z} such that the following holds:
πz(x | S) > πz(x | S \ {y}) (1.10)
Then (x, y) ∈ P and x is revealed preferred to y.
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1.5.5 Pseudo-Markovian RNC
As mentioned in Section 1.5.4, it is possible that, for a given set of consideration
set or choice data consistent with RNC, there may be multiple (F,) representations
thereof. Consider the following example. The choice probabilities in Table 1.11 come
from an RNC where all possible networks on three options have the same probability
of 1
8
and  is such that x  y  z. Given this choice data, one could work in the
opposite direction, uniquely identifying probabilities of a subset of networks that
are consistent with an RNC representation. As it turns out, in this example, one
cannot uniquely identify probabilities for a subset of these networks given choice
probabilities alone.
Available Set S
{x, y} {x, z} {y, z} {x, y, z}
πz(x | S) - 12 0
5
8
πz(y | S) - 0 12
1
8





πy(x | S) 12 - 0
5
8
πy(y | S) 12 - 1
3
8
Table 1.11: Choice Data for f(g) = 1
8
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To see this starkly, first consider the RNC representation of this choice data
that actually generated these choice probabilities (i.e. F such that f(g) = 1
8
for all
g). Now, consider those networks under which z is isolated or only connected to x,
as displayed in Figure 1.8.
It is easy to see that, for any ε ∈ [0, 1
8
], a newly constructed pair (F ′,) will





if g 6∈ {g1, g2, g3, g4}
1
8
+ ε if g ∈ {g1, g3}
1
8
− ε if g ∈ {g2, g4}
(1.11)
with g1, g2, g3, and g4 as in the figure above. In words, F
′ is simply F adjusted by
ε for some of the networks. Thus, even for this very simple case, the most general
RNC model can lead to an infinite number of plausible representations of some given
π. However, this may not be a desirable property in some empirical environments.
In this section, I consider a stochastic special case of RNC, Pseudo-Markovian RNC
(PM-RNC, hereafter) that does end up exhibiting a unique representation for some
π.
In this special case, we consider only RNC representations of a particular form,
where we add restrictions on F in the following manner:
Definition 6. An RNC (F,) is a Pseudo-Markovian RNC (PM-RNC) if
there exists a matrix µ with entries µij ∈ [0, 1] where for each network g ∈ G, the
probability of g occurring, f(g) can be written as follows:
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[1{gij = 1}µij + 1{gij = 0}(1− µij)] (1.12)
For PM-RNC, we use the notation Mx(T | S) to refer to the RNC Gx under
this particular formulation. Further, it suffices to represent the entire distribution
over networks as a weighted network, with the weight on the connection between
options i and j as µij. We denote a PM-RNC representation as (µ,).
A benefit of considering the special case of PM-RNC is that the distribution
over networks in each PM-RNC representation is unique:
Lemma 5. Let π be a PM-RNC with representations (µπ,π). Then µi = µ̄ for all
(µi,i) representations of π (i.e. µ is unique).
We can build up intuition for this form of a starting point contingent random
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Figure 1.9: Network g with Four Nodes
consideration set mapping by working through the following example:11
Suppose that we are interested in computing Gx(T | S) under the network
in Figure 1.9. Consider Gx({x, y, z} | {w, x, y, z}). The DM starts at option x,
considering node x with probability 1. Consideration of the set {x, y, z} from the
set {w, x, y, z} can then follow any of the T -Connected networks under S, shown in
Figure 1.10.
11Note that, in all figures, µij = 0 is represented as the absence of a connection between nodes
i and j.
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Figure 1.10: Networks that generate Consideration Set {x, y, z}
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In each case, we consider the probability that consideration spills over from
node x to nodes y and z, but not to node w (hence its inclusion in each of the
networks in Figure 1.10). Taking g1 as an example, we then construct f(g1) by
multiplying together µxy and µyz (consideration spills over from node x to y, then
from y to z), then (1 − µxz) (consideration does not spillover from x to z or vice
versa), and finally by (1−µxw) and (1−µzw) (consideration does not spillover from
x or z to w).
We can then calculate the probability of the consideration set being {x, y, z}
as follows:
Gx({x, y, z} | {x, y, z, w}) = f(g1) + f(g2) + f(g3) + f(g4)
= µxyµyz · (1− µxz) · (1− µxw)(1− µzw)
+µxzµyz · (1− µxy) · (1− µxw)(1− µzw)
+µxyµxz · (1− µyz) · (1− µxw)(1− µzw)
+µxyµxzµyz · (1− µxw)(1− µzw) (1.13)
We can thus use the above procedure to calculate Gx(T | {x, y, z, w}) for any
T . But what happens when we add an element to the grand set of alternatives?
Now consider the following example:
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Figure 1.11: Network g′ with Five Nodes
When inspecting the same consideration set T = {x, y, z} under {x, y, z, w, v},
we have to include the possibility that consideration now spills over to node v from
node z. In this case, we use the following constrained sub-networks of G′:
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Figure 1.12: Networks that generate Consideration Set {A,B,C}
Looking just at nodes {x, y, z} and connection weights between them, we can
see that this is identical to the networks in Figure 1.10. This is straightforward, as
nothing has changed in connection weights within the set {x, y, z}. Additionally, in
each network displayed in Figure 1.12, we have to account for the possibility that
consideration spills over to node w, just as we did for the networks in Figure 1.10.
However, we now have to consider the possibility that node v is considered once z
is considered. For this reason, we can write Gx({x, y, z} | {x, y, z, w, v}) as follows:
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Gx({x, y, z} | {x, y, z, w, v}) = f(g′1) + f(g′2) + f(g′3) + f(g′4)
= (1− µzv)[f(g1) + f(g2) + f(g3) + f(g4)]
= (1− µzv)Gx({x, y, z} | {x, y, z, w}) (1.14)
Then as we inspect the same potential consideration set T in larger and larger sets,
the probability of set T being considered aggregates by including the probability
that none of the added alternatives are considered, accounting for all links between
the added alternatives and the set T . Notice that in the above, we don’t consider
any connection weights between alternatives w and v in any of the networks used to
construct Gx({x, y, z} | {x, y, z, w, v}). This is intuitive: since we aren’t considering
cases where alternative w is considered, we never need to account for the possibility
that consideration spills over from w to v (even though there is a positive probability
of this happening under the network g′, represented by µwv).
From the above examples, one can intuit an additional property of PM-RNC
consideration set mappings beyond those of the general RNC case. The networks
enumerated in Figures 1.10 and 1.12 should illuminate the fact that RNC Symmetry
holds under PM-RNC. However, a comparison between the examples in Figures 1.9
and 1.11 suggests a more strict form of monotonicity than that required in RNC
Upward Monotonicity. This characteristic is given below:








Proposition 3. If an RNC Gx has a PM-RNC representation, it satisfies PM-RNC
Binary Separability.
1.6 Results: Random Network Choice
In this section, tests of the more general stochastic properties of RNC are con-
ducted. For each test, in order to generate consideration probabilities, observations
are aggregated over all subject, treating each observation as if it came from a repre-
sentative subject who encountered each problem multiple times. Thus, for a given
extended decision problem (x, S) and for some consideration set T ⊆ S, Γx(T | S)
was set to be equal to the frequency of consideration set T observed in the full data
set, conditional on the extended decision problem being (x, S).
1.6.1 RNC Monotonicity
For each T observed with strictly positive probability, RNC Monotoncity is
constructed by comparing Γx(T ) to the sum of probabilities over supersets of T
for some presented superset of S, offering a direct test of the RNC Monotonicity
property. Table 1.12 presents the aggregate mean violations of RNC Monotonicity.
Many consideration sets T are feasible for a given (x, S) extended decision problem,
in that they are such that on T ⊆ S, but they do not occur with positive proba-
bility. Then RNC Monotonicity will, by default, be satisfied trivially. While these
observations are technically consistent with RNC Monotonicity, they are excluded in
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the column labeled “NT”, for “Non-Trivial” in Table 1.12. In the aggregate, 12.5%
of all observations result in a violation of RNC Monotonicity, compared to 79.8%
when testing against the NC model. Even when only considering “Non-Trivial”
observations, the rate of Monotonicity violations is considerably lower under RNC
than under NC at 39.7% (Wilcoxon signed-rank p < 0.01 for H0 : µ = 0.8).
Table 1.12: Aggregate Test of RNC Monotonicity
All NT
Mean 0.125 0.397
Std Error 0.000 0.000
N 9974 3132
Wilcoxon signed-rank p < 0.01 for aggregate test of H0 : µ = 0 for both All and NT
Mann-Whitney p < 0.01 for H0 : µAll = µNT
NT results exclude observations where Γx(T | S) = 0
Considering the presence of RNC Monotonicity violations even when “trivial”
observations are included, I further investigate the determinants of these violations.
For a given (x, S) and T pairing, one can imagine several measures as generalizations
of the “Distance” measure used in Section 1.4.3.1. First, conditional on S, larger
consideration sets T leave less room for supersets to be included in the right-hand
side of the RNC Monotonicity expression. Larger sets T more closely approach
full consideration of the set S, leaving less room for non-trivial observations of
supersets of T under S ′ ⊇ S. Thus, we may expect that violations are more likely
to occur as S \ T increases in size across observations. Second, when comparing to
some set S ′ ⊇ S, the size of S ′ \ T relative to T may have a similar effect. These
factors are considered in Table 1.13. Additional options in S \ T actually increase
the likelihood of a violation occurring by 0.299 percentage points each, though this
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effect is only marginally significant. Consistent with the hypothesis presented above,
each additional option in S ′ \ T decreases the likelihood of a violation occurring by
2.57 percentage points each. This result is further confirmed in Figure 1.13, where
average RNC monotonicity violations are plotted by quartile of |S ′ \ T |. This leads
to an interesting comparative result relative to NC. Recall that in Section 1.4.3.1,
it is shown that monotonicity violations were ubiquitous once the distance between
S and S ′ became sufficiently large. Here, the opposite is true: holding the size of
T constant, as options are added to S ′, RNC Monotonicity violations become less
common.
Table 1.13: Determinants of RNC Monotonicity Violations
Model 1
|S \ T | 0.00299∗
(0.00175)
|S ′ \ T | -0.0257∗∗∗
(0.00185)
Observations 9974
Standard errors in parentheses
Marginal effects from logistic regression specifications
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
While none of these results on the determinants of RNC Monotonicity Vio-
lations are implied by the RNC model directly - clearly the RNC model implies
no violations of RNC Monotonicity at all - I view the analysis above as reasonable
starting points for further generalizations of network consideration in the stochastic
case. It is possible that generalizing RNC further to include adaptive consideration
behavior, directed random network structures, and/or other features may directly
imply the results above.
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Figure 1.13: RNC Monotonicity Violations by |S ′ \ T | Quartile
1.6.2 RNC Symmetry
While the subject-level data reveals a number of violations of the deterministic
Symmetry property in NC, it may be possible that aggregate consideration set
probabilities are consistent with RNC. This is tested using two methodologies: first,
by conditional logit regression estimation and second, by individual difference-in-
means tests for each pair of consideration set and available set.
Initially, each observation used for the conditional logistic regression specifica-
tions consists of a subject, an extended decision problem (i.e. a starting point that
is an element of {x, y} and an available set Ai), and the set of options considered by
the subject (i.e. the observed consideration set). A test of RNC Symmetry consists
of a test of whether the probability of a given consideration set being observed is
dependent on the starting point in {x, y}, given that the consideration set contains
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both starting points. To this end, for each of the five available sets used for the Sym-
metry extended decision problems, I treat each observed unique consideration set
that includes both starting points as an “available consideration set” that the sub-
ject may then “choose”. Thus, a case for the purposes of these conditional logistic
regressions is defined as a subject - available set pair, with the unique consideration
sets which include both starting points observed in the data for that available set
across all subjects constituting the “available consideration sets” from which this
subject can “choose.” Note that, for a given case, each of these consideration sets
is offered to the subject as an available consideration set twice: once for each ex-
tended decision problem that utilized the available set for this case. This is done to
allow for the possibility that the same consideration set was chosen by an individual
subject in both extended decision problems that utilize the available set for this
case. Thus, in these conditional logit specifications, the dependent variable Choose
indicates whether the “available consideration set” was “chosen” for an individual
case. The lone dependent variable, Starting Point, is a binary variable that takes
the value 1 when the starting point for the observation is y and 0 otherwise.
Of the 553 distinct consideration sets observed for the 10 extended decision
problems constructed to test the Symmetry property, 235 were such that {x, y} ⊆ T .
Results at the aggregate level are displayed in Table 1.14. When we aggregate over
all possible available sets (N ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, 25}), we see that there is no relationship
between the starting point and whether a consideration set is “chosen.” This result
is robust to whether a separate conditional logit regression is run on each available
set individually, as can be see in Table 1.15. There are thus broad, early indications
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that consideration set formation is consistent with RNC Symmetry.






Standard errors in parentheses
Odds ratios from conditional logit regression specifications
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.15: RNC Symmetry Regressions
N = 5 N = 10 N = 15 N = 20 N = 25
Choose
Starting Point -0.252 -0.0155 -0.155 -0.0216 0.134
(0.168) (0.176) (0.186) (0.208) (0.232)
Observations 776 5100 13448 11088 7670
Standard errors in parentheses
Odds ratios from conditional logit regression specifications
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
While aggregate results support RNC Symmetry according to these condi-
tional logistic regression models, it is possible that additional information provided
to the subject in the Context environment might have an effect on RNC Symme-
try, especially in light of the slight, though statistically insignificant, difference in
symmetry violations at the individual level between the Baseline and Context en-
vironments. The same regression specification used in Table 1.15 and is conducted
separately for each environment in Tables 1.16 and 1.17. This reveals a significant,
though mixed, effect of the starting point in certain treatment - N combinations.
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Table 1.16: RNC Symmetry Regressions: Baseline
N = 5 N = 10 N = 15 N = 20 N = 25
Choose
Starting Point -0.319 -0.358 -0.407∗ -0.437 -0.443
(0.232) (0.229) (0.236) (0.274) (0.302)
Observations 400 3000 8036 6006 4602
Standard errors in parentheses
Odds ratios from conditional logit regression specifications
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.17: RNC Symmetry Regressions: Context
N = 5 N = 10 N = 15 N = 20 N = 25
Choose
Starting Point -0.178 0.527∗ 0.288 0.614∗ 1.147∗∗∗
(0.244) (0.291) (0.312) (0.345) (0.434)
Observations 376 2100 5412 5082 3068
Standard errors in parentheses
Odds ratios from conditional logit regression specifications
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Each consideration set observed in the data individually can be examined
directly by looking at Γx(T | S) and Γy(T | S) for each T ⊆ S combination. If
the frequency of T conditional on S being available is significantly different between
Γx and Γy, this is a violation of RNC Symmetry. We thus conduct a Wilcoxon
sign-rank test on each of the Y consideration sets where {x, y} ⊂ T . Note, however,
that if a given T is only ever chosen once in the entire sample, a sign-rank test will
result in an insignificant difference by starting point.12 A relatively conservative
approach is used here, where only those consideration sets that occur with non-
trivial frequency, defined as “having occurred more than once across all 10 symmetry
extended decision problems,” are included in this analysis. Of the 235 distinct
consideration sets observed in these extended problems that satisfy {x, y, } ∈ T , 183
12Consideration set - available set pair has 214 observations, 107 for each starting point. If the
consideration set only occurs once, the sign-rank test will result in p > 0.10.
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occurred only once. The remaining consideration sets are then used to construct
Γx(T | S) and Γy(T | S) for each S such that T appeared at least once across (x, S)
and (y, S). This resulted in 69 separate tests of T ⊂ S pairs.13 Of these 69 tests,
only 5 resulted in a statistically significant rejection of H0 : Γx(T | S) = Γy(T | S),
only 7.23%. We therefore find robust support for RNC Symmetry regardless of the
test method (conditional logit vs. rank-sum at the consideration set - available set
pair level).
1.6.3 RNC Path Connectedness
Finally, RNC Path Connectedness is tested by systematically considering sub-
sets of the experimental data according to whether they satisfy the hypotheses of
RNC Path Connectedness for each potential case. Recall that, in the construc-
tion of the extended decision problems used to test Path Connectedness in NC, four
different cases resulted from varying the option used in each extended decision prob-
lem. Table 1.18 presents the results of aggregate tests of RNC Path Connectedness
separately for each case.
Recall that under the RNC Path Connectedness, the hypothesis of this prop-
erty would be endogenously determined by consideration set data in the experiment:
∃T ⊆ S with z ∈ T such that Γx(T | S) > 0 and 6 ∃T ′ ⊆ S \ {y} such that z ∈ T ′
and Γx(T
′ | S \ {y}) > 0,
In order to structure tests of RNC Path Connectedness, I then consider, for each
13Note that this is greater than 235−183 = 52. This is due to the fact that several consideration
sets were observed under multiple available sets.
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case, the largest number of observations such that this hypothesis is satisfied when
aggregating over subjects to construct each Γx(T | S). Then N in Table 1.18 can
be interpreted as the number of subjects (out of 107) who satisfy the particular
hypothesis of the case under consideration. Cases 2 and 4 are clearly less stringent
tests of RNC Path Connectedness; all 107 subjects satisfy the hypothesis of these
cases.
The implication portion of the RNC Path Connectedness property is framed
around “the existence” of some set that includes z (y) and is considered with positive
probability. This is equivalent to a positive frequency of z(y) being observed for the
observations considered in each case. Then for each case, the fact that Prob(Y ) and
Prob(Z) are positive in Table 1.18 indicates that the dataset, as a whole, is consistent
with this property. This should not be a surprise, even considering the fact that there
are non-trivial violations of other properties of RNC consideration sets documented
in this section. RNC Path Connectedness, like Path Connectedness, is a relatively
weak requirement to impose on consideration set probabilities.
Table 1.18: RNC Path Connectedness
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
Prob(Y) Prob(Z) Prob(Y) Prob(Z) Prob(Y) Prob(Z) Prob(Y) Prob(Z)
Mean 0.327 0.327 0.925 0.561 0.227 0.091 0.879 0.178
Std Error 0.068 0.068 0.026 0.048 0.045 0.031 0.032 0.037
N 49 49 107 107 88 88 107 107
Result 4. Aggregate consideration set frequencies are largely consistent with RNC:
• Only 12.5% of all observations violate RNC Monotonicity
• Fewer than 8% of all consideration sets observed in the aggregate data violate
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RNC Symmetry
• Aggregate results are wholly consistent with RNC Path Connectedness
1.6.4 PM-RNC Binary Separability
In addition to RNC Monotonicity, RNC Symmetry, and RNC Path Connect-
edness, consideration set data consistent with PM-RNC necessarily must satisfy the
additional Binary Separability property. Results of tests thereof using this experi-
mental data are presented in this section.
Notice that Binary Separability will necessarily result in consideration set
probabilities such that Γx(T | S ∪ S ′) is weakly less than Γx(T | S), since PM-RNC
simply takes the latter and multiplies it by the product of a number of probabilities
between 0 and 1, inclusive. A clear violation of Binary Separability would thus con-
sist of an observation of Γx(T | S ∪S ′) > Γx(T | S). Aggregate tests of violations of
this type, which I term “First-Order Binary Separability Violations,” are presented
in Table 1.19.
Table 1.19: Aggregate Test of First Order PM-RNC Binary Separability Violations
All NT
Mean 0.122 0.282
Std Error 0.003 0.007
N 9974 4308
Wilcoxon signed-rank p < 0.01 for aggregate test of H0 : µ = 0 in each case
NT: Γx(T | S) = Γx(T | S′) = 0 excluded
In the aggregate, 12.2% of observations constitute first-order Binary Separa-
bility violations, with the proportion of such violations jumping to 28.2% when we
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isolate attention to only “Non-Trivial” observations as defined above.
In order to provide a more finely-tuned test of Binary Separability, the expres-
sion provided in the PM-RNC Binary Separability property is constructed for each
observation that does not constitute such a first-order Binary Separability Violation.
Recall this expression:





Γz({z} | {t, z})
In the above, the construction of Γx(T | S ∪ S ′) and Γx(T | S) is straightforward
and conducted as in previous analyses in this section. However, the construction





Γz({z} | {t, z}), is not so clear, given
that subjects are never presented with an extended decision problem of the form
(z, {t, z}) for any pair of options. In the PM-RNC model, Γz({z} | {t, z}) is clearly
equal to 1−µzt, or the probability that consideration does not spill over from z to t
in the binary comparison. Thus, in order to construct this nested product, I utilize
an estimated 1 − µzt as a proxy for Γz({z} | {t, z}). For each pair of options (i, j)
presented to subjects in the experiment, an observed µij is estimated by calculating
the frequency with which subjects navigate from i to j, or from j to i, conditional
on a link being provided in the experimental interface. Note that this frequency is
across all observed links between i and j, regardless of the direction followed, so that
the resulting estimated weighted network of µij is undirected. Only those estimated
µij which were statistically significantly greater than 0 at the α = 0.10 level were
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taken as non-zero frequencies.14
Table 1.20: Aggregate Test of Binary Separability Violations
All NT
Mean 0.349 0.989
Std Error 0.005 0.002
N 8759 3093
Wilcoxon signed-rank p < 0.01 for aggregate test of H0 : µ = 0 in each case
NT: Γx(T | S) = Γx(T | S′) = 0 excluded
Mean direct Binary Separability violations are reported in Table 1.20. Results
in Table 1.20 are presented only for those observations that did not constitute a
first-order Binary Separability violation. Across all such observations, 34.9% violate
Binary Separability directly along with a staggering 98.9% of Non-Trivial observa-
tions (as defined above). The latter result is not particularly surprising, since a
“violation” as defined in this section does not allow for additional noise in consid-
eration probabilities beyond that directly implied by the strong form of PM-RNC:
unless the realized left-hand side of the Binary Separability expression was exactly
equal to the estimated right-hand side, the observation was coded as a Binary Sepa-
rability violation. A more thorough investigation of Binary Separability would thus
necessitate analyzing the size of errors in estimation.
Table 1.21 reports the summary statistics of two measures of errors in the
estimation of these Binary Separability expressions, compared to the distribution of
positive Γx(T | S ∪S ′) for reference. In an abuse of notation for the sake of brevity,
in Table 1.21 and in this discussion, let Γ refer to Γx(T | S ∪ S ′) and Γ̂ refer to





Γz({z} | {t, z}). Then Γ−Γ̂Γ gives the normalized
14Each µij was tested using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
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difference between the two expressions, conditional on positive Γ, and Γ̂ | Γ = 0
gives the estimated right-hand side expression, conditional on Γ being equal to zero.
Both of these measures of Binary Separability errors are presented only for those
observations where a violation is observed.
Table 1.21: Binary Separability Error Size Summary Statistics
Γ Γ−Γ̂
Γ
Γ̂ | Γ = 0
Mean .011 .031 .005
SD .008 .759 .004
N 1427 178 2881
p1 .009 -3.591 .000
p25 .009 -.143 .002
p50 .009 .253 .005
p75 .009 .471 .007
p99 .047 .938 .016
Notes:
Γ s.t. Γx(T | S ∪ S ′) > 0
First compare the first two columns for Γ and Γ−Γ̂
Γ
. Note that the interquartile
range deflation rate of Γ (given by Γ−Γ̂
Γ
for p50) is −0.143 to 0.471 implying that
there is considerable spread in the PM-RNC Binary Separability estimate of Γ. This
implies that PM-RNC Binary Separability is likely too strong an assumption for the
given experimental data. However, the distribution of Γ̂ | Γ = 0 appears to closely
resemble that of Γ suggesting that Γ̂ may yet still present a reasonable estimate of
Γ for out-of-sample consideration sets; it’s possible that because the experimental
data includes a considerable number of observations of Γ = 0, that PM-RNC Binary
Separability is failed because of data limitations. There are thus only mixed, and
generally negative, results concerning the fit of PM-RNC Binary Separability to the
experimental data set. I view further exploration of PM-RNC Binary Separability
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using a large field dataset to be a worthwhile avenue for future research on this
topic.
1.7 Discussion
The NC and RNC models can be applied to many settings, but in this section
I focus on one particular application of note: empirical studies of the effects of
advertising. As mentioned previously, Shapiro (2018),Sahni (2016), and Lewis and
Nguyen (2015) report evidence of so-called “positive spillovers in advertising,” where
attention spills over from an advertised good to similar competitor goods. A common
refrain in studies such as these is that the positive externalities resulting from these
attention spillovers lead to an under-allocation of advertising in the competitive
equilibrium. Indeed, Shapiro (2018) presents a supply-side model and accompanying
estimates which support this claim.
However, an implicit assumption in the models commonly assumed in the
above studies is that these positive attention spillovers affect competing goods at
the category level. When this framework is rooted in an RNC model setup, it can
be easily seen that a more general treatment of these spillovers as coming from a
generalized random network structure will result in more ambiguous welfare impli-
cations.
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Figure 1.14: An example RNC network
1.7.1 A Simple Advertising Model
Consider a simple RNC Advertising Game with firms A, B, and C, each
producing a single good (which I will also denote A, B, and C, respectively), and
each choosing whether advertise or not, such that the strategy for each firm is
σi ∈ {0, 1}. Advertising (σi = 1) involves a fixed cost of c > 0, which is identical
across firms. There is a continuum of DMs of mass 1, each of whom exhibits limited
stochastic attention according to the RNC model. The distribution over possible
networks on X = {A,B,C} is given in Figure 1.14, with a restriction on α such
that α ∈ [0, 1
2
].
The DM’s choice of any firm leads to the same level of utility, so I assume
that a DM who considers more than one firm is equally likely to choose any of the
firms they consider.15 Further, since RNC is starting-point dependent, I assume
that DMs set their starting points based on the firms that are advertising. If more
than one firm advertises, the mass of DMs is divided equally among all those firms
who advertise. The sequence of the game then works as follows:
15Note that this random choice procedure is indeed a departure from the choice procedure
used in RNC. This is done for tractability in this particular application and is of no particular
consequence to the main point under discussion.
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1. Firms simultaneously choose whether to advertise or not
2. DMs observe who advertises and sets a firm as their starting point with equal
probability among all those who advertise
(a) If no firm advertises, DMs consider no firm and choose nothing (resulting
in 0 profit for all firms)
3. DMs form stochastic consideration set mappings according to their starting
points and the distribution over networks on the set of firms
4. DMs choose each firm that they consider with equal probability
5. Firms realize profit, which is simply the mass of DMs who choose their firm
minus the fixed cost of advertising (if the firm chose to advertise)
For a given network g, let Ni(g) represent the set of firms connected to firm i
under g by some path (i.e. firm i’s “neighbors”). Given a strategy profile σ, let the
set of firms who advertise under σ be equal to σa. Then for a given strategy profile








− c · σi (1.15)
Given this setup, it is straightforward to show that there exists a non-empty
subset of the α−c parameter space that lead to i) σ∗ = (1, 0, 1) as a Nash Equilibrium
and ii) σ′ = (0, 1, 0) not as a Nash Equilibrium, where profit is strictly higher under
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σ′. This is captured in the following proposition, with the proof included in the
Appendix:
Proposition 4. In the RNC Advertising Game with parameters α, β, and c, such
that (α, β, c) is in the unit cube, there exist non-empty subsets of the parameter space
where:
1. σ∗ = (1, 0, 1) is supported as a Nash Equilibrium
2. σ′ = (0, 1, 0) is not supported as a Nash Equilibrium
3. Aggregate profit under σ′ is higher than under σ∗
This proposition then tells us that the welfare properties of advertising in such
an environment will depend on the structure of distribution in the RNC limited
consideration on the part of the consumers. In particular, the “category” spillover
approach implicitly assumed in previous work in the marketing body of literature is
nested in the RNC Advertising Game where α = 0. When this is true, advertising
will never be undertaken by multiple firms simultaneously in equilibrium. Indeed,
for sufficiently high costs (c > 1
3
), no firm will advertise. This is a stark example
of the free-riding effect documented in Shapiro (2018), but is only implied by a
narrow interpretation of attention spillovers as spillovers occurring equally across an
entire category of goods. In the more general case described here, positive attention
spillovers actually result in an over-allocation of advertising relative to an alternative
allocation with the same levels of revenue.
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1.8 Conclusion
In this work, I present a the results of an experiment designed to test for
the validity of the deterministic Network Choice (NC) model of Masatlioglu and
Suleymanov (2017). Overall inconsistency of the data with NC led to a proposed
stochastic generalization thereof in RNC and PM-RNC. These models have appli-
cations in the realms of choice architecture, web platform search optimization, and
advertising. In the latter case, I view a significant contribution of this work as
illuminating a possible model for positive spillovers in advertising behavior, which
highlights the need to examine product network structures empirically, especially
for the purposes of welfare analysis.
It should be noted that RNC is only one version of a stochastic generalization
of NC. Indeed, Cattaneo et al. (2017) present another version in which the network
is deterministic and starting points are stochastically determined. While the experi-
mental data presented herein was predominantly consistent with RNC, there remain
non-trivial violations thereof to be investigated in either further generalizations of
RNC or other attempts at modelling stochastic network consideration. This is likely
a fruitful avenue for future research.
Additionally, the mixed results of the PM-RNC model, combined with the
RNC results, suggest that there is a nested model of network consideration with
more structure than RNC (which potentially leads to a unique representation), but
less than that of PM-RNC. Future theoretical research can likely shed light on the
structure and validity of models between the two.
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Chapter 2: The Relevance of Irrelevant Information
Co-authored with Emel Filiz-Ozbay and Erkut Ozbay
2.1 Introduction
In many decision problems, unavailable options along with irrelevant attributes
are presented to decision makers. For example, a search on Amazon.com for tele-
visions yields 1,239 different alternatives, 753 of which are unavailable at the time
of search.1 Additionally, these televisions are described by a great number of at-
tributes: e.g. Refresh Rates, backlighting vs. no backlighting, size dimensions,
availability of Wi-Fi connectivity, SMART vs non-SMART functions, number and
types of inputs, etc. Many of these attributes may be irrelevant to some decision
makers.
Consider some additional examples of unavailable alternatives: In a restaurant
menu, unavailable items may still be listed in the menu with a sold out note. A health
insurance buyer will go over the insurance plans, some of which she is not qualified
to purchase. A local event ticket website may list events that are sold-out. Also,
consider some more examples of irrelevant attributes: Insurance coverage for care
1Site accessed 02/02/2017.
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related to pregnancy may be presented to someone who could never get pregnant.
The US Food and Drug Administration requires standardized nutrition label on
food and beverage packages including fat, cholesterol, protein, and carbohydrate
even when they are 0%, such as for a bottled water. Smartphones will list available
service providers, even though this set will not vary across available smartphones.2
From the perspective of classical rational choice theory, decision makers have free
disposal of irrelevant information: they can costlessly ignore unavailable options
and irrelevant attributes, and hence the presentation of such irrelevant information
would not lead to different choices than those made when it is not presented. We
experimentally demonstrate that the presentation set matters, providing evidence
that the free disposal of irrelevant information is a non-trivial assumption in many
contexts.
Our experiment is designed to test the effects of presenting irrelevant informa-
tion in two dimensions. In a differentiated product setting, the decision problems
presented to subjects vary according to a) the presentation of options in a set of
alternatives that can never be chosen (hereinafter referred to as unavailable options)
and b) the presentation of attributes that have no value (i.e. that enter into a lin-
ear utility function with an attribute-level coefficient of zero; hereinafter referred
to as irrelevant attributes). We find significant evidence that the presence of both
unavailable options and irrelevant attributes increases the frequency of sub-optimal
choice, but that adding one without the other (i.e. unavailable options with no
2An attribute that does not vary across available options may be utility relevant, but it is
certainly not decision relevant information in that it does not meaningfully distinguish one good
from another.
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irrelevant attributes or irrelevant attributes with no unavailable options) does not.
Furthermore, motivated by the variation in online shopping websites allowing
consumers to sort on the products based on the attributes they consider relevant, as
well as allowing them to exclude the unavailable alternatives, we ask if individuals
are willing to pay to reduce the amount of irrelevant information presented to them.
We show that subjects are willing to pay significant positive amounts not to see
unavailable alternatives or irrelevant information. Such a payment is mainly due
to the reduction in mistakes and time costs caused by the presence of unavailable
options and irrelevant attributes. Nevertheless, individuals may have a “preference
for simplicity” in the presentation of information implying an additional cost, a
cognitive cost of ignoring the irrelevant information. In order to identify such a
cognitive cost, we analyze the willingness to pay (WTP) of the subjects who always
chose optimally and who experience no additional time costs in the presence of
unavailable options and irrelevant attributes. Our results indicate that even these
subjects are willing to pay positive amounts to change the presentation set.
To our knowledge, unavailable alternatives have only been studied in the con-
text of the decoy effect, which is the presentation of an alternative that increases
the preference for a target alternative. Although in a typical experiment on decoys,
the decoy alternative is available in the choice set, Soltani et al. (2012) showed that
displaying an inferior good during an evaluation stage, but making it unavailable
at the selection stage, also generates the decoy effect. Also, the phantom decoy
alternatives that are superior to another target option, but unavailable at the time
of choice, increases the preference for the inferior target option (see e.g. Farquhar
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and Pratkanis (1993)). The crucial difference between the decoy effect experiments
and our experiment is that in our setup the unavailable alternative does not create
a reference point for another alternative, hence it allows us to directly investigate
the impact of the presentation set.
Our experiment also complements the experimental literature investigating
the effects of relevant information on choice optimality. In particular, Caplin et al.
(2011) find that additional (available) options and increased “complexity” (addi-
tional relevant attributes in our context) lead to increased mistake rates. Also,
Reutskaja et al. (2011) present evidence from an eye-tracking experiment that sub-
jects are unable to optimize over an entire set (given a large enough alternative
set), but can optimize quite well over a subset (see also Gabaix et al. (2006)). One
contribution of our work herein is to show that a similar effect is present for adding
unavailable alternatives and increasing the number of irrelevant attributes.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that existing bounded rationality models that
are capable of explaining the sub-optimal decisions build on the available alterna-
tives and the relevant attributes. For example, in the limited consideration models,
the DM creates a “consideration set” from the available set of alternatives and then
chooses from the maximal element of the “consideration set” according to some ra-
tional preference relation (see e.g. Masatlioglu et al. (2012), Manzini and Mariotti
(2007; 2012; 2014), and Lleras et al. (2017)). Also, according to the boundedly ratio-
nal model that focuses on attributes, the salience theory of choice, certain relevant
attributes may appear to be “more salient” to a DM than others, causing them to
be overweighted in the decision-making process (see Bordalo et al. (2012), Bordalo
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et al. (2013), and Bordalo et al. (2016)). Our results highlight that the DM consid-
ers not only the alternative set and the relevant attributes but also the presentation
set in which unavailable options and the irrelevant attributes are presented. The
presentation of a decision problem can be viewed as a “frame” as in Salant and
Rubinstein (2008). However, if the DM chooses the best option when the presen-
tation set is simple, but chooses a subotimal option by using a boundedly rational
model, such as a model of satisficing as in Simon (1955), when the presentation set
is more complex, such an extended choice function induces a choice correspondence
that cannot be described as the maximization of a transitive, binary relation. We
discuss this formally in Section 2.5.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the design
of the experiments in detail. Section 2.3 presents the experimental results. Section
2.5 discusses our results in light of extant theory and suggests a “presentation set”
approach to modelling choice and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Experimental Procedure
The experiments were run at the Experimental Economics Lab at the Univer-
sity of Maryland (EEL-UMD). All participants were undergraduate students at the
University of Maryland. The data was collected in 14 sessions and there were two
parts in each session. No subject participated in more than one session. Sessions
lasted about 90 minutes each. The subjects answered forty decision problems in
Part 1, and a subject’s willingness to pay to eliminate unavailable options and irrel-
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evant attributes were elicited in Part 2. In each session the subjects were asked to
sign a consent form first and then they were given written experimental instructions
(provided in Appendix C.9) which were also read to them by the experimenter. The
instructions for Part 2 were given after Part 1 of the experiment was completed.
The experiment is programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All amounts in
the experiment were denominated in Experimental Currency Units (ECU). The final
earnings of a subject was the sum of her payoffs in ten randomly selected decision
problems (out of forty) in Part 1, her payoffs in two decision problems she answered
in Part 2, the outcome of the Becker et al. (1964) (BDM) mechanism in Part 2,
and the participation fee of $7. The payoffs in the experiment were converted to
US dollars at the conversion rate of 10 ECU = 1 USD. Cash payments were made
at the conclusion of the experiment in private. The average payments were $27.90
(including a $7 participation fee).
Each decision problem in the experiment asked the subjects to choose from five
available options and each option had five relevant attributes. Each attribute of an
option was an integer from {1,2,..., 9} and it could be negative or positive. The value
of an option for a subject was the sum of its attributes.3 The subjects knew that
their payoff from a decision problem would be the value of their chosen option if that
decision problem was selected for payment at the end of the experiment. Figure 2.1
provides an example of both an available option and an unavailable option presented
to the subjects (see Appendix C.9 for examples of the decision screen presented to
3A similar design wherein the value of an option is the sum of its displayed attributes is used
in Caplin et al. (2011).
82
subjects in each decision problem). Note that the header of each column indicates
whether an attribute enters to the option value as a positive or negative integer
(plus or minus sign). Whether a column should be added, subtracted, or ignored
when calculating the value of an option was only indicated in this header row, so this
information had to be continually referenced as the subject considered options at
lower positions on the screen. In some decision problems, some of the attributes did
not enter the value of an option and those were indicated by zero at the header.4 In
Figure 2.1, there are ten attributes with a zero in the header and this means that the
option had ten irrelevant attributes which did not affect the value of the option for
the subjects. In a given decision problem, there were either five relevant attributes
(each one with either positive or negative integer value from {1, 2, . . . , 9}) or fifteen
attributes where five of them were relevant and ten of them were irrelevant. The
value of an option was the sum of its positive and negative attributes and it was
a randomly generated positive number to guarantee that the subjects will not lose
money by choosing an option.
Figure 2.1: Options with 5 Relevant and 10 Irrelevant Attributes
+ + 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 0 + 0 0 - 0
 Option 1 three four three one seven four four two six two eight five two six one
Option 2 one eight two six one five nine two six two eight three one seven nine
Regardless of the type of decision problem, the matrix of information presented
to the subject took up the entire screen. This design was chosen to abstract away
from possible confounds that lie in the way that information is presented. No matter
4Our design of varying irrelevant information in two dimensions will later be shown to cre-
ate symmetric difficulty for subjects. Even though one may think that the perceptual operations
required to solve a task are very different in these two dimensions (keeping track of payoffs hor-
izontally and vertically), the impact of these two dimensions on decision makers turn out to be
similar.
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which type of decision problem the subject faced, their eyes were forced to scan the
entirety of the screen in order to fully process all relevant information. In this way
we abstract away from the possibility that subjects are more capable of processing
less (or more) visual space on a computer screen.
In each decision problem, the subjects needed to choose one of the five available
options in 75 seconds.5 In some decision problems they were presented fifteen options
and told that only five of them were available to choose from. The other ten were
shown on their screens but the subjects were not allowed to choose any of those.
OiAj is the notation for a decision problem with i options and j attributes. The
decision problems that were used in the experiment had i, j ∈ {5, 15}; in each case
the effective numbers of options and attributes were five, i.e. if the number of options
or attributes on a screen was fifteen, then ten of those were either unavailable options
or irrelevant (zero) attributes. The order of the decision problems were randomized
at the session-individual level (i.e. Subject 1, for instance, in each session, saw the
same order of decision problems; with 16 subjects per session, we therefore have 16
distinct decision problem orderings).
Once Part 1 of the experiment was completed, subjects received instructions
for Part 2. The aim of Part 2 was to elicit subjects’ willingness to pay to elim-
inate unavailable options or irrelevant attributes to estimate the cost of ignoring
irrelevant information. A BDM mechanism was used to measure subjects willing-
ness to pay to remove irrelevant information in one direction. Hence, we elicited
the subjects’ WTP in four different directions: moving from i) O15A5 → O5A5, ii)
5Subjects earned a payoff of $0 if they didn’t make a choice within 75 seconds.
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O5A15 → O5A5, iii) O15A15 → O5A15, and iv) O15A15 → O15A5. The distribution of
selling prices used in the BDM procedure (and explained to subjects) was uniform
from 0 to 15 ECU. These four BDM elicitation procedures were conducted across
two treatments for Part 2 of our experiment: a “low information” treatment and a
“high information” treatment. Seven sessions were conducted for each treatment. In
the “low information” treatment, BDM procedures were run for (i) and (ii) - WTP
was elicited for removal of options or attributes, given that irrelevant information
in the opposite dimension was not present. In “high information” treatments, BDM
procedures were run for (iii) and (iv) - WTP was elicited for removal of options or
attributes, given that irrelevant information in the opposite dimension was present
and cannot be eliminated. Hence, we elicited the cost of ignoring 10 unavailable
options and cost of ignoring 10 irrelevant attributes separately and in two different
informational environments. Note that a given subject completed two BDM pro-
cedures, with roughly half of our subjects completing (i) and (ii) and half of them
completing (iii) and (iv). We chose this between-subject design to eliminate a possi-
ble framing effect where a subject may have thought that she was expected to price
the elimination of unavailable options or irrelevant alternatives differently depend-
ing on the amount of information in the other dimension. Table 2.1 summarizes the
treatments of the experiment.
Subjects completed Parts 1 and 2 without being provided any feedback on
their performance in earlier decision problems similar to the experiments in related
literature. First, we did not provide feedback after each decision problem in Part 1
in order to avoid any reference dependence or triggering new emotions such as re-
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Table 2.1: Treatment Summary
Treatment # of Sessions # of Subjects Part 1: Decisions Part 2: BDM
Low Info 7 112 40 Decisions O15A5 → O5A5 and O5A15 → O5A5
High Info 7 110 40 Decisions O15A15 → O5A15 and O15A15 → O15A5
gret. For example, a subject may work harder than otherwise she would if she knows
that she would receive feedback on how suboptimal her decision was. Second, we do
not provide aggregate feedback at the end of Part 1 to avoid unnecessary priming
and to more closely approximate an analogous real-world setting. Direct feedback
regarding mistake rates and/or time spent in each decision problem type may in-
duce the subject to think that they should be willing to pay to eliminate irrelevant
information, even if the subject does not intrinsically possess such a preference. We
view the potential effect of feedback in this setting as analogous to an experimenter
demand effect.
After the completion of Parts 1 and 2, the subjects answered a demographic
questionnaire where they reported gender, age, college major, self-reported GPA,
SAT, and ACT scores, and they were given the chance to explain their decisions in
Part 2 of the experiment.
2.3 Experimental Results
Our main hypothesis is that unavailable options and irrelevant attributes cause
cognitive overload for the decision makers and this leads to sub-optimal choice. In
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the following analysis, we say that a “mistake” has been made in an individual
decision problem when the subject failed to select the highest valued available option
presented within the time limit of 75 seconds. If no option was chosen, this is treated
as a “timeout”, but not as a mistake. When timeouts are treated as mistakes, results
are qualitatively similar.
2.3.1 Part 1: Decision Task
In this section we present the results from Part 1 of the experiment. We
begin with aggregate results and then investigate individual-level heterogeneity and
learning effects.
2.3.1.1 Aggregate Results
Table C.25 presents the mistake rate for each type of decision problem OiAj
in the aggregate data for i, j ∈ {5, 15}, treating timeouts as mistakes, calculating
the “mistake rate” for each treatment as the average of subject-level mistake rate.
Note that the addition of unavailable options and irrelevant attributes alone does
not generate significantly larger mistake rates relative to the benchmark O5A5 (p-
values 0.584 and 0.653, respectively for decision problem types O15A5 and O5A15).
However, conditional on the presence of either unavailable options or irrelevant
attributes (in types O15A5 and O5A15), the addition of irrelevant information in the
opposite dimension does increase mistake rates by about 50% (p-value 0.000 in each
case). Thus, in the aggregate, both unavailable options and irrelevant attributes are
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necessary to generate increased mistake rates. We believe that this is evidence that
our design does not favor one type of irrelevant information over the other. If, for
some reason, our design explicitly allowed for easier processing of either unavailable
options or irrelevant attributes, we’d expect to see that mistake rates would respond
to an increase in irrelevant information in only one dimension. This is clearly not the
case. As such, we’d expect our results to be robust to permutations of our design,
for example, where the matrix of displayed data was transposed. The results are
qualitatively similar when we do not count timeouts as mistakes and these can be
found in Appendix C.11.1. Additionally, when we instead measure welfare loss from
sub-optimal choice by i) the rank of the chosen option among the available options
or ii) normalized loss in ECU relative to optimal choice, our main result survives.
These analyses can be found in Appendix C.11.4.
Table 2.2: Mistake Rates: Timeouts as Mistakes
O5 O15
Mean 0.213 0.218
A5 Std Error 0.013 0.013
N 222 222
Mean 0.228 0.337
A15 Std Error 0.012 0.016
N 222 222
p = 0.000 for O15A5 → O15A15, O5A15 → O15A15, and O5A5 → O15A15
p > 0.100 otherwise.
Note that when a subject finds a decision problem more challenging, she may
react to this in two ways: (i) she may take more time to make decision and this may
or may not lead to an optimal choice; (ii) she may run out of time and computer
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may record this as a sub-optimal choice. Even though the mistake rates in Table
C.25 do not change much when only the number of options is increased while the
number of attributes are kept at 5 (from O5A5 to O15A5) and when only the number
of attributes is increased while the number of options are kept at 5 (from O5A5 to
O5A15), this does not necessarily mean that the subjects find the increased number
of options or attributes in only one dimension not challenging. This increase in
the difficulty of the decision problem may also appear as increased time required
to submit a decision. Table 2.3 reports on the average time (in seconds) at which
subjects submit a decision in each type of decision problem. Observations where the
subject did not submit a decision in the allotted time were are excluded in Table
2.3 just as they were in Table C.25. For results that treat timeouts as the maximum
time allotted (i.e. time = 75) and for the sub-sample where the subject chose the
correct (optimal) option, see Tables C.26 and C.27 in Appendix C.11.1, respectively;
results are not qualitatively different from those presented in Table 2.3.
Note that adding irrelevant information in any dimension (i.e. unavailable
options or irrelevant attributes) increases the time spent on each decision problem
in Table 2.3. However, this difference is not statistically significant when moving
from O5A5 to O15A5. Time costs increase much more substantially when irrelevant
information in one dimension is already present. For example, the time spent in-
creases by just over one second on average with the addition of unavailable options
when there are no irrelevant attributes displayed (in the first row of Table 2.3), but
increases by nearly 4 seconds when there are irrelevant attributes displayed (in the
second row of Table 2.3). A similar effect is present for the addition of irrelevant
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attributes. Furthermore, from Table 2.3 we may surmise that irrelevant attributes
increase time spent more than unavailable options: time spent increases more on
average when moving vertically down in Table 2.3 than when we move horizontally
across it. Both these interaction and asymmetry effects will be investigated further
in the next subsection.
Table 2.3: Time: No Timeouts
O5 O15
Mean 48.605 49.926
A5 Std Error 0.712 0.680
N 222 222
Mean 52.935 56.365
A15 Std Error 0.780 0.810
N 222 222
p = 0.00 for O5A5 → O5A15, O15A5 → O15A15,
O5A15 → O15A15, O5A5 → O15A15, and O15A5 → O5A15
p > 0.10 for O5A5 → O15A5
Finally, given that there is a time limit of 75 seconds for each decision problem,
the increased difficulty that could arise from the presentation of irrelevant informa-
tion could also increase the rate at which timeouts occur in each type of decision
problem. Recall that subjects earn zero in the case of a timeout and letting 75
seconds pass without a choice is worse than choosing randomly. Timeouts are not
prevalent in our data: only 4.67% of decision problems resulted in a timeout. 60.31%
of timeouts occurred within the first ten periods; 31.16% occurred in the first period.
Further, note that our choice of a time threshold is somewhat arbitrary: we could
have easily chosen to give subjects more (or less) time to complete each decision
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problem. As such, we ignore timeouts as a significant concern for the remainder of
our analysis, conducting all tests conditional on experiencing no timeouts.6
From all of the above, we are left with the following main aggregate results:
i) irrelevant attributes and unavailable options are both necessary to generate in-
creased mistake rates, and ii) time costs are increased by irrelevant information
displayed in either dimension. We summarize these findings in Result 5. In order
to investigate each of these in more detail, we conduct regression analysis to control
for individual-level heterogeneity and learning in the following subsection.
Result 5. Irrelevant information presented in a decision problem can affect choice
using several disparate measures:
• Unavailable options and irrelevant attributes jointly generate increased mistake
rates.
• Both unavailable options and irrelevant attributes generate increased time costs.
2.3.1.2 Individual Heterogeneity
To investigate subject-level heterogeneity in the mistake rate, we conduct lo-
gistic regressions controlling for learning, gender, and academic achievement effects.
Table 2.4 reports regression results where the dependent variable is “Mistake” and
the independent variables are varied in different models specified. “Mistake” is a
binary variable with 1 corresponding to the subject failing to select the element with
6There were four subjects who experienced timeouts in more than 20% of their decision prob-
lems. They are included in the sample upon which all analysis is conducted, but results are not
qualitatively different if they are excluded.
91
the maximal value in the set of (available) alternatives. It is equal to 0 otherwise. In
all models, the independent variables are as follows: “Options” is a dummy variable
indicating the presence of 10 additional unavailable options displayed (i.e. Options
is equal to 1 for type O15A5 and O15A15 decision problems and it is 0 otherwise),
“Attributes” is defined analogously for irrelevant attributes (i.e. Attributes = 1 for
type O5A15 and O15A15 decision problems), “Options * Attributes” is the interaction
between the type dummies, “Female” is a dummy variable indicating whether the
subject is female, “English” is a dummy variable indicating whether the subject’s
native language is English, “Economics/Business” is a dummy variable indicated
whether the subject’s major is in the University of Maryland Economics Depart-
ment or Business School, and “Period” is the period in which the decision problem
was presented. Reported coefficients are calculated marginal effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the Subject level.
Cognitive Scores were calculated using a combination of responses on the De-
mographic Questionnaire. Responses for GPA, SAT, and ACT were normalized as
in Cohen et al. (1999) and Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2016): Let j be the variable under
consideration with j ∈ {GPA, SAT, ACT}, µji be the value of variable j for sub-
ject i, µjmax be the maximum value of j in the subject population, and µ
j
min be the
minimum value of j in the subject population. Then let µ̂ji , the normalized value of







such that µ̂ji can be interpreted as the measure of j for subject i, normalized by
the distribution of j in the subject population. Some subjects were missing one or
more measures for j ∈ {GPA, SAT, ACT}, since these measures were self-reported
(and some subjects could not recall their scores on one or more of these measures).
As such, the Cognitive Score for subject i was set to µ̂GPAi if the subject reported
a feasible GPA, µ̂SATi if a feasible GPA score was missing and the subject reported
a feasible SAT score, and µ̂ACTi if both a feasible GPA and SAT score was missing
and the subject reported a feasible ACT score. GPA Scores were given precedent
in the calculation of Cognitive Scores because most subjects could reliably report
these while SAT Scores took precedent over ACT Scores because it is more common
for University of Maryland, College Park undergraduates to have taken the SAT.
Results based on using GPA only are presented in Appendix C.11.3.
In addition to the above specified independent variables, we include two more
variables in all models: “Position” and “Positive”. Variable “Position” is simply
the position, from 1 to 15, of the optimal available option that is displayed. Pre-
vious work, including Caplin et al. (2011), has shown that subjects often search
a list from top to bottom, implying that optimal options displayed lower-down on
the list have a lower probability of being chosen due to the early termination of
search. We thus include this variable as a control in each of our model specifica-
tions, its coefficient being significant and positive in all instances: subjects make
more mistakes and spend more time when the optimal option is presented further
down a list of alternatives. Variable “Positive” is the number of positive relevant
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attributes displayed in the decision problem, ranging from three to five.7 There are
potentially two reasons why “Positive” would matter in a given decision problem:
i) a subject responds with increased effort in the presence of stronger incentives
and ii) subjects find the task less difficult with fewer subtraction operations. The
first comes from the fact that the expected value of the optimal available option is
increasing in the number of positive attributes. Subjects may then work harder or
stop search later in the presence of five positive attributes than in the presence of,
say, three positive attributes. It also may be that subtraction operations are more
difficult cognitively than addition operations such that the difficulty of the task is
decreasing in the number of positive attributes. Our results are consistent with the
latter explanation. The coefficient on “Positive” is negative and significant in all
regression specifications.
Finally, any effects of irrelevant information that we may find could possibly
be due simply to the increased complexity of the decision problem when irrelevant
information is added, not due to the mere presence of irrelevant information. For
example, adding unavailable options to a decision problem forces the DM to have
to “skip” more visual information on the screen in order to evaluate an individual
available option, since whether an attribute is positive or negative is displayed at
the top of the screen. Similarly, irrelevant attributes force the DM to interrupt
the evaluation process, visually “skip” a column of irrelevant information, and then
7Our data generation process gave equal weight to the possibility of having a positive or
negative relevant attribute. However, we only used generated decision problems that i) had a
unique optimal available option and ii) had all positive-valued available options. Thus, the range
of the number of positive available options in the generated dataset is more restrictive than that
which would be generated without these constraints.
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continue with evaluation. Therefore, we define “Attribute Complexity” and “Op-
tion Complexity” as the number of “skips” required for full search/evaluation in
the decision problem. For example, Option 1 in the example Figure 2.1 above, has
a “Option Complexity” equal to 3 (since there are essentially three groups of ir-
relevant attributes encountered for full evaluation of the option). In the baseline
O5A5 decision problems, both of these variables are set equal to 0. When “Op-
tions”(“Attributes”) is equal to 1, “Option Complexity” (“Attribute Complexity”)
varies between 2 and 5 in the realized data.
The regressions in Table 2.4 are conducted on the sub-sample where the sub-
mission is made in under 75 seconds. As mentioned above, specifications that treat
timeouts as mistakes are qualitatively similar to those presented here. In Model 1,
we replicate the aggregate result that can be seen in Table 2: unavailable options
and irrelevant attributes increase the mistake rate when presented jointly. Having
irrelevant information in both of these dimensions increases the mistake rate by
up to 9.52 percentage points (in Model 4). Moreover, this effect is not due to the
“complexity” of the decision problem in the presence of irrelevant information, as
both Attribute Complexity and Option Complexity are insignificant in Model 4.
We see considerable subject-level heterogeneity. Subjects who have higher Cogni-
tive Scores make fewer mistakes. Women make more mistakes on average: being
female increases the mistake rate by up to 9.31 percentage points (in Models 2, 3,
and 4). We find no evidence of learning; in both models, the coefficient on “Period”
is statistically insignificant.8
8Results are qualitatively similar if we conduct fixed effect panel regressions for all specifica-
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Table 2.4: Mistake Rate Regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Timeouts as Mistakes
Options 0.00969 0.00943 -0.0218∗ -0.0560∗∗ -0.0733∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0131) (0.0284) (0.0292)
Attributes 0.000268 0.000417 -0.00615 -0.0108 0.0172
(0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0122) (0.0282) (0.0281)
Options * Attributes 0.0871∗∗∗ 0.0874∗∗∗ 0.0935∗∗∗ 0.0952∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0182)
Period 0.000314 0.000314 0.000326 0.000323 -0.000895∗
(0.000442) (0.000438) (0.000439) (0.000439) (0.000461)
Cognitive Score -0.243∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗
(0.0596) (0.0596) (0.0596) (0.0600)
Female 0.0931∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗∗ 0.0908∗∗∗
(0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0222)
Economics/Business 0.00809 0.00793 0.00790 0.0237
(0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0261)
English 0.00605 0.00599 0.00600 -0.00431
(0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0247)
Position 0.00433∗∗∗ 0.00486∗∗∗ 0.00572∗∗∗
(0.00122) (0.00126) (0.00133)
Positive -0.0277∗∗∗ -0.0300∗∗∗ -0.0288∗∗∗
(0.00802) (0.00818) (0.00835)
Attribute Complexity 0.00120 -0.00172
(0.00743) (0.00735)
Option Complexity 0.00929 0.0129∗
(0.00704) (0.00717)
Observations 8555 8555 8555 8555 8880
Standard errors in parentheses
Marginal effects from logit regression specifications
Robust standard errors reported are clustered at the Subject level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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In order to investigate the heterogeneity in time responses to these different
types of decisions problems, we present the results of several random-effect Tobit
regression models in Table 2.5. Observations are censored below by 0 and above
by 75 seconds.9 In each model presented the dependent variable is Time (measured
in seconds), defined as the time at which the subject submits her decision. As
in previous model specifications, Models 1 - 4 are conducted on the sub-sample
where the time of submission is less than 75 seconds (i.e. excluding timeouts and
submissions in the last second). All variables are defined as previously mentioned.
In Model 1, we present the simplest model incorporating the effects of the presence
of irrelevant information on the time to reach a decision. We find results that
are similar to those seen in Table 2.3: irrelevant information displayed in either
dimension increases time costs considerably. Further, we confirm that there are
interaction effects: that having both unavailable options and irrelevant attributes
increases time spent by 1.483 seconds above the individual decision problem type
effects. We also discover that irrelevant information has an asymmetric effect on
time spent depending on the dimension: irrelevant attributes increase time costs
more than unavailable options (βAttributes > βOptions; p − value = 0.000). Finally,
from Model 4 it can be seen that the effect of Options on time to make a decision
stems from the increased complexity; Option Complexity is positive and significant
in Model 4 while the coefficient on Options is insignificant. This is in keeping with
the aggregate results, where we had an insignificant effect of Options in the absence
tions.
9To investigate the sensitivity of our results to this choice, we conduct further regressions using
lower time thresholds. These can be found in Appendix C.11.2.
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of Attributes.
We also find evidence of subject-level heterogeneity. Subjects for whom En-
glish is their native language spend less time on average. Female subjects spend less
time, but this effect is only marginally significant. There is evidence of learning;
“Period” is negative and significant in all model specifications. Note that results
are qualitatively similar when our main specification (used in Model 4) is conducted
on the sub-sample where the chosen option was the highest valued of the available
options (in the model labelled “Correct”) or when we treat timeouts as a submission
at 75 seconds (in the final model in Table 2.5). Our results are therefore robust to
these assumptions.
We summarize all of the aforementioned results in Results 6 and 7:
Result 6. When controlling for subject-level heterogeneity and learning, we replicate
the results found in Result 5. Namely, that irrelevant information can increase the
suboptimality of choice and time spent per decision problem.
Result 7. We find evidence of subject-level heterogeneity and learning:
• There is evidence that female subjects make more mistakes and spend less time
on each decision problem.
• Subjects with higher Cognitive Scores make fewer mistakes.
• There is evidence of learning. Subjects spend less time per decision problem in
later periods. However, they do not make fewer mistakes in later periods.
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Table 2.5: Time Regressions
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Correct Timeouts as Time = 75
Options 2.255∗∗∗ 2.267∗∗∗ 1.326∗∗∗ -1.168 -1.061 -1.778∗
(0.353) (0.352) (0.441) (0.887) (0.954) (0.949)
Attributes 5.108∗∗∗ 5.091∗∗∗ 4.807∗∗∗ 3.998∗∗∗ 5.104∗∗∗ 4.920∗∗∗
(0.426) (0.426) (0.432) (0.925) (1.093) (0.932)
Options * Attributes 1.483∗∗∗ 1.470∗∗∗ 1.733∗∗∗ 1.841∗∗∗ 3.362∗∗∗ 2.122∗∗∗
(0.492) (0.494) (0.494) (0.499) (0.534) (0.503)
Period -0.263∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗∗
(0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0255) (0.0197) (0.0281)
Cognitive Score 9.507∗∗ 9.498∗∗ 9.497∗∗ 6.191∗ 8.747∗∗
(4.101) (4.101) (4.102) (3.342) (4.276)
Female -2.567∗ -2.569∗ -2.569∗ -1.337 -2.455∗
(1.356) (1.356) (1.356) (1.121) (1.364)
Economics/Business -2.200 -2.205 -2.207 -2.278 -1.479
(1.565) (1.565) (1.565) (1.398) (1.601)
English -3.343∗∗ -3.346∗∗ -3.347∗∗ -2.234∗ -3.603∗∗
(1.433) (1.432) (1.432) (1.332) (1.434)
Position 0.120∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.0398) (0.0410) (0.0456) (0.0422)
Positive -1.301∗∗∗ -1.460∗∗∗ -1.042∗∗∗ -1.425∗∗∗
(0.264) (0.269) (0.281) (0.281)
Attribute Complexity 0.227 -0.0245 0.120
(0.227) (0.295) (0.228)
Option Complexity 0.692∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.231) (0.221)
Observations 8555 8555 8555 8555 6668 8880
Standard errors in parentheses
Marginal effects reported from tobit regressions censored below by 0 and above by 75
Robust standard errors are clustered at the Subject level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.3.2 Part 2: Willingness-To-Pay
Recall that the second part of the experiment elicited subjects WTP to elim-
inate unavailable options and irrelevant attributes in both “Low Information” and
“High Information” environment. Table 2.6 shows the average WTP, measured in
Experimental Currency Units (ECUs), for each type of elimination. For reference,
recall that the support of the BDM procedure used was [0, 15] ECUs with a uniform
distribution.
Table 2.6 can be read from left to right as “WTP to eliminate Attributes given
that there are only 5 Options”, “WTP to eliminate Options given that there are only
5 Attributes”, etc. The first two columns belong to our “Low Information” treatment
and the last two belong to our “High Information” treatment. Note that subjects
participated in only one of these treatments; a given subject submitted her WTP
for either columns 1 and 2 or columns 3 and 4. Thus, when making comparisons
between WTP within a particular information treatment (Low or High), we match
the data by subject. Let WTP to get rid of information be written as follows:
WTP (X|Yn) where X is the dimension of information they are paying to remove
given Y -dimension information with n units. For example, WTP (A|O5) is the WTP
to eliminate 10 irrelevant Attributes, given that five options are present (all of them
available). WTP to reduce attributes is significantly higher than WTP to reduce
options only in the low information case. (p-value = 0.021 in Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
Test with H0 : WTP (A | O5) = WTP (O | A5)).
Tests of whether WTP (A|O5) is greater (less) than WTP (A|O15) and whether
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WTP (O|A5) is greater (less) than WTP (O|A15) were conducted un-matched as
these were submitted independently by separate subjects. There is no significant
difference between WTP to get rid of Attributes or Options by “Low Information”
or ‘High Information” treatment. Recall that eliminating irrelevant information in
one dimension does not affect mistake rates significantly when there is no irrelevant
information in the other dimension. However, eliminating irrelevant information in
one dimension does affect the mistake rate when there is irrelevant information in
both dimensions. Subjects do not seem to anticipate this effect on mistake rates
when setting their WTP.
Table 2.6: Willingness to Pay
Low Information High Information
WTP (A|O5) WTP (O|A5) WTP (A|O15) WTP (O|A15)
Mean 4.473 4.071 4.473 4.373
Std Error 0.286 0.266 0.275 0.273
N 112 112 110 110
p = 0.021 for H0 : WTP (A|O5) = WTP (O|A5)
p > 0.100 otherwise
The regressions reported in Table 2.7 were conducted in order to understand
the heterogeneity in the subjects willingness to pay in each of the four directions
where irrelevant information could be removed. Table 2.7 displays results aggregated
across the Low Information and High Information treatments. Note that in all these
regressions, Attributes is a binary variable indicating whether the dependent variable
is WTP (A|On). When Attributes = 0, the dependent variable is WTP (O|An).10
The variable “High Info” is a dummy variable used to indicate whether the observa-
10For these regressions, answers submitted at time = 75 seconds are coded as mistakes to avoid
collinearity of regressors.
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tion is from a High Information treatment. All interaction variables used in Table
2.7 are straightforward.
First we ask if Willingness-To-Pay to eliminate irrelevant information in either
dimension is sensitive to measures of performance in Part I of the experiment, de-
spite there being no feedback provided prior to Part II. All three models are Tobit
regression specifications with a lower limit of 0 and an upper limit of 15 (i.e. the
support of the BDM mechanism used in Part II of the experiment). Note that in
all models, Mistakes and Time are a count of the number of mistakes and the sum
of time spent across all decision problems in the treatment under consideration for
WTP. For example, if a subject in the low information WTP treatment made 7
mistakes across the 10 O5A15 decision problems and spent a total of 500 seconds
across these same 10 decision problems, Mistakes would equal 7 and Time would
equal 500 for the observation of WTP (A | O5) for this subject.
WTP increases with the incidence of mistakes: Mistakes is positive and sig-
nificant in all models in Table 2.7. This is somewhat surprising, given that subjects
were not provided feedback between Parts I and II of the experiment; it seems that
subjects are aware of a general level of optimality of choice and are thus more will-
ing to pay to eliminate irrelevant information if they make more mistakes in the
corresponding decision problem type.
Additionally, we ask if these performance measures influence whether WTP
is positive: it is possible that WTP itself is not sensitive to individual measures
of performance, but that performance in one dimension can affect whether WTP
is positive at all. Models 4 through 6 report coefficients from logistic regression
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specifications where the dependent variable is a binary variable indicating whether
WTP is greater than 0. There is only weak evidence that whether WTP is greater
than zero is affected by Mistakes and High Information: the coefficients on both
of these variables are positive and significant in Model 6 only. Additionally, Model
6 reveals that subjects’s WTP may even be less sensitive to Mistakes in the High
Information treatment (coefficient on High Info * Mistakes is negative and significant
at the α = 0.05 level).
Notably, WTP is not sensitive to increased time spent on decision problems in
any specification included in Table 2.7. Additionally, subjects are more willing to pay
to eliminate irrelevant attributes than unavailable options in the Low Information
treatment, but not in the High Information treatment. This is true only at the
intensive margin (i.e. in Models 1 and 2) and disappears in Model 3 entirely. We
think that (lack of) feedback provided to subjects may prevent them from setting
consistent WTP in Low Information and High Information treatments. Further
study on the role of feedback in such environments is necessary. We summarize
these results in Result 8:
Result 8. WTP is heterogeneous and sensitive to a number of independent variables:
• WTP increases with the number of mistakes made in the relevant decision
problem type
• There is weak evidence that WTP is higher for Attributes than for Options,
but only for the Low Information treatment
• Higher mistake rates increase the likelihood that WTP is strictly positive
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Table 2.7: WTP Regressions
WTP WTP > 0
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Mistakes 0.198∗∗ 0.184∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.205∗ 0.162 0.441∗∗∗
(0.0882) (0.0886) (0.113) (0.108) (0.101) (0.146)
Time -0.00187 -0.00164 0.00116 -0.00177 -0.00141 0.00186
(0.00180) (0.00185) (0.00287) (0.00187) (0.00188) (0.00258)
Attributes 0.311∗∗ 0.307∗∗ 0.424 0.0817 0.0688 0.147
(0.149) (0.149) (0.271) (0.144) (0.146) (0.311)
High Info 0.0656 0.116 4.971∗ -0.167 -0.109 5.759∗∗
(0.475) (0.478) (2.600) (0.396) (0.421) (2.677)
Female 0.0103 -0.133 0.554 0.364
(0.429) (0.432) (0.405) (0.404)
Cognitive Score -1.243 -0.997 -1.670∗ -1.436
(1.113) (1.132) (0.941) (1.004)
High Info * Mistakes -0.325∗ -0.441∗∗
(0.177) (0.214)
High Info * Time -0.00591 -0.00731∗
(0.00388) (0.00388)
High Info * Attributes -0.350 -0.318
(0.322) (0.334)
Constant 4.485∗∗∗ 5.272∗∗∗ 3.187∗ 2.539∗∗ 3.431∗∗∗ 1.006
(1.092) (1.265) (1.733) (1.252) (1.330) (1.627)
sigma
Constant 3.225∗∗∗ 3.218∗∗∗ 3.197∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.207) (0.204)
Observations 444 444 444 444 444 444
Standard errors in parentheses
Models 1 - 3: Tobit regression specifications with lower limit of 0 and upper limit of 15
Models 4 - 6: Logit regression specifications
Robust standard errors reported are clustered at the Subject level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Robust across these model specifications and treatments is the fact that the
constants in these models are always positive and significant (with the exception
of the constant in Model 6). For example, consider a subject for whom irrelevant
information has no effect: they never make more mistakes when irrelevant infor-
mation is present and they never spend more (or less) time. This subject would
still be willing to pay some amount to eliminate this information. We call this a
pure “preference for simplicity” - even in the absence of any effect of irrelevant in-
formation on choice, decision makers prefer to exclude it. To our knowledge, ours
is the first study to identify such a preference, and this is the “cost of ignoring”
in its purest form: there is a preference-based psychological consequence to having
to ignore irrelevant information that is not captured by standard measures of the
effect of irrelevant information on choice. We investigate this further by analyzing
individual WTP for those subjects who experience no increase in mistake rates in
the presence of irrelevant information in the following section.
2.3.3 A Preference For Simplicity
To more precisely estimate the extent to which such a preference for simplicity
exists, we look at WTP for two categorizations of subjects for a given decision
problem: i) those who experience no mistakes and ii) those who make no mistakes
and incur no time costs associated with the presence of irrelevant information. Our
interpretation of “making no mistakes” differs by the the Informational treatment:
for Low Information treatments, a subject is deemed to have made “no mistakes” in
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decision problems of type OiAj if she selected the optimal option in all 10 decision
problems of this type; for High Information Treatments, a subject is deemed to have
made “no mistakes” in decision problems of type OiAj if her mistake rate in OiAj
was weakly less than her mistake rate in OiAj−10 for j = 15 (or Oi−10Aj, for i = 15).
In other words, a subject is counted in the first row of Table 2.9 if she indeed made
no mistakes for Low Information treatments, or if she made no more mistakes in
High Information treatments as a result of irrelevant information in the relevant
dimension. For example, a subject in the High Information treatment who made 8
optimal choices in O15A5 and 9 optimal choices in O15A15 will be considered to have
made “no mistakes” in O15A15 because her mistakes didn’t increase with the addition
of irrelevant attributes. We use two separate interpretations here because using the
stricter interpretation (as is used in the Low Information treatments) results in too
few subjects satisfying this criteria in the High Treatment for meaningful analysis.
We additionally consider subjects who make no mistakes and incur no addi-
tional time costs. A subject is deemed to have incurred no time costs if the difference
in the amount of time that she spends in decision problems of type OiAj is not sig-
nificantly different from the amount of time she spends in decision problems of type
OiAj−10 for j = 15 (or Oi−10Aj, for i = 15). In other words, a subject is counted
in the second row of Table 2.9 if she made “no mistakes” as per the interpretation
presented in the previous paragraph and she did not spend significantly more time
on a type of decision problem as a result of irrelevant information.11
11In all relevant analysis, “No Mistakes” and “No Mistakes or Time Costs” are defined at the
subject-OiAj decision problem type level, independent of behavior in other decision problem types.
As such, a subject could be considered to have made “No Mistakes” in some decision problems,
but not others, and may appear in some cells of Tables 2.8 and 2.9, but not all. These measures
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For each sub-group we present the summary statistics of both the WTP level
in Table 2.8 and of a dummy variable indicating whether WTP is greater than zero
in Table 2.9. The mean WTP and fraction of WTP greater than zero is positive
and significant at the 5% level in each case. Additionally, a comparison between the
first two rows and the last row of Tables 2.8 and 2.9 reveals that the mean WTP
and frequency of positive WTP closely matches that of the overall sample. In fact,
only in the WTP (A | O5) case is mean WTP lower for subjects who experience
No Mistakes relative to those who do (seen in the left-most cell in the first row
of Table 2.8; p = 0.0859 in Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test). Similarly, in Table 2.9,
WTP is greater than zero less frequently than for subjects who make mistakes only
in the WTP (O | A5) and WTP (O | A15) cases for subjects who make No Mistakes
only (p = 0.034, p = 0.049 respectively; all other measures in Table 2.9 are not
significantly different relative to those for subjects who do make mistakes and/or
incur time costs).
Additionally, let y(I|Jk) = 1{WTP (I|Jk) > 0} indicate whether WTP to
eliminate irrelevant information in the Ith dimension, given that there are k units of
information in the Jth dimension, is positive. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality
of distributions fails to reject the null H0 : F (ymistakes(I|Jk)) = F (yno mistakes(I|Jk))
for each (I, Jk). Such tests also fail to reject the analogous null for WTP levels
themselves (H0 : F (WTPmistakes(I|Jk)) = F (WTPno mistakes(I|Jk))).
All of this taken together provides additional evidence that even subjects for
whom irrelevant information does not affect the optimality of choice nor increase
do not require any joint conditions over multiple decision problem types for a given subject.
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time spent on a decision problem prefer not to see such irrelevant information;
there exists a preference for simplicity of the informational environment, even when
irrelevant information has no effect on choice. Moreover, a brief look at responses
to the open-ended question in our questionnaire reveals similar reasoning for some
of our subjects. A subject who made no mistakes responded that “I chose [positive
WTP amounts] to relax my eyes a little bit.” Another responded that “either one
[of eliminating irrelevant attributes or unavailable options] wouldn’t be too helpful,
but they still kind of help, so I put a low number and if I got it I got it, if I didn’t,
oh well.” One possible explanation for this preference for simplicity may be that
there is an additional dimension of cognitive effort spent on these decision problems
that is not fully captured by mistake rates or time costs. Said another subject, “[...]
unavailable options and attributes are distracting and cause me to work harder
and longer when trying to calculate from options and attributes that are actually
available. Therefore, I would be willing to pay ECU to get rid of them on the screen
in order to work more efficiently and effectively” (emphasis added).
Table 2.8: WTP: No Mistakes
Low Information High Information
WTP (A|O5) WTP (O|A5) WTP (A|O15) WTP (O|A15)
No Mistakes 3.45 3.2273 4.9167 4.5217
(.6003) (.5919) (.4253) (.4116)
20 22 24 23
No Mistakes or Time Costs 3.4444 3.2 5.125 4.6364
(.6579) (.6513) (.5977) (.4138)
18 20 16 22
All 4.4732 4.0714 4.4727 4.3727
(.2856) (.2663) (.2748) (.2727)
112 112 110 110
Std. Errors in Parentheses
Sample mean > 0 at the α = 0.05 level in each instance
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Table 2.9: WTP > 0: No Mistakes
Low Information High Information
WTP (A|O5) WTP (O|A5) WTP (A|O15) WTP (O|A15)
No Mistakes .85 .7273 .9583 1
(.0819) (.0972) (.0417) (0)
20 22 24 23
No Mistakes or Time Costs .8333 .7 .9375 1
(.0904) (.1051) (.0625) (0)
18 20 16 22
All .8929 .8661 .8636 .8818
(.0294) (.0323) (.0329) (.0309)
112 112 110 110
Std. Errors in Parentheses
Sample mean > 0 at the α = 0.05 level in each instance
We summarize these results in Result 9:
Result 9. There is a cost of ignoring irrelevant information that is not measured
by mistake rates or time costs: subjects are willing to pay some amount not to see
irrelevant information, even when irrelevant information does not affect choice.
• When measured by the Constant terms in WTP regressions, this cost is posi-
tive.
• When measured in an analysis of WTP for subjects who make no additional
mistakes in response to irrelevant information, this cost is again positive.
• When measured in an analysis of WTP for subjects who make no additional
mistakes in response to irrelevant information and spend no additional time
in response to irrelevant information, this cost is again positive.
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2.4 Robustness Checks
In order to investigate to what extent our results are sensitive to the design
specification used for these tasks, we conducted six additional sessions under al-
ternative designs. Four of these sessions were conducted with alternative designs
regarding Part 1 decision tasks and two of these sessions were conducted with al-
ternative designs regarding the Part 2 willingness-to-pay tasks. These sessions are
summarized in the following table:
Table 2.10: Robustness Treatment Summary
Treatment # of Sessions # of Subjects Part 1: Decisions Part 2: BDM
8x8: Low Info 2 32 40 Decisions O8A5 → O5A5 and O5A8 → O5A5
8x8: High Info 2 30 40 Decisions O8A8 → O5A8 and O8A8 → O8A5
Alt-High Info 2 30 40 Decisions O15A15 → O5A5
In the treatments designated as “8x8” in the above table, decision tasks in-
cluded a maximum of three unavailable options and three irrelevant attributes rel-
ative to the baseline in order to explore the effects of changing the parameter space
on our main results. This resulted in decision task treatments O5A5, O5A8, O8A5,
and O8A8. In the treatment named “Alt-High Info”, the decision tasks presented in
Part 1 were the same as for the main treatments. However, in Part 2, subjects were
asked a single WTP question eliciting WTP to move from O15A15 to O5A5.
All relevant results are presented in Appendix C.10. In this section, we will
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highlight several important results that further illuminate the main contributions of
this paper.
2.4.1 Convexities in the Mistake Rate Function
In the above analysis, we argue that mistake rates are not affected by un-
available options and irrelevant attributes linearly; both unavailable options and
irrelevant attributes are necessary to generate increased mistake rates in our main
experimental task. However, an apt reader may notice that with five available op-
tions each with five relevant attributes in each treatment, our design leads to the






Table 2.11: Treatments and Irrelevant Information
So since we find higher mistake rates in treatment O15A15 only, this could be
the result of either a) convexity in the mistake rate function or b) the presence of
an additional 150 irrelevant cells relative to treatments O5A15 and O15A5. Using
the alternative 8x8 design, we can more precisely investigate the effect of the “size”
of the irrelevant information set on mistake rates. The 8x8 design leads to the
following:
If mistake rates in treatment O8A8 are higher than in treatment O5A5 in this







Table 2.12: Robustness Treatments and Irrelevant Information
take rate function and not simply the size of the set of irrelevant information. This
is indeed the case, as displayed in Table C.17 in Appendix C.10.1: mistake rates
are roughly 8 percentage points higher in treatment O8A8 relative to the baseline.
Moreover, adding three unavailable options or three irrelevant attributes alone does
not increase mistake rates relative to the baseline. Treatment O8A8 with 49 irrel-
evant cells displayed to subjects, has a mistake rate of 24.2%, higher than either
O5A15 and O15A5 in the main dataset.
12 Taken together, these additional analyses
reveal that the central result contained in this work is indeed due to the presence
of both unavailable options and irrelevant attributes, not simply due to the sheer
amount of irrelevant information displayed.
2.4.2 Additional Willingness-to-Pay
As previously mentioned, we’ve shown that both unavailable options and ir-
relevant attributes are necessary to generate an increase in the mistake rate, with
mistake rates in treatment O15A15 being significantly higher than in the baseline.
We’ve also shown that WTP to eliminate irrelevant information is sensitive to indi-
vidual mistake rates, even though subjects are not provided with feedback regarding
12We also view mistake rates in the treatments used for robustness as lower bounds on true
mistake rates. The mistake rate for the baseline treatment of this dataset was 16.8%, lower than
the baseline mistake rate of 21.3% for the main dataet.
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their performance in Part 1 of the experiment prior to submitting their WTP.
To bridge these two results, we conducted an additional two sessions where
Part 2 of the experiment was altered to only as a single WTP question, with subjects
submitting their WTP to move from O15A15 to O5A5. We asked only one WTP
question in these sessions to avoid priming the subjects to rank WTP in a particular
order. Our central hypothesis is that, because mistake rates are higher only in
O15A15, WTP for O15A15 to O5A5 should be significantly higher than any other
WTP measure. If we had asked, say, three WTP measures (O15A15 → O5A15,
O15A15 → O15A5, and O15A15 → O5A5) in these sessions, the subject may be
primed to internally rank these three WTPs with O15A15 → O5A5 as the “most
valuable” simply due to the relatively large number of irrelevant cells eliminated.
To avoid this priming, we ask for WTP for O15A15 → O5A5 alone.
We find results consistent with our hypothesis, as indicated in Tables C.23 and
C.24 in Appendix C.10.2. Mean WTP for O15A15 → O5A5 is 5.452 ECU, higher
than any other WTP measure previously elicited in the main dataset. Moreover,
approximately 84% of subjects submitted a positive WTP for O15A15 → O5A5,
again higher than any other frequency elicited for the main dataset. These results
provide more credence to the notion that WTP to eliminate irrelevant information
closely tracks performance in Part 1, even absent any feedback.
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2.5 Discussion
From the above analysis we’ve shown that irrelevant information can increase
the frequency of sub-optimal choice. This has implications for how we model both
rational choice under constraints on attention and boundedly rational choice. We
can reject purely random choice in each treatment: note that mistake rates in each
treatment would be equal to 80% (since one of the five available options will always
be optimal) if subjects choose randomly, giving each option an equal chance of being
chosen. We can reject a null hypothesis that mistake rates are equal to 80% in each
treatment (p < 0.000 in each). Likewise, we can reject fully rational choice (under
no attention constraints) at the α = 0.001 level.
Given that our results are consistent with neither random choice nor fully
rational choice, it remains to be seen whether a behavioral model that allows for
sub-optimal choice is consistent with our data. As mentioned in Section 2.1, models
that allow for sub-optimal choice focus on available options and relevant attributes.
In limited consideration based models of choice (see e.g. Masatlioglu et al. (2012),
Manzini and Mariotti (2007; 2012; 2014), and Lleras et al. (2017)), the decision-
maker first creates a “consideration set” from the set of available options. If the
optimal option in the set of available options does not make it into the consideration
set, it will not be chosen and choice will be sub-optimal. Similarly in models of
satisficing and search (e.g. Caplin et al. (2011)), the decision-maker searches through
the list of available options, leaving the potential to fail to consider the optimal
option displayed. In models of rational inattention (see e.g. Caplin and Dean
114
(2015); Matejka and McKay (2014); Sims (2003; 2006)), the decision-maker acquires
information at some cost through a rational attention allocation process. In such a
framework, the agent would optimally pay no attention to irrelevant information (i.e.
unavailable options or irrelevant attributes). Similarly, the salience-based model of
Bordalo et al. (2012; 2013; 2016) is based on relevant attributes only. In this model,
attributes of a given option are weighted based on their distance from the mean value
of that attribute across all goods that are available. Trivially, irrelevant attributes
in such a model would have equal (zero) salience and would thusly be ignored.
To rectify our results with the extant body of literature, one would have to
make considerable alterations to these models. The cost of acquiring information
in a rational inattention framework, for example, would have to be modeled as
dependent on the amount of irrelevant information displayed.13 In models of search
or satisficing, one would have to assume that the decision-maker either a) has a
cost-of-search parameter that depends on the presence of irrelevant information or
b) searches through unavailable options mistakenly with some probability. Similarly,
the salience-based model of Bordalo et al. (2012; 2013; 2016) would have to be
modified to allow for the presence of irrelevant attributes.
In this spirit, we propose the concept of a “presentation set” to be incorporated
in more general choice theoretic models. A decision problem in such an approach
would be defined as a (S, P )-tuple, with S and P as subsets of the grand set of
13In the same vein, there is a small, but growing body of literature on incorporating “perceptual
distance” between states of nature into models of rational inattention (see Experiment 4 in Dean
and Neligh (2017b)). Our results could be viewed through this lens: it is more difficult to perceive
which option is optimal in the presence of irrelevant information, even though the state-space is
payoff equivalent to the decision-problem without irrelevant information.
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alternatives such that S ⊆ P . While S is the set of available options displayed to
the consumer, a (weakly) larger set P is presented to the consumer, with s ∈ P \ S
interpreted as unavailable options. An attribute-dependent modification of this
approach is straightforward. Our results suggest that choices depend on P as well
as S.
Such an approach is related to the work of Salant and Rubinstein (2008). In
their model, choice is affected by a “frame” which they define as including “observ-
able information that is irrelevant in the rational assessment of the alternatives, but
nonetheless affects choice.” Since a “frame” is anything other than relevant infor-
mation to the decision problem that can affect choice, the “presentation set” can be
interpreted as a “frame”. Nevertheless, this “presentation set” may trigger the DM
to use a different choice procedure.
Consider the following example: a DM always optimizes (i.e. considers all
options and chooses the best one) when the presentation set is equal to the set of
available goods, but uses Simon’s satisficing criteria for more complicated presenta-
tion sets. Further, suppose there are three available options, x, y, and z such that
U(x) > U(y) > U(z) for some utility function U and that U(z) ≥ τ , for some sat-
isficing level of utility τ . Thus, if the DM is optimizing, she will choose x, but the
DM will choose the first available option considered if following a satisficing criteria.
Assume that there are two frames/presentation sets: f1 where there is no additional
information displayed other than the available goods and f2 where x, y, and z are
displayed along with unavailable goods.
Under f1, the DM will always choose the U -maximal option, since the DM can
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optimize under simple frames/presentation sets. However, under f2, the consumer
will choose the first available option that she sees. Suppose the options are always
displayed in the order z − y − x. Then the DM’s choice correspondence will be as
follows:
{x, y, z} {x, y} {x, z} {y, z}
c(A, f1) {x} {x} {x} {y}
c(A, f2) {z} {y} {z} {z}
Cc(A) {x, z} {x, y} {x, z} {y, z}
Table 2.13: Example: Choice Data for Salant-Rubinstein Application
In the above, as in Salant and Rubinstein (2008), given a set of frames, F , Cc
is constructed such that Cc(A) = {x | ∃fi ∈ F such that c(A, fi) = x} for c(A, f)
as a choice correspondence under set A and frame f . Salant and Rubinstein (2008)
present a γ-axiom under which if x ∈ Cc(A) ∩ Cc(B) then x ∈ Cc(A ∪ B), which is
required for a choice with frames to be consistent with the maximization of some
transitive, binary relation. This property is clearly violated in the above choice data
(to see this easily, let A = {x, y} and B = {y, z}).
This type of adaptive choice procedure is consistent with our data. Forty-eight
(48 out of 222) of our subjects made no mistakes in the baseline O5A5 type decision
problems (i.e. they are “simple optimizers” according to the above adaptive choice
procedure). We define a violation of satisficing procedure as a subject choosing an
option placed at position i when there is a higher-valued option placed at position
j < i (i.e. higher up on the screen). According to this definition, 5 of these 48
simple optimizers make no mistakes through violations of satisficing. Some 16 of
the remaining 43 subjects make fewer than 60% of their mistakes through violations
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of satisficing. Thus, there is a sizeable (though minority) contingent of our sample
who can be modeled as following the adaptive procedure described in the example
above, but who will violate the central γ-axiom of Salant and Rubinstein (2008). 14
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the results of a novel experimental design
to test for both i) effects of irrelevant information presented in a decision prob-
lem on choice and ii) willingness-to-pay to get rid of irrelevant information. Our
main contribution is the identification of complementarities in irrelevant informa-
tion presentation: both unavailable options and irrelevant attributes are necessary
to generate increased mistake rates. This central result can shed light on the extant
body of literature on decision theory and limited attention. Namely, we find that
no leading models of choice, either rational and constrained or boundedly rational,
can explain our data unless they are significantly modified. It is our hope that these
results may provide direction for upcoming theoretical research intended to model
choice in the presence of irrelevant information.
Our results are applicable to a number of contexts in the realms of public
policy, marketing, and choice architecture. In particular, our results indicate that
choice architects should possibly err on the side of simplicity when presenting infor-
mation that may or may not be pertinent to all DMs who will see it. In the United
States, there is currently robust debate as to whether or not the federal government
should require the food industry to label goods as having genetically engineered
14This example is similar to the two moods example (Salant and Rubinstein, 2008, page 1294).
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(GE) ingredients or not. Indeed, George Kimbrell, Legal Director for the Center
for Food Safety, an American advocacy organization, has stated that “Americans
deserve nothing less than clear on-package labeling [regarding GE ingredients], the
way food has always been labeled” (Center for Food Safety, 2017). In the absence of
scientifically proven health concern about GE, this information will be “irrelevant”
but it will distract to pay less attention to the relevant attributes, such as sodium
or fat contents of the food. Our results should inspire caution on the part of policy-
makers. Armed with only a rational model of consumer choice, a policy-maker may
decide that “more information is always better for consumers.” Our results indicate
that not only may this additional information make it more difficult to choose op-
timally for a consumer who finds the information irrelevant, such a consumer may
simply have an unexpressed preference for simplicity. We see similar applications of
these results in such areas as prescription drug labelling.
Returning to the example presented in the Introduction, online shopping plat-
forms such as Amazon.com, Wayfair.com, and Jet.com appear to be unsure of how
to treat the unavailability of certain goods. For example, even within Amazon’s
platform, there is contrasting treatment of out-of-stock goods: for standard goods,
Amazon displays no out-of-stock options by default, allowing the consumer to opt
into seeing out-of-stock items, but when searching on Amazon Fresh, Amazon’s gro-
cery delivery platform, out-of-stock items are displayed by default with no option to
opt out of seeing them. We should caution that our results don’t suggest that not dis-
playing such information is always optimal for the firm; displaying such information
may be profitable for a number of reasons, including dynamic alternative sets and
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purchasing decisions, reference dependence (away from which we have abstracted in
this work),such as the possibility that unavailable goods serve as decoy options that
make certain available goods seem more attractive. However, our results do suggest
that any agent considering whether to display such irrelevant information should
recognize that there is a trade-off: a firm must weigh the potential immediate effect
on profit relative to the effect on choice optimality on the part of the consumer that
is induced by the presence of irrelevant information.
Further, we identify a pure “preference for simplicity”. That is, for a subject
who is faced with no cognitive costs of having to ignore irrelevant information, we
find that they are still willing to pay some amount to get rid of this information.
This tells us that there are aspects of consumer preference in this environment that
are not fully contained by measures intended to capture the notion of lost monetary
value (i.e. mistake rates and time required to make a decision). It needs to be
further investigated in future research how the complexity of presentation affects
the algorithm used in decision making and how robust the preference for simplicity
we document here is with respect to features of the decision problems used, such as
color coded irrelevant information.
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Chapter 3: Reciprocity and Uncertainty: A Laboratory Experiment
of Gift Exchange with Risk
Co-authored with Erkut Ozbay
3.1 Introduction
Positive reciprocity - responding to a positive action taken by another agent by
taking a positive action in return - is a well-documented behavior in both the lab and
the field. Laboratory studies of positive reciprocity in the form of “gift exchange”
have consistently identified Pareto-improving trade among pairs of subjects when
such trade is not predicted under the assumption of rational self-interest. Behavior
documented in the lab serves as a baseline for observed reciprocity in the field.
However, while reciprocal behavior in the real world can take many forms, some
including some element of uncertainty, the vast majority of laboratory studies of
gift exchange are conducted in environments with no uncertainty.
Take the following scenario as an example: there is a firm who is considering
how many stock options to offer to a worker as part of their compensation package.
Once the worker receives this compensation package, they can then choose to work
hard on the job or shirk. The returns to the worker exerting high effort are going
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to be subject to some uncertainty, both aggregate (e.g. “what if the stock market
crashes tomorrow?”) and idiosyncratic (e.g. “we’ve lost power to our main plant
and cannot produce for a month”). Similarly, the value of the stock options offered
to the employee will be subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic risks.
All of this begs several questions. Is positive reciprocity a meaningful behav-
ioral phenomenon in environments with uncertainty? If so, are there differences in
the form that such reciprocity takes relative to environments with no uncertainty?
Finally, given that essentially all of the available results in controlled laboratory en-
vironments come from environments with no uncertainty, how well can these proxy
for behavior in situations with risk?
To answer these questions, we conducted a laboratory experiment using an
extension of the standard Gift Exchange Game to environments with uncertainty:
the Stochastic Gift Exchange Game (SGE). In SGE, a Firm and Employee are both
given 100 lottery tickets and can exchange them with one another. The Firm first
offers a “wage” to the employee and the Employee then responds with “effort.” At
the end of this game, one prize can be won by either the Firm or the Employee, but
not both. In this way, we shut down the possibility of ex-post reciprocal concerns,
that is, caring about giving in terms of the final allocation between the agents only,
operating as a meaningful channel for Gift Exchange. In contrast, only “ex-ante”
reciprocal concerns, or caring about giving in expectation, in SGE could generate
positive levels of reciprocity. We find that this is the case: similar to deterministic
studies of the Gift Exchange game, Wages offered are significantly higher than the
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium prediction and these higher Wages are rewarded
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with above-equilibrium levels of Effort. Moreover, Effort provision is sensitive to
the size of the Wage, similarly in line with previous results regarding deterministic
gift exchange.
We also utilize a within-subject design to elicit behavior in the Deterministic
Gift Exchange game (DGE) for each of our subjects. While there are positive levels
of giving in SGE, Wages are significantly lower in SGE than in DGE, indicating a
systematic difference in the form of positive reciprocity in environments with risk.
Because real world environments seldom are totally absent risk and because labo-
ratory studies of reciprocity are typically conducted for DGE only, we ask whether
giving in DGE is a decent enough proxy for giving in SGE. We find that it isn’t:
giving in DGE only explains a portion of giving in SGE. This presents a problem
for the extant body of literature on reciprocity and could be indicative of an over-
estimation of the amount of reciprocal giving in the real world by undue reliance on
deterministic environments in the lab.
This work extents the current body of literature on gift exchange to environ-
ments with uncertainty. Beginning with Fehr et al. (1993), laboratory studies of
variants of the Gift Exchange game have consistently documented above equilib-
rium wages and effort, as well as sensitivity of effort to the size of the wage. 1
Gift exchange is robust to modifications in the sequence of strategy choice (Car-
penter, 2017), the level of competition (Brandts and Charness, 2004), and the level
of control in the environment , i.e. whether DGE was conducted as a field study
1See also Fehr et al. (1998), Falk et al. (1999), Gächter and Falk (2002), and others.
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(Bellemare and Shearer, 2009; Falk, 2007; Gneezy and List, 2006).2 Yet to be ex-
plored, however, is the presence of positive reciprocity in environments with risk.
Our work is the first study to address this question explicitly.
This isn’t to say that no variants of DGE exist with some element of stochas-
ticity. Charness and Levine (2007) introduces stochasticity in wages, not to test
the effect of stochasticity on the presence of positive reciprocity directly, but to test
whether positive intentions matter distinctly from the ex-post outcome. A related
design is used in both Rubin and Sheremeta (2015) and Davis et al. (2017). They
find that employees, for example, reward medium wages more when a higher wage
was chosen by the firm, but “bad luck” in the form of a negative shock lowered the
actual wage received by the employee than when the medium wage itself was chosen
by the firm. However, in their experiment, the choice of a wage always affected both
the ex-ante payoff distribution and ex-post payoff distribution for the two agents. In
contrast, in SGE, a choice of a positive wage can only affect the ex-ante allocation
between the two agents, always in the direction of increasing the probability of an
ex-post unfair allocation. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to explicitly
consider the presence of an ex-ante reciprocal motive.
Our work herein is closely related to the growing body of literature at the
intersection of social preferences and risk preferences, particularly studies of ex-ante
fairness motives. The experiment most similar to ours is that of Brock et al. (2013).
They present subjects with a stochastic version of the Dictator Game where a dic-
2One exception is Charness et al. (2004), where they found that the absence of payoff tables
presented in experimental instructions effectively eliminated positive reciprocity.
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tator gives a certain number of tokens to a recipient, with each token representing
a chance at some monetary prize. They find that theories of fairness concerns that
do not simultaneously account for ex-ante and ex-post motives are incapable of ex-
plaining their data. Fudenberg and Levine (2012) were the first to identify the need
for a theory of ex-ante fairness, with Saito (2013) offering a tractable Expected In-
equality Aversion (EIA) model shortly thereafter. EIA extends the work of Fehr
et al. (1993) by proposing a value function that is the weighted sum of the Fehr
et al. (1993) Inequality Aversion utility function applied to ex-ante and ex-post con-
cerns separately. A related approach is taken in López-Vargas (2015), where the
value function is discounted by a function of the distance between two agents’ dis-
tribution of payoffs. These two approaches, though distinct, share the feature that
ex-ante and ex-post concerns are separable and fundamentally operate according to
the same psychological channel. Our results are not in accordance with this inter-
pretation of ex-ante preferences and this is discussed in Section 3.4.3. In particular,
we find evidence of an endowment effect on the ability to affect either the ex-ante or
ex-post outcome, suggesting that incorporating some form of reference dependence
a la Tversky and Kahneman (1991) may provide a fruitful approach to modeling
ex-ante reciprocity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we present the
experimental design and findings regarding the presence of ex-ante reciprocity. We
discuss the implications of our results for both the Gift Exchange body of literature
and the larger body of literature at the intersection of social and risk preferences in
Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Experiment
We ran 16 sessions of the experiment at the Experimental Economics Labo-
ratory at the University of Maryland, College Park. In each session, 16 subjects
participated, for a total of 256 subjects. Subjects earned an average of $22.25 USD.
Due to the stochastic nature of payoffs, a function of our experimental design, there
was considerable heterogeneity in cash earnings: the minimum payoff was $8 USD;
the maximum payoff was $45 USD; and the standard deviation was $8.66. Ses-
sions lasted approximately 90 minutes. The experiment was programmed in zTree
Fischbacher (2007).
In each session, subjects completed 5 tasks: i) a Stochastic Gift Exchange
Game which varied by treatment, ii) the Deterministic Gift Exchange Game, iii)
Self Holt-Laury (2002) risk elicitation procedure, iv) Other Holt-Laury (2002) risk
elicitation procedure, and v) Questionnaire(s). The order was fixed, moving from
Task One to Task Five in each session. Tasks are described in detail below.
3.2.1 Stochastic Gift Exchange
In the first task, subjects played eight one-shot Stochastic Gift Exchange
Games (SGE). For each SGE, a subject was randomly matched with another sub-
ject in the lab and the SGE was played in pairs. No subject played the SGE with
the same partner more than once. Subjects in the first eight sessions played the
standard SGE described in this section. In the remaining eight sessions, subjects
completed one of two variations on the standard SGE, explained in Section 3.3.3.
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The Stochastic Gift Exchange game was explained to subjects as follows:
There are two players, a Firm and an Employee. 3 Roles were assigned to
subjects in the first period and remained fixed for each of the eight SGE that were
played ina given session. The game contains two stages: Stage One in which the
Firm makes a decision and Stage Two in which the Employee makes a decision. In
Stage One, the Firm starts with 100 virtual “tokens” and can choose how many
they would like to give to the Employee. The Employee then receives five times
that number of tokens. In Stage Two, the Employee is given 100 additional tokens
and can choose how many (out of 100) they would like to give to the Firm. The
Firm then receives five times the number of tokens given to them by the Employee.
Each token held by the Firm or Employee at the end of Stage Two represents
a 1
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chance at a single prize of $20. The prize can be won by the Firm, the
Employee, or by neither; there is no event wherein both the Firm and Employee win
a monetary prize. Note that the initial endowments of 100 tokens each implies an
ex-ante endowment of a 10% chance of winning the prize, with the remaining 80%
held by the experimenter. At the end of Stage Two, the expected payoff for each





j ) = 20 ·
100− τ ti + 5τ tj
1000
(3.1)
where τ ti refers to the chosen transfer of tokens from player i to player j.
Note that only by transferring the entirety of both endowments from one player
3The terminology “Person 1” and “Person 2” were employed in our instructions for the roles
of “Firm” and “Employee,” respectively.
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to the other may a pair ensure that the prize would be won by either the Firm or
Employee. In this sense, trade is ex-ante Pareto Optimal, a feature shared by both
the Deterministic Gift Exchange game described in 3.2.2 and in other studies of
reciprocity that share a similar payoff structure.
In the SGE Task, subjects completed eight rounds of the SGE game for their
treatment using perfect stranger matching. Each subject kept the same role (either
Firm or Employee) for all eight rounds.
3.2.2 Deterministic Gift Exchange
The Deterministic Gift Exchange (GE) game was standard and works as de-
scribed above for SGE, except that payoffs were deterministic. Instead of receiving
100 tokens, subjects were given 100 Experimental Currency Units (ECU). Again, in
Stage One, the Firm chose how many of 100 ECU they would like to transfer to the
Employee. The Employee was then given five times that number of ECU. In Stage
Two, the Employee chose how many of 100 ECU they would like to transfer back






j ) = 100− τ ecui + 5τ ecuj (3.2)
where τ ecui refers to the chosen transfer of ECU from player i to player j. At the
end of this Task, ECU was converted to USD at a rate of 50 ECU to $1 USD. Note
that this exchange rate implies that if a given pair choses strategy profiles in SGE
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Employee), it would lead to equal
expected utilities across SGE and DGE for a risk-neutral agent.
Subjects completed one round of DGE in Task Two and were randomly matched
with another participant in the room. They had the same roles as were assigned
previously for SGE.
3.2.3 Self Holt-Laury Risk Elicitation Task
After completing both the SGE and DGE tasks, subjects were asked to com-
plete the risk preference elicitation task described in Holt and Laury (2002). In this
task, the subject was to make ten decisions, choosing between two options in each
decision. Each decision had a “safe” option and a “risky” option, as given in the
original Holt and Laury (2002) experiment. At the end of this task, two lotteries
(per subject) were conducted: one to decide which of the ten decisions to use for
payment, and one to realize the outcome of the subject’s choice for that decision.
Subjects were then informed of their payoff from this task.
3.2.4 Other Holt-Laury Risk Elicitation Task
Because SGE involves strategy choices that i) involve risk and ii) involve an-
other agent’s payoffs, we need to control for potential “other-regarding” risk pref-
erences. That is, it is possible that a subject’s choices among risk alternatives may
depend on whether that choice is made for oneself or on behalf of another person. To
this end, we repeated the risk preference elicitation task of Holt and Laury (2002),
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but instead informed subjects that they would be choosing on behalf of another
subject in the lab. They were also informed that another subject in the lab would
be choosing on their behalf, but that these people (i.e. the person for whom sub-
ject X is choosing and the person choosing on behalf of subject X) may not be the
same. This matching was completed anonymously and such that every subject made
decisions for one other subject in the room, but without explicit partner matching.4
3.2.5 Questionnaire
Finally, each subject completed a short demographic questionnaire. Subjects
were asked about their age, gender, self-reported SAT and ACT scores, and their
GPA. In addition, there was an open-ended field where subjects could give some
narrative justification for the decisions that they made in the experiment.
3.3 Results
Our subject pool is balanced in terms of age and gender. The average age of
our subjects was 20.125 years and 45.31% were female. Subject statistics, including
self-reported SAT, ACT, and GPA , are reported in Table 3.1 below.
As mentioned previously, there are several motivations for studying the pres-
ence of reciprocity in an environment with uncertainty. We consider each of them
in turn in the following subsections.
4Specifically, each subject was randomly assigned an id number from 1 to 16 in the experimental
program. Subject i then made decisions on behalf of subject i+1, with Subject 16 making decisions
on behalf of Subject 1. These id numbers were never revealed to subjects during this task.
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Table 3.1: Subject Statistics
mean sd min max count
Age 20.125 1.611235 16 29 256
Female .453125 .498773 0 1 256
SAT 1844.976 308.8474 1000 2400 210
ACT 29.91346 3.829144 18 36 104
GPA 3.364882 .4309551 1.7 4 254
Observations 256
SAT, ACT, GPA observations were dropped if the subject submitted infeasible responsed
4, 29, and 2 observations dropped for SAT, ACT, and GPA, respectively
3.3.1 Does Ex-Ante Reciprocity Exist?
Leading models of reciprocity, including Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000), and Cox et al. (2007), do not predict the presence of any
gift exchange in our environment when incorporated into an expected utility model.
More precisely, these theories can lead to positive wages and effort, but imply no
sensitivity of effort to the proffered wage.
From Figure 3.1 below, we can see both positive wages offered by the Firm
in SGE and positive Effort in response. There is also little evidence of learning:
no discernible trend in Wage or Effort by Period can be detected. Finally, offered
Wages, but not Effort, are somewhat lower on average in SGE relative to DGE.
These differences are explored further in Section 3.3.2
Provided Effort levels are also sensitive to the Wage offered in SGE. Figure 3.2
shows an overall positive relationship between offered Wage and Effort in response
in SGE: average Effort is roughly 10 tokens in response to Wages offered between
0 and 19 tokens, which increases to roughly 58 tokens in response to offered Wages
between 80 and 100 tokens. This effect remains when controlling for subject-level
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Figure 3.1: Mean Wage and Effort by Period
heterogeneity in the tobit regression specifications given in Table 3.6: the coefficient
on Wage is positive and significant in each model specification where the dependent
variable is Effort. Furthermore, the coefficient on Wage is significantly greater than
0.2, indicating that a strictly positive Wage was profitable in SGE in expectation.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of Effort: SGE and DGE



















Standard errors in parentheses
Tobit regressions with lower limit equal to 0 and upper limit equal to 100
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 3.2: Mean Effort by Wage: SGE
Taken together, the analysis above leads us to our first result:
Result 10. Ex-ante reciprocal motives exist in SGE:
• Mean Wages and Effort are both positive in SGE
• Effort provided by Employees is sensitive to the size of the Wage in SGE
• Positive Wages are profitable in expectation
3.3.2 Does Gift Exchange Differ Between SGE and DGE?
Having established that gift exchange does indeed exist in SGE, we now turn
to explicit differences between Wages and Effort between SGE and DGE. There are
several reasons why we might expect differences in either Wages or Effort between
the two environments. First, SGE involves an element of uncertainty not present
in DGE: one token transferred may not actually result in a change in the ex-post
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allocation of the recipient. As such, we might expect risk preferences to have an
effect on Wages and Effort in SGE, but not in DGE. Additionally, subjects are only
able to choose transfers based on ex-ante reciprocal motives in SGE, since no transfer
can chance the set of feasible ex-post allocations of the two players. In DGE, ex-ante
and ex-post reciprocal motives coincide: a transfer of one ECU from one player to
the other increases the allocation of the recipient in expectation (trivially) and in
actuality. Thus, if ex-post reciprocity matters, we may expect lower levels of Wages
or Effort in SGE relative to DGE.
Mean Wages and Effort are given in Table 3.4. On average, subjects offer
about 10.83 fewer tokens in the Wage in SGE relative to DGE (significant at the
α = 0.05 level). However, overall Effort levels are not different between the two
environments. These effects survive in tobit regression specifications in Tables 3.5
and 3.6, which control for potential learning (i.e. controlling for Period) and indi-
vidual heterogeneity. As seen in Table 3.5, subjects with higher GPAs offer higher
Wages and Female subjects offer fewer, on average.5 The same is not true for Ef-
fort provided in response. Additionally, there appears to be no learning in terms
of sensitivity of Wage to Period; however, Effort provided does decrease with each
Period.
This fundamental difference in Wages offered between SGE and DGE is not
limited to simply the mean. As can be seen in Table 3.7, more subjects offered a
Wage of zero in SGE, though this difference is not statistically significant. Addition-
5We view the detection of lower Wages offered on the part of our Female subjects as merely the
result of controlling for gender in our regression specifications, not as a fundamental result about
gender differences in giving. Ex-ante fairness concerns, ambiguity attitudes, and other preferences
may differ between men and women, none of which is controlled for in these specifications.
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Table 3.4: Mean Wage and Effort by Stochasticity
DGE SGE Difference
Wage 51.25 40.42 -10.83∗∗
(4.872) (1.595)
64 512
Effort 32.61 27.30 -5.305
(4.168) (1.474)
64 512
Std. Errors in Parentheses
Table 3.5: Determinants of Wage: SGE and DGE















Standard errors in parentheses
Tobit regressions with lower limit equal to 0 and upper limit equal to 100
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: Determinants of Effort: SGE and DGE



















Standard errors in parentheses
Tobit regressions with lower limit equal to 0 and upper limit equal to 100
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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ally, fewer subjects offered half of their endowment or all of their endowment (i.e.
Wage = 50, 100, respectively) in SGE. Figure 3.3 presents the CDF of Wages in SGE
and DGE, indicating a difference between these two distributions in the direction of
lower Wages overall in SGE. While Table 3.7 seems to indicate that fewer subjects
responded with Effort of 50 or 100 in SGE, Figure 3.4 shows that these two CDFs
are not statistically difference from one another.
Table 3.7: Wage and Effort Frequencies: SGE and DGE
DGE SGE Difference
Wage
0 0.0469 0.109 0.0625
(0.0266) (0.0138)
64 512
50 0.188 0.107 -0.0801∗
(0.0387) (0.0137)
64 512




0 0.312 0.250 -0.0625
(0.0542) (0.0192)
64 512
50 0.156 0.0840 -0.0723∗
(0.0457) (0.0123)
64 512
100 0.188 0.0957 -0.0918∗∗
(0.0368) (0.0130)
64 512
Std. Errors in Parentheses
Finally, given that there are meaningful differences between Wages offered in
environments with uncertainty (SGE) relative to those with none (DGE), it may
be a concern that the bulk of laboratory studies of gift exchange exclusively focus
on variants of DGE. Moreover, given that compensation schemes in the real world
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Figure 3.3: Wage CDF: SGE and DGE
Figure 3.4: Effort CDF: SGE and DGE
can involve stochastic elements (e.g. stock options, equity, retirement benefits) and
that the returns to effort provided by some worker will always be subject to both
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, this points to a weakness of the current body
of literature on gift exchange in terms of external validity. we then ask to what
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extent measures of reciprocity taken in DGE can proxy for behavior in SGE. The
results in Table 3.8 are not promising in this regard. These tobit regressions were
conducted with Wage in SGE as the dependent variable, using Wage in DGE by
the same subject as the primary independent variable. We control for both learning
(i.e. Period) and individual heterogeneity by GPA and gender. In neither model is
the coefficient on Wage DGE close to 1, which would indicate that Wages in DGE
are a perfect proxy for Wages in SGE. The coefficient is positive and significant, but
much variation in Wages under SGE is left unexplained by Wages in DGE alone.
6 The degree to which Wages in SGE vary even controlling for Wages in DGE can
further be seen in Figure 3.5. Confidence intervals at on the 95% level are quite
wide and do not indicate much precision in the estimation of Wages in SGE using
Wages in DGE alone.
Taken together, the analysis in this section leads us to our next three results:
Result 11. Wages are lower in SGE than in DGE:
• Mean Wages in SGE are lower than in DGE
• Cumulative distribution functions are different between SGE and DGE in the
direction of lower Wages in SGE
• There are fewer observations of Wages at 50 and 100 in SGE than in DGE
Result 12. Effort levels are equal across SGE and DGE.
6In an ideal setting, we could report the R2 from these regression specifications as a measure
of “variance in Wages under SGE explained by a DGE proxy.” However, tobit regressions, which
are required for this analysis due to the upper and lower limits on the strategy space for our
subjects, have no R2 statistic. Pseudo-R2s can be reported, but offer no similar interpretation in
this setting.
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Table 3.8: DGE as Proxy for SGE
Model 1 Model 2












Standard errors in parentheses
Tobit regressions with lower limit equal to 0 and upper limit equal to 100
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 3.5: Mean Wages in SGE by DGE Wage Range
Result 13. Wages in DGE are a poor proxy for Wages in SGE:
• The coefficient for “DGE Wage” with “SGE Wage” as the dependent variable
is significantly less than one in all relevant regression specifications
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• Conditional on Wages in DGE, there is significant variation in Wages in SGE
for the same subject
3.3.3 Does the Source of Risk Matter?
Given that i) reciprocity exists in the presence of risk and ii) there is a sys-
tematic difference in reciprocal behavior between environments with risk (SGE) and
environments with none (DGE), it is natural to ask whether the source of uncer-
tainty matters. In SGE, both Wages and Effort are subject to uncertainty: giving
one token only increases the expected payoff of the recipient, but cannot affect it
for sure. Moreover, there is a fundamental asymmetry in SGE due to its sequential
nature (i.e. Wages are offered before an Effort response is chosen).
In order to investigate whether the source of risk matters, we implemented four
sessions each of two variants on the SGE: a Wage-SGE and an Effort-SGE. Recall
that in SGE, both the Firm and Employee were endowed with 100 tokens, but in
DGE both were endowed with ECU. Both players were endowed with the same
good. In the two variants of SGE that we conducted, we instead endowed the Firm
and Employee with different goods with one receiving tokens and the other receiving
ECU. ECU were converted to cash directly at a rate of $1 USD to 50 ECU, just as
in DGE. Tokens each gave a chance at a $20 prize that could be won exclusivelyby
either player, just as in SGE. Table 3.9 below describes these endowments and the
expected payoffs of each player conditional on transfers τ ij , denominated in USD.
These asymmetric endowments contribute to asymmetric abilities to affect the
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Treatment Endowment Expected Payoffs
Firm Employee Firm Employee




























Table 3.9: Wage- and Effort-SGE Endowments and Payoffs
ex-ante and ex-post allocations between the two players. In Wage-SGE, the Firm
could affect only the ex-ante allocation of the two players, whereas the Employee
could affect both the ex-post allocation and, trivially, the ex-ante allocation. The
reverse is true in Effort-SGE. Does this asymmetry lead to different Wage or Effort
levels in these variants relative to SGE? We answer this and related questions in
this section.
Table 3.10 below displays Wage and Effort levels for all four variants of gift
exchange that we utilize in this study. Overall, Wage and Effort are lower in variants
of SGE than in DGE. This effect largely remains when we control for individual-level
heterogeneity, risk preferences, learning, and the size of the Wage offered in Table
3.11. In Table 3.11, Safe HL refers to the number of “safe” options chosen in the
Holt and Laury (2002) Task, while Safe Other HL is the analogous measure for our
variant where the subject chooses on behalf of another person. Neither Wages nor
Effort are affect by this measure of risk preferences. Notably, Effort is no lower in
SGE than in DGE once controlling for the size of the Wage (which is lower in SGE
than in DGE, as previously mentioned).
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Std. Errors in Parentheses
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Table 3.11: Treatment Effects
No Risk Preferences Risk Preferences
Wage Effort Wage Effort
Full SGE -22.10∗∗∗ -4.352 -21.83∗∗∗ -7.266
(6.362) (6.070) (7.262) (7.167)
Wage SGE -26.23∗∗∗ -23.55∗∗∗ -27.89∗∗∗ -32.16∗∗∗
(9.816) (7.269) (10.25) (8.587)
Effort SGE -21.77∗∗ -13.06∗ -19.60∗ -16.83∗∗
(9.379) (7.618) (10.25) (7.936)
DGE 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.)
GPA 18.49∗∗ -4.234 16.61∗ -3.228
(8.288) (4.555) (8.865) (5.350)
Female -24.78∗∗∗ 5.884 -30.40∗∗∗ 5.146
(7.335) (6.245) (8.071) (7.253)
Period -0.201 -1.555∗∗∗ 0.150 -2.146∗∗∗
(0.600) (0.570) (0.660) (0.649)
Wage 0.640∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗
(0.0605) (0.0665)
Safe HL 0.539 -0.753
(2.859) (2.292)
Safe Other HL -0.318 0.526
(2.289) (1.927)
Constant 12.94 18.09 18.48 20.06
(27.92) (16.39) (32.07) (18.40)
sigma
Constant 50.91∗∗∗ 43.31∗∗∗ 52.18∗∗∗ 44.80∗∗∗
(3.165) (3.371) (3.563) (3.899)
Observations 1152 1152 999 990
Standard errors in parentheses
Tobit regressions with lower limit equal to 0 and upper limit equal to 100
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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From Table 3.10, we can see that Wage levels are roughly the same across
all treatments with some uncertainty, ranging from 41.68 on average in Effort-SGE
to 42.59 on average in Wage-SGE, with SGE in the middle at 40.42. None of this
variation is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney p > 0.10 in each case). There
is, however, significant variation in mean Effort across treatments with uncertainty.
Effort is lower on average in both Wage-SGE and Effort-SGE than in SGE (Mann-
Whitney p < 0.01 for Wage-SGE vs SGE; Mann-Whitney p < 0.05 for Effort-SGE vs
SGE). However, effort is not significantly different between Wage-SGE and Effort-
SGE (Mann-Whitney p > 0.10). These differences in Effort levels are also present in
the entirety of the Effort distribution. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 display CDFs for Effort
between SGE and Wage-SGE and Effort-SGE, respectively. Both are significantly
different in the direction of lower overall effort in both Effort-SGE and Wage-SGE.
However, when controlling for the size of the Wage, Effort levels in Effort-SGE are
not significantly different than in SGE, as displayed in Table 3.12 below, though
the coefficient is still negative. Taking these results together, we say that Effort
is weakly lower in Effort-SGE than in SGE. This difference is strict for Wage-SGE
relative to SGE.
Taken together, the analysis above gives us our next results:
Result 14. The source of uncertainty does not matter for Wages and Effort:
• Wages are lower in SGE, Wage-SGE, and Effort-SGE relative to DGE, equally
and regardless of the source of uncertainty
• Effort levels are equally lower in both Wage-SGE and Effort-SGE relative to
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Table 3.12: Effort Across SGEs
No Risk Preferences Risk Preferences
Wage 0.608∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗
(0.0591) (0.0661)
Full SGE 0 0
(.) (.)
Wage SGE -18.92∗∗∗ -24.75∗∗∗
(6.682) (8.114)


















Standard errors in parentheses
Tobit regressions with lower limit equal to 0 and upper limit equal to 100
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 3.6: Effort CDF: Wage-SGE and SGE
Figure 3.7: Effort CDF: Effort-SGE and SGE
DGE
Result 15. Asymmetries in uncertainty matter for reciprocal Effort:
• Effort levels are lower in Wage-SGE and (weakly) Effort-SGE relative to SGE
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3.4 Discussion
In the above we have shown that i) gift exchange exists in environments with
uncertainty; ii) there are significant differences in Wages and Effort offered in en-
vironments with uncertainty relative to those with none; and iii) the source of un-
certainty does not affect positive reciprocity, but the asymmetry of uncertainty in
the form of endowments does. Our results have implications for both how scholars
should interpret laboratory findings regarding positive reciprocity and how these
results should feed into the development of new theories of social preferences un-
der uncertainty. We turn to each of these implications in turn in the following
subsections.
3.4.1 On Gift Exchange With Uncertainty
To our knowledge, no leading model of reciprocity, including Falk and Fis-
chbacher (2006), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Cox et al. (2007), predicts posi-
tive levels of gift exchange in SGE. This is partly due to the reliance of these models
on reciprocity coming from two channels: reciprocal intentions and outcome. We
interpret “reciprocity regarding outcome” as ex-post reciprocity. Due to the asym-
metrical nature of the ex-post allocation and the nature of transfers in SGE, we
have effectively shut down this channel for reciprocal motives: subjects have no way
to either offer wages or effort to affect the ex-post outcome. Another way of stating
this is that trade from one player to another can only increase the probability of an
ex-post unfair outcome (i.e. one player winning $20 and the other player winning
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nothing). As such, models of reciprocity based exclusively on the ex-post allocation
will predict no trade in our environment.
Reliance on the ex-post allocation alone is a modelling issue that had previ-
ously been identified in the gift exchange body of literature. As such, Falk and
Fischbacher (2006) and related models include measures of the “intentionality” of
a gift, such that a recipient can identity and reward “good intentions” that do not
necessarily positively affect the ex-post allocation. We have also shut down this
channel as a meaningful source of variation between SGE and DGE. A gift of a
positive number of tokens in SGE can be nothing other than fully intentional, ex-
clusively meant to increase the expected payoff of the recipient. One might expect
then that Falk and Fischbacher (2006) or related models may predict positive gift ex-
change in SGE. However, the psychological game presented in Falk and Fischbacher
(2006) is not easily modified to include uncertainty regarding the allocation, since
it already includes an ad-hoc notion of uncertainty regarding the intentions of the
players (through the use of higher-order beliefs). An expected utility treatment of
this model to generate predictions for SGE does not generate our results.
As such, similar to the lesson of Brock et al. (2013), we view a contribution
of this work as identifying a need for further generalizations of extant theories of
reciprocity to include a notion of “ex-ante” reciprocal concerns. A treatment of
such concerns as merely “positive intentions” as would be required in Falk and
Fischbacher (2006) is not sufficient to explain both i) positive Wages in SGE and
ii) sensitivity of Effort to Wages in SGE. One may think that a reasonable first
pass would be to take an approach similar to that taken in Saito (2013) for social
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preferences under risk. However, as we propose in Section 3.4.3, such an approach
would still fall short of fitting our data.
3.4.2 On The Limits of Laboratory Gift Exchange
Our results indicate that the body of literature on gift exchange in the labo-
ratory may be significantly overestimating the amount of positive reciprocity in the
real world. In the DGE, our subjects offered Wages of 54.77 ECU or roughly half
of their endowment on average across all treatments. Employee subjects responded
with average Effort of 34.16 ECU, roughly one third of their endowment. These
Wage and Effort levels are roughly in-line with other laboratory studies of gift ex-
change that use the same payoff functions. Wages were 59.0 ECU on average in the
“No Minimum Wage” treatment of Owens and Kagel (2010) and 50.7 ECU overall
in Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2016), both of which used idential payoff functions to that
used herein.7 Effort levels are roughly 29.1 in Owens and Kagel (2010) and 25.2 in
Filiz-Ozbay et al. (2016).
However, we find considerably lower Wages in treatments with uncertainty and
lower Effort levels in treatments with asymmetric endowments. In the real world,
compensation packages can take many forms, some including some degree of uncer-
tainty (e.g. stock options, equity payouts, insurance benefits, etc.). Additionally,
the return associated with a given Effort level will be subject to both idiosyncratic
and aggregate shocks. The uncertainty associated with these two aspects of gift
7Brandts and Charness (2004) also use several linear payoff functions similar to ours, but Wages
offered were not “dictated”: Employee subjects viewed posted Wages and choose to accept/reject
them in a market setting. As such, their Wage/Effort levels were elicited in a different institutional
setting and are not comparable to ours.
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exchange may also be asymmetric. As such, we should expect to find that gift ex-
change in the real world is more in-line with our results derived from treatments
with uncertainty and by focusing on environments with no uncertainty, the body of
literature on gift exchange in the lab may be overestimating the amount of positive
reciprocity one can expect in a reasonable real-world environment.
3.4.3 On Ex-Ante vs Ex-Post Reciprocity
We have seen in the Wage-SGE and Effort-SGE treatments that Employee
subjects (weakly) prefer to keep more of their endowment when they are endowed
with ECU, conditional on the size of the Wage offered. For example, in Wage-SGE
when a subject is given tokens but can only respond with ECU, they give less than
when they can respond with tokens in kind. The analogous is true for Effort-SGE.
What we’ve identified is a form of the endowment effect wherein subjects prefer to
keep what they already own. However, notice that tokens and ECU are effectively
the same good: both tokens and ECU represent lotteries over monetary prizes, with
ECU merely being degenerate versions of tokens with the same expected value.
What is different between a token and an ECU is that the former can affect ex-
ante allocations only, while the latter can affect both the expected payment and the
ex-post allocation. In our view, we are thus documenting an endowment effect with
regards to ex-ante vs ex-post reciprocity motives rather than strict goods. Consider
a gift of 1 token from Firm to Employee in Wage-SGE. The Firm has increased the
expected payoff of the Employee, but has not affected the set of feasible ex-post
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allocations. When the Employee can only respond by using ECU, they are forced to
compensate ex-ante giving with ex-post giving. The reverse is true in Effort-SGE.
Because we see that Effort levels in both Wage-SGE and Effort-SGE are lower than
SGE, but not Wages, we argue that Employee subjects are biased toward their own
endowments. Such behavior is not consistent with current interpretations of the
interplay between ex-ante and ex-post fairness.
Consider one of the most widely-used models of ex-ante vs ex-post fairness, the
Expected Inequality Aversion (EIA) model of Saito (2013). In this model, decision
makers maximize a value function that is a weighted sum of ex-ante fairness motives
and ex-post fairness motives. This value function is given by the following:
V (p) = δU [Ep(x)] + (1− δ)Ep[U(x)] (3.3)
where Ep(·) is the expected value according to some lottery p, U(·) is an inequal-
ity aversion utility function of Fehr et al. (1993), and δ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of
the strength of the ex-ante fairness motive of the decision maker. Ex-ante motives
are described by a preference for equality in expectation, given by U [Ep(x)] above.
Ex-post motives are described by the standard inequality averse utility function ex-
tended to the expected utility case, given by Ep[U(x)]. Any model that combines
ex-ante and ex-post motives in this way will imply that actions taken taken to affect
the ex-ante portion of the decision maker’s value function can be directly compen-
sated with commensurate actions to affect the ex-post portion: for any change ∆ in
U [Ep(x)], a change of ∆
′ = δ
(1−δ)∆ in Ep[U(x)] will have the same effect on V (p).
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This implication is not borne out in our data. While Wages remain constant
across SGE, Wage-SGE, and Effort-SGE, Effort levels are systematically lower in
the latter two. This cannot be explained by any model that relies on ex-ante and ex-
post motives being separable. Lower Effort in Wage-SGE relative to SGE can only
mean that Employee subjects believe that fewer ECU are required to compensate
for a given gift of tokens (i.e. Wages in SGE and Wage-SGE). This would imply
a particular rate of exchange between ex-ante and ex-post motives. However, since
Wages are also equal across SGE and Effort-SGE, this rate of exchange should then
imply higher Effort in Effort-SGE, since the Wage now affects ex-post motives in
the form of ECU. This is not the case in our data, where we find weakly lower Effort
levels in Effort-SGE relative to SGE. The result is a form of the endowment effect,
not on the good that makes up the endowment, but on which motive, ex-ante or
ex-post, the endowment is capable of affecting. When endowed with the ability to
affect only the ex-ante allocation, as in SGE and Effort-SGE, Employee subjects
seem to care more about giving in expectation. When endowed with the ability to
affect the ex-post allocation, as in Wage-SGE, they seem to care more about giving
in terms of the final allocation.
While extant models of reciprocity and fairness incorporating ex-ante concerns
cannot immediately explain our data, we view the identification of this endowment
effect as being a worthwhile place to begin theoretical examinations of ex-ante reci-
procity. It is possible that a model of loss aversion a la Tversky and Kahneman
(1991), modified to consider “ex-ante” vs “ex-post” domains instead of the tradi-
tional “gain/loss” framework could explain our results. Similarly, models incorpo-
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rating status quo bias, such as Masatlioglu et al. (2005) or Dean et al. (2017), could
be extended into the an ex-ante/ex-post framework. These theoretical questions are
beyond the scope of the current work, but we view them as fodder for interesting
further exploration.
3.5 Conclusion
In this work, we study i) the presence of positive reciprocity in environments
with risk and ii) the difference in the form of reciprocity when uncertainty is present.
Our results tell us about the limits of exclusively studying gift exchange in deter-
ministic environments in the lab, but also provide plausible routes upon which to
theoretically study ex-ante reciprocity. Considering the presence of an endowment
effect on reciprocal motives in our results, we view reference-dependent models as
providing a decent starting point for future theoretical exploration of these ques-
tions.
Considering the differential effects of uncertainty in the transfer between Firm
and Employee on expected profit and reciprocal motives, it remains to be see just
what mixture of uncertainty is optimal. Should Firms lower the proportion of a com-
pensation scheme dedicated to stock options and/or equity, given that Employees
respond with lower effort in response? Should Firms invest in lowering the uncer-
tainty in how employee effort feeds into firm profit? We view studying these and
related questions as being fruitful follow-up studies to that contained herein.
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A.6 Proofs For Chapter 1
Lemma 1. For any g such that g[S] is T-Connected for some T ⊆ S, g[S ′] is




GS′T ′ for all S ⊆ S ′.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and comes from the definitions of g[S] and T -
Connectedness. Recall that g[S] = g −
∑
{i,j}⊆X\S
gij. If g[S] is T -Connected, by
definition, there exists a t − t′ path in g[S] for all t, t′ ∈ T , t 6= t′. Each of these






each t, t′ ∈ T is connected under g[S ′].
Let T ′ be the largest set of nodes in S ′ such that each t, t′ ∈ T ′ is connected
under g[S ′] and T ′ ⊇ T . Clearly T ′ 6= ∅, since T itself is connected under g[S ′] by
the above logic. Then g[S ′] is T ′-Connected.
To show that T ′ is unique, suppose it isn’t and consider T ′′ ⊆ S ′, but T ′′ 6= T .
Note that T ⊂ T ′′, by construction, so either i) ∃t′′ ∈ T ′′ such that t′′ 6∈ T ′ or ii)
T ′′ ⊆ T ′. Suppose it is case (i), then T ′ was not the largest set of nodes in S ′ such
that each t, t′ ∈ T ′ is connected under g[S ′], since t′′ is connected to some t ∈ T (by
T ⊆ T ′′) and T ′∪{t′′} ⊇ T ′, a contradiction. Next, suppose it is case (ii), then g[S ′]
is not T ′′-Connected, since ∃t′′ ∈ T ′ \ T ′′ that is connected to some t ∈ T ⊆ T ′′ by
construction, which is a contradiction. Therefore, T ′ is unique.
Proposition 1. If Γx(T | S) is a random consideration set mapping such that i)
Γx(T | S) ∈ {0, 1} for all x ∈ T ⊆ S and ii) Γx satisfies A1 - A3, then Γx(S)
156
satisfies B1 - B3 where Γx(S) = T for Γx(T | S) = 1.
Proof. Let Γx(T | S) be a random consideration set mapping such that i) Γx(T |
S) ∈ {0, 1} for all x ∈ T ⊆ S and ii) Γx satisfies A1 - A3. Let Γx(S) = T for
Γx(T | S) = 1




′ | S ′)
for each x ∈ T ⊆ S and S ′ ⊇ S. By definition of Γx(T ′ | S ′), which requires
that Γx(T
′ | S ′) = 1 for some unique T ′ ⊆ S ′, there exists some T ′′ such that
Γx(T




′ | S ′) ≥ 1 = Γx(T | S),
ensures that T ⊂ T ′′. Then Γx(S) = T ⊆ T ′′ = Γx(S ′) and Γx(S) satisfies B1.
B2. Consider Γx(S) and Γy(S), assuming x, y ∈ S and that y ∈ Γx(S). Then
∃T, T ′ where Γx(T | S) = 1 = Γy(T ′ | S). Since y ∈ Γx(S), y ∈ T and T = T ′,
since by A2 y ∈ T implies Γx(T | S) = Γy(T | S) = 1. Then Γx(S) = Γy(S)
and Γx(S) satisfies B2.
B3. Let z ∈ Γx(S) and z 6∈ Γx(S \ {y}). Then z ∈ T for T such that Γx(T | S) = 1
and z 6∈ T ′ for Γx(T ′ | S \ {y}) = 1. Note that T ′ is the only subset of S \ {y}
for which Γx(T
′ | S \ {y}) > 0, by definition of Γx(T | S) and Γx ∈ {0, 1}.
Since Γx(T | S) satisfies A3, 6 ∃T ′′ with y ∈ T ′′ such that Γx(T ′′ | S \ {z}) > 0
and 6 ∃T ′′′ with z ∈ T ′′′ such that Γy(T ′′ | S \ {x}) > 0. Then, by definition of
Γx(S), y 6∈ Γx(S \ {z}) and z 6∈ Γy(S \ {x}). Therefore, Γx(S) satisfies B3.
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Proposition 2. If a random consideration set mapping has a random network con-
sideration set mapping representation, it satisfies RNC Symmetry, RNC Upward
Monotonicity, and RNC Path Connectedness.
Proof. Suppose a random consideration set mapping Γ has a random network con-
sideration set mapping G:
RNC Symmetry Consider any T ⊂ S with {x, y} ⊆ T and x 6= y. If
Gx(T | S) > 0, then there exists some network g[S] that is T -Connected. Since
y ∈ T , g[S] will also be included in Gy(T | S). Therefore, Gx(T | S) ≤ Gy(T | S).
Gy(T | S) ≤ Gx(T | S) by the same logic. Finally, if Gx(T | S) = 0, then there are
no y ∈ G such that g[S] is T -Connected. This will hold regardless of the starting
point in T , so Gy(T | S) = 0 as well. Then RNC Symmetry holds
RNC Upward Monotonicity Given Lemma 1, the proof is trivial. With }[S]T ⊆⋃
T ′⊆S′:T⊆T ′
GS′T ′ for all S ⊆ S ′, the statement follows directly from the definition of
Gx(T | S).
RNC Path Connectedness Let T be such that z ∈ T with Gx(T | S) > 0. Then
there exists some g[S] ∈ GST where f(g[S]) > 0. Since 6 ∃T ′ ⊆ S \ {y} with z ∈ T ′
such that Gx(T
′ | S\{y}) > 0, then every path that connects x to z under g[S] must
include y as an intermediate node. To see why this is the case, consider some x-z
path in g[S] that does not include y as an intermediate node. When y is removed
from S, this path remains (since y was not on this path under g[S]) and Gx(T
′ |
S \ {y}) > 0 for T ′ = {j | j is connected to some node on this x-z path in g[S]}
since f(g[S]) > 0. Since there exists an x-y-z path in yS, we can consider each
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sub-path independently.
Consider the x-y sub-path. When z is removed from S, this path survives, and
if we let T ′′ = {j ∈ S \ {z} | j is connected to some node on the x-z path in g[S]},
then Gx(T
′′ | S \ {z}) > 0, since f(g[S]) > 0.
By similar logic, Gy(T
′′′ | S\{x}) > 0 for T ′′′ = {j ∈ S\{x} | j is connected to some node on the y-z path in g[S]}.
Lemma 2. For any RNC π, x is revealed preferred to y if ∃S ⊆ X such that:
πy(x | S) > 0 (A.4)
Proof. For some π with an RNC representation, suppose that there exists S ⊆ X
such that πy(x | S). Choose some RNC representation of π, call it (F̂ , ̂). By
definition of π with an RNC representation, this implies that ∃T ⊆ S with {x, y} ⊆
T where GFy (T | S) > 0. Further, by definition, x is ̂−best in T . Since y ∈ T ,
x̂y according to this representation.
To show that x  y for all RNC representations, suppose not. Then ∃(F ′,′
) 6= (F̂ , ̂) that also represents π, but for which y ′ x. However, πy(x | S) > 0
implies that x ′ y, by the above logic, a contradiction.
Lemma 3. For some RNC π, x is revealed preferred to y if, and only if, xPRy.
Proof. →:
The if part of this proof is trivial. Since xPRy, either xPy, indicating that x
is revealed preferred to y directly by Lemma 2 or ∃k such that xPk and kPy. In
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the latter case, xPk and kPy in all representations of π, again by Lemma 2, which,
by transitivity of  implies that xPRy in all RNC representations of π. Thus, x is
revealed preferred to y.
←:
Suppose that x is revealed preferred to y, but not xPRy. Since PR is the
transitive closure of P , it can be written as PR =
⋃
i=1,2,3,...
P i, where P 1 = P and
P i+1 = P ◦ P i. Then, if xPRy, (x, y) ∈ P i for some i and there then exists some
finite sequence {k0, k1, ..., kn} where xPk0P...PknPy. Since (x, y) 6∈ PR, there exists
no such finite sequence.
By Lemma 2, all representations of π will be such that P ⊆. Select one,
calling it (F,). From this, we construct an additional RNC (F,′), where ′ is
such that:
1. P ⊆′
2. (y, x) ∈′
3. ′ is transitive
Note that by the last requirement, PR ⊆′ (all transitive supersets of P will include
PR). Since (x, y) 6∈ PR, the construction of ′ to include P and (y, x) is valid.
We claim that (F,′) also represents π. To show this, let π′ be RNC choice
probabilities under ′ and consider πw(z | S) and π
′
w (z | S) for some arbitrary
w, z ∈ S.
Case 1: (z, w) ∈ P or (w, z) ∈ P
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Suppose, to the contrary, that πw(z | S) > π
′
w (z | S), without loss of gen-
erality. Then ∃ some T ⊆ S with {w, z} ⊆ T and z as -best in T , but z is not
′ −best in T , with some g[S] ∈ GST such that f(g[S]) > 0. Let t
′
be the ′-best
element in T . Note that t
′ 6= w, since (z, w) ∈ P ⊆′. Let T ′ ⊆ T be the set of all
nodes on some w − t′ path in g[S]. Now consider πt′ (z | T ′). Since f(g[S]) > 0,
t
′
and z are connected under g[S], and πt′ (z | T ′) > 0, since z is -best in T ⊇ T ′.
Then (z, t
′
) ∈ P ⊆′, a contradiction.
For (w, z) ∈ P , follow the above logic, reversing the roles of w and z.
Case 2: (z, w) and (w, z) 6∈ P
Since neither (z, w) nor (w, z) ∈ P , by definition πw(z | S) = πz(w | S) = 0
for all S ⊆ X. Suppose under , z  w. Then for πw(z | S) = 0 to be true, either i)
f(g[S]) = 0 for all g[S] such that z and w are connected or ii) for all g[S] such that
f(g[S]) > 0 and z is connected to w, all w−z paths in g[S] include some node k such
that k  z and k  w. Clearly, if F such that (i) holds, π′w (z | S) = π
′
z (w | S) = 0.
Then if (ii) holds, for each g[S] such that f(g[S]) > 0 and z is connected
to w, and for each a w − z path that includes some node k such that k  z,
consider independently the w− k and k− z sub-paths. Denote the sets of nodes for




k−z , respectively. Then πw(k | T
g[S]
w−k) > 0 and
πz(k | T g[S]k−z ) > 0, since f(g[S]) > 0. It follow then, that {(k, w), (k, z)} ⊆ P ⊆′
and π
′
w (z | S) = π
′
z (w | S) = 0 for all S ⊆ X.
Therefore, π
′
= π and (F,′) also represents π. Since both (F,) and (F,′)
represent π, but (y, x) ∈′, x is not revealed preferred to y, a contradiction.
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Lemma 4. Let π be an RNC and let x and y be such that there exists some set
S ⊇ {x, y, z} such that the following holds:
πz(x | S) > πz(x | S \ {y}) (A.5)
Then (x, y) ∈ P and x is revealed preferred to y.
Proof. Let x and y be such that there exists some set S and z ∈ S such that
πz(x | S) > πz(x | S \ {y}). Then when S is available, there exists some network
g[S] ∈ GST for some T ⊇ {x, z} such that x is  −best in T and f(g[S]) > 0.
Suppose, to the contrary, that y 6∈ T . Then if g[S] is T -Connected, gS\{y} is also
T -Connected. Then πz(x | S) = πz(x | S \ {y}), since this will hold for all T such
that y 6∈ T and x is -best in T , a contradiction. Then y ∈ T .
Note that if g[S] is T -Connected, gT is T -Connected. Then πy(x | T ) > 0,
since f(g[S]) = f(gT ) > 0, {x, y} ⊆ T , x is -best in T , and gT is T -Connected.
Therefore, (x, y) ∈ P and x is revealed preferred to y.
Lemma 5. Let π be a PM-RNC with representations (µπ,π). Then µi = µ̄ for all
(µi,i) representations of π (i.e. µ is unique).
Proof. This lemma is fairly straightforward and is a function of the restrictions
imposed by the particular consideration structure.
Note that for this lemma to hold, we must show that for any (succi, µi) and
(j, µj) that both represent π, µikl = µ
j
kl k, l ∈ X such that k 6= l.
Suppose k  l (or k is revealed preferred to l). Then the following must be
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true πl(k | {k, l}) = µikl since µi represents π. Similarly, πl(k | {k, l}) = µ
j
kl. It
follows that µikl = µ
j
kl for all k, l such that k is revealed preferred to l.
But what if k cannot be revealed preferred to l? Assume to the contrary that
µikl > 0 for some µ
i that represents π. By definition,
πl(k | {k, l}) =

µikl, for k i l
0, for l i k
(A.6)
Since µikl > 0 and 6 (k  l), l i k. By definition,
πk(l | {k, l}) =

µikl, for l i k
0, for k i l
(A.7)
Since µikl > 0 and l i k, πk(l | {k, l}) > 0, which implies that l  k, a
contradiction.
Thus, for any two elements k and l where we cannot reveal preference, µikl = 0
for any µi that represents π.
Proposition 3. If an RNC Gx has a PM-RNC representation, it satisfies PM-RNC
Binary Separability.
Proof. The proof is written for S ′ = {z}, but the aggregate of the logic to larger S ′
is trivial.
Let Gx be an RNC with a PM-RNC representation, which is denoted as the
matrix of consideration weights µ. For any network g, the probability that it occurs
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[1{gij = 1}µij + 1{gij = 0}(1− µij)]
Then for any starting point x in set S, the probability that set T ⊆ S is
considered is given by the following, for any non-trivial probability:









[1{gij = 1}µij + 1{gij = 0}(1− µij)]
Note that by Lemma 1, if gS∪{z} is T -Connected, then g[S] is also T -Connected.
In other words, Γx(T | S ∪ {z}) can be constructed by beginning with GST and
subtracting out those networks for which g[S] is not T -Connected.
Consider a partition P(GST ) of GST into subsets where g and g′ are included in
the same subset if gij = g
′
ij for all {i, j} 6= {t, z} for some z 6∈ S and t ∈ T . Let P





where f(P ) is taken to be probability over all networks in P . Recalling that on
each g ∈ P is such that g[S] is T -Connected, restrict attention only to those in P
such that gS∪{z} is T -Connected. There is clearly a single g ∈ P such that gS∪{z} is
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T -Connected, the network g such that gtz = 0 for all t ∈ T (otherwise, gS∪{z} would
not be T -Connected). Let this unique g ∈ P be denoted g∗(P ). Since g∗tz(P ) = 0




Then Γx(T | S ∪ {z}) can be constructed as follows:


























(1− µtz)Γx(T | S)
The result then directly follows an observation that (1 − µtz) is simply equal
to Γz({z} | {t, z}) in the PM-RNC model.
Proposition 4. In the RNC Advertising Game with parameters α, β, and c, such
that (α, β, c) is in the unit cube, there exist non-empty subsets of the parameter space
where:
1. σ∗ = (1, 0, 1) is supported as a Nash Equilibrium
2. σ′ = (0, 1, 0) is not supported as a Nash Equilibrium
3. Aggregate profit under σ′ is higher than under σ∗
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Proof. 1. σ∗ = (1, 0, 1) is supported as a Nash Equilibrium:
First, consider each firm’s incentives under σ∗ = (1, 0, 1). Firm A’s expected









In order for Firm A to not have an incentive to unilaterally deviate to σA = 0,











The condition for Firm C is identical.
Conditional on Firm’s A and C choosing to advertise, Firm B has no incentive














Clearly there exist positive α and c such that conditions A.9 and A.10 hold.
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2. σ′ = (0, 1, 0) is not supported as a Nash Equilibrium:













The condition is identical for Firm C.






3. Aggregate profit under σ′ is higher than under σ∗
This should be clear from the definition of the profit function. Under σ∗,
aggregate profit is equal to 1 − 2c, since two firms are advertising, whereas
under σ′ it is simply 1− c.
A.7 Additional Results
A.7.1 Results by Baseline/Context
167
Table A.13: Correct Rate by Treatment
NC C
Mean 0.851 0.863
Std Error 0.009 0.009
N 1733 1555
Wilcox p > 0.10 for H0 : µC = µNC .
Table A.14: Monotonicity Violations by Context
Baseline Context
Mean 0.791 0.805
Std Error 0.012 0.013
N 1140 1000
Wilcox p > 0.10 for H0 : µBaseline = µContext
Figure A.8: Cumulative Distribution of Mean MV by Subject and Treatment
Table A.15: Path Connectedness by Context
Baseline Context
Mean 0.456 0.452
Std Error 0.067 0.078
N 57 42
Mann-Whitney p > 0.10 for H0 : µBaseline = µContext
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A.7.2 Omitted Results
Table A.16: Determinants of Consideration Set Size
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
N 0.217∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)








Constant 4.241∗∗∗ 2.687∗∗ 4.520∗∗∗
(0.234) (1.106) (0.859)
Observations 25811 25811 21525
Standard errors in parentheses




Thank you for participating in the experiment today. At this time, please be
sure that your cell phone is turned off and stored away. At no point during this
experiment should you use your cell phone or any other electronic device. Also,
please refrain from communicating with any other subject in the lab today. Failure
to follow these rules will result in your expulsion from the lab and you will forfeit
any cash earnings you may have otherwise received.
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This is an experiment in decision making. You will be paid a $7 guaranteed
show-up fee in addition to earnings based on your decisions in the experiment.
Decision Environment
In each of 31 periods, you will be faced with a number of options from which
you can select one. Each option has 4 attributes: Shape, Pattern, Size, and Number.
The value of an individual attribute is given in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs)
in the following table:
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Shape Value Pattern Value Size Value Number Value
1 ECU 1 ECU EXTRA SMALL 1 ECU 1 1 ECU
2 ECU 2 ECU SMALL 2 ECU 2 2 ECU
3 ECU 3 ECU MEDIUM 3 ECU 3 3 ECU
4 ECU 4 ECU LARGE 4 ECU 4 4 ECU
5 ECU 5 ECU EXTRA LARGE 5 ECU 5 5 ECU
The value of a given option is the sum of the value of its attributes as per the
table above.
In each period, you will be shown a version of the following screen:
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The screen is composed of the following parts (left to right, top to bottom):
Option Label: this is the option for which information is currently displayed.
In the example, Option 19 is shown along with information on the Attributes of
Option 19. Option Labels have been chosen randomly for each Period and do not
reflect the value of the option. Moreover, two options with the same option label
may have different values in different periods.
Current Choice: this is the option that you are currently holding as your
choice. This will be explained in detail below. In addition to the label for your
Current Choice, you are shown information about the Attributes for your Current
Choice for your reference.
Attribute Information: these are the attributes for the option currently dis-
played. The value of each option is the sum of its attributes as according to the
table above. For example, the value of Option 19 in the example above is 16 ECU
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(5 for Heptagon + 3 for Two-Bar Pattern + 5 for Extra Large + 3 for Number 3 =
16).
Choose this Option Button: you can click this button to change your Current
Choice to the option that is currently displayed. If your Current Choice is the
option that is currently displayed, this portion of the screen with display The option
currently displayed is your Current Choice.
Linked Options: this is a clickable list of options that are Linked to the cur-
rently displayed option. An option is Linked to the currently displayed option if
it shares 2 or more attributes with the currently displayed option. For example, if
there was another Option in the current Period with a Two-Bar Pattern and the
Number 3, it would be shown in the list of Linked Options for Option 19 in the
screenshot above. Note that this list may be quite long, in which case you will see
a scroll bar next to the list of Linked Options.
Options Already Viewed: this is a clickable list of options that have already
been viewed by you in the given period. You can click on any option in this list and
click View Selected Option to view information for that option again. Again, if the
list of Options Already Viewed gets sufficiently long, you will be shown a scroll bar
next to the list. Note: you can only view information for options other than the
one currently displayed by either clicking on it in the Linked Options menu or the
Options Already Viewed menu.
Stop: if you would like to Stop looking at information for the available options
and would not like to change your Current Choice, you can click the Stop button.
Period Duration
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In each period, you will have up to 75 seconds to evaluate all of the available
options and make choices. At any time, you can click Stop and you will not be
shown any more information on any of the options for the given period. Note: in
order to move on to the next period, you must wait for the entire 75 seconds to pass
in the current period. Thus, if you Stop after, say, 45 seconds in the current period,
you will still have to wait the remaining 30 seconds for the period to end in order
to move on to the next period.
Choices
At the end of each Period, a random time between 2 and 75 seconds will be
chosen and your Current Choice held at that time will be implemented as your
chosen option for that Period. Each time between 2 and 75 seconds is equally likely
to be chosen.When evaluating options during the 75 seconds, you will not know at
what time your Current Choice will be implemented as your chosen option for that
Period. At the beginning of each Period, you will start off being shown information
for one particular Option but will have no Current Choice. If you do not have a
Current Choice at the time chosen randomly by the computer program to implement
your choice, you will be paid nothing for the current Period. Thus, it is in your best
interest to choose any Option as soon as possible. You can then replace it with a
better option when/if you find an option that has a higher value.
At the end of each period, you will be told i) at what time your Current Choice
was implemented, ii) which Option you held at that time, and iii) what the value
(in ECU) of that option was.
For clarification purposes, consider the following example: a subject is in
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Time 0 Seconds 30 Seconds 40 Seconds
Option Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Value 10 ECU 12 ECU 14 ECU
Period 4 with a time limit of 75 seconds and they immediately choose the first
option shown to them, Option 1, which has a value that they have determined to
be 10 ECU. After 30 seconds, the subject changes their Current Choice to Option
2 with a value of 12 ECU and continues evaluating the available options. After
10 more seconds (40 in total since the start of the period), the subject selects a
new Current Choice of Option 3 with a value of 14 ECU. The subject makes no
further choices and the 75 seconds runs out. The subject’s choices are shown in the
following table:
If the time chosen randomly by the system at the end of the Period is anywhere
between 2 and 30 seconds, the subject will be paid 10 ECU (for holding Option 1).
If it is anywhere between 30 and 40 seconds, they will be paid 12 ECU (for holding
Option 2). If it is 40 seconds or higher, they will be paid 14 ECU.
Earnings
You will be paid a guaranteed show-up fee of $7 in addition to your earnings
for your decision. The value of the option that is treated as your final choice for a
period (i.e. the option held by you at the time chosen by the system) is the sum
of the value of its Attributes as given in the table above. Experimental Currency
Units (ECUs) will be converted to cash (USD) at a rate of 1 ECU = $1 USD.
Though you will make decisions in each of 31 periods, you will only be paid
for 1 of these periods. Which period will be paid will be chosen at random at the
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end of the experiment, with each period being equally likely to be chosen. Thus, it
is in your best interest to behave in each period as if it is the period for which you
will be paid.
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A.8.2 Environment with Context
Instructions
Thank you for participating in the experiment today. At this time, please be
sure that your cell phone is turned off and stored away. At no point during this
experiment should you use your cell phone or any other electronic device. Also,
please refrain from communicating with any other subject in the lab today. Failure
to follow these rules will result in your expulsion from the lab and you will forfeit
any cash earnings you may have otherwise received.
This is an experiment in decision making. You will be paid a $7 guaranteed
show-up fee in addition to earnings based on your decisions in the experiment.
Decision Environment
In each of 31 periods, you will be faced with a number of options from which
you can select one. Each option has 4 attributes: Shape, Pattern, Size, and Number.
The value of an individual attribute is given in Experimental Currency Units (ECUs)
in the following table:
177
Shape Value Pattern Value Size Value Number Value
1 ECU 1 ECU EXTRA SMALL 1 ECU 1 1 ECU
2 ECU 2 ECU SMALL 2 ECU 2 2 ECU
3 ECU 3 ECU MEDIUM 3 ECU 3 3 ECU
4 ECU 4 ECU LARGE 4 ECU 4 4 ECU
5 ECU 5 ECU EXTRA LARGE 5 ECU 5 5 ECU
The value of a given option is the sum of the value of its attributes as per the
table above.
In each period, you will be shown a version of the following screen:
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The screen is composed of the following parts (left to right, top to bottom):
Option Label: this is the option for which information is currently displayed.
In the example, Option 16 is shown along with information on the Attributes of
Option 16. Option Labels have been chosen randomly for each Period and do not
reflect the value of the option. Moreover, two options with the same option label
may have different values in different periods.
Current Choice: this is the option that you are currently holding as your
choice. This will be explained in detail below. In addition to the label for your
Current Choice, you are shown information about the Attributes for your Current
Choice for your reference.
Attribute Information: these are the attributes for the option currently dis-
played. The value of each option is the sum of its attributes as according to the
table above. For example, the value of Option 16 in the example above is 15 ECU
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(4 for Hexagon + 2 for One-Bar Pattern + 4 for Large + 5 for Number 5 = 15).
Choose this Option Button: you can click this button to change your Current
Choice to the option that is currently displayed. If your Current Choice is the
option that is currently displayed, this portion of the screen with display The option
currently displayed is your Current Choice.
Linked Options: there are four clickable lists of options that are Linked to the
currently displayed option. An option is Linked to the currently displayed option if it
shares 2 or more attributes with the currently displayed option. For example, if there
was another Option in the current Period with a One-Bar Pattern and the Number
5, it would be shown in a list of Linked Options for Option 16 in the screenshot
above. Note that a list may be quite long, in which case you will see a scroll bar
next to the list of Linked Options. The full list of Linked options is separated into
four different fields, one for each Attribute: Shape, Pattern, Size, and Number. An
option will be displayed in the relevant field if it meets two criteria: i) the option
shares at least two Attributes with the currently displayed option and ii) it shares
the Attribute for the relevant field with the currently displayed option.
For example, Option 4 also has the Hexagon Shape Attribute and the One-
Bar Pattern Attribute. Since Option 16 (the currently displayed option) has both
of these Attributes, Option 4 is linked to Option 16. Since it has the same Shape
as Option 16, it will be listed in the Shape Linked Options list. Since it has the
same Pattern as Option 16, it will also be listed in the Pattern Linked Options
list. Consider, for example, another option, call it Option 12 (not displayed in the
above screenshot). It has the Attributes: Square, One-Bar, Small, 4. Notice that
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it shares the Pattern Attribute with Option 16 (the currently displayed option):
both have the Pattern One-Bar. But it does not share any other Attributes with
Option 16. Therefore, it will not show up in any of the link lists when Option 16
is the currently displayed option. Especially note that it will not show up in the
Pattern Linked Options list for Option 16, even though they have the same Pattern
Attribute, because it does not share two or more Attributes with Option 16.
Options Already Viewed: this is a clickable list of options that have already
been viewed by you in the given period. You can click on any option in this list and
click View Selected Option to view information for that option again. Again, if the
list of Options Already Viewed gets sufficiently long, you will be shown a scroll bar
next to the list. Note: you can only view information for options other than the
one currently displayed by either clicking on it in one of the Linked Options menus
or the Options Already Viewed menu and clicking the View the Selected Option
button for that list. Whenever you click on a new option from one of these lists and
click View the Selection Option, all of the information on the screen (Option Label,
Attribute Information, Linked Options, Options Already Viewed) will update to
display information for the option to which you are navigating. The Current Choice
information in the upper right of the screen will only ever change if you change your
Current Choice (by choosing a new option using the Choose this Option button).
Stop: if you would like to Stop looking at information for the available options
and would not like to change your Current Choice, you can click the Stop button.
Period Duration In each period, you will have up to 75 seconds to evaluate
all of the available options and make choices. At any time, you can click Stop and
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you will not be shown any more information on any of the options for the given
period. Note: in order to move on to the next period, you must wait for the entire
75 seconds to pass in the current period. Thus, if you Stop after, say, 45 seconds
in the current period, you will still have to wait the remaining 30 seconds for the
period to end in order to move on to the next period.
Choices
At the end of each Period, a random time between 2 and 75 seconds will be
chosen and your Current Choice held at that time will be implemented as your
chosen option for that Period. Each time between 2 and 75 seconds is equally likely
to be chosen.When evaluating options during the 75 seconds, you will not know at
what time your Current Choice will be implemented as your chosen option for that
Period. At the beginning of each Period, you will start off being shown information
for one particular Option but will have no Current Choice. If you do not have a
Current Choice at the time chosen randomly by the computer program to implement
your choice, you will be paid nothing for the current Period. Thus, it is in your best
interest to choose any Option as soon as possible. You can then replace it with a
better option when/if you find an option that has a higher value.
At the end of each period, you will be told i) at what time your Current Choice
was implemented, ii) which Option you held at that time, and iii) what the value
(in ECU) of that option was.
For clarification purposes, consider the following example: a subject is in
Period 4 with a time limit of 75 seconds and they immediately choose the first
option shown to them, Option 1, which has a value that they have determined to
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Time 0 Seconds 30 Seconds 40 Seconds
Option Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Value 10 ECU 12 ECU 14 ECU
be 10 ECU. After 30 seconds, the subject changes their Current Choice to Option
2 with a value of 12 ECU and continues evaluating the available options. After 10
more seconds (40 in total since the start of the period), the subject selects a new
Current Choice of Option 3 with a value of 14 ECU. The subject makes no further
choices and the 75 seconds runs out. The subjects choices are shown in the following
table:
If the time chosen randomly by the system at the end of the Period is anywhere
between 2 and 30 seconds, the subject will be paid 10 ECU (for holding Option 1).
If it is anywhere between 30 and 40 seconds, they will be paid 12 ECU (for holding
Option 2). If it is 40 seconds or higher, they will be paid 14 ECU.
Earnings
You will be paid a guaranteed show-up fee of $7 in addition to your earnings
for your decision. The value of the option that is treated as your final choice for a
period (i.e. the option held by you at the time chosen by the system) is the sum
of the value of its Attributes as given in the table above. Experimental Currency
Units (ECUs) will be converted to cash (USD) at a rate of 1 ECU = $1 USD.
Though you will make decisions in each of 31 periods, you will only be paid
for 1 of these periods. Which period will be paid will be chosen at random at the
end of the experiment, with each period being equally likely to be chosen. Thus, it






Thank you for participating in this experiment. In this session you will work
alone and are not permitted to talk with any other participant. At this time, please
be sure that your cell phone is turned off. At no point during the experiment are
you permitted to use your cell phone or any other personal electronic device.
The Experiment
The experiment today is broken into two parts. These are the instructions for
Part I of the experiment. At the conclusion of Part I, the experimenter will hand
out and read instructions for Part II before proceeding. Your earnings in Part I and
Part II are independent.
This is an experiment on decision-making. In each of 40 periods, you will be
asked to choose one from among a number of options. You will have at most 1
minute and 15 seconds (or 75 seconds) to make this decision in each period. Each
option is described by a number of attributes. Attributes take on the numbers 1-9
with each number being equally likely to be shown. The value of each option is
the result of the addition and/or subtraction of these attributes and is measured
in Experimental Currency Units (or ECU). The exchange rate will be as follows: 1
USD = 10 ECU. You will know whether to add or subtract each attribute based on
column headers in the displayed data. While calculating these values, you will not
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be permitted to use a calculator or pen and paper.
In each period, you will see a screen that looks similar to the one below:
Notice that Option 1 is accompanied by 5 numbers (shown in words) in a grid
to its right. The value of Option 1 is simply the result of adding or subtracting
the numbers in its corresponding row. You will know whether to add a number or
subtract it based on the plus or minus sign in the column header row. Thus, the
value of Option 1 is 13 ECU (or eight - one + one - two + seven = ECU). The
values of Options 2-5 can be calculated in a similar way.
Variations
In each of the 40 periods, the number of available options is the same (5).
However, the number of displayed options will vary. In other words, there may be
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some options displayed on your screen that you will not be able to select. Consider
the following example:
Note that each option still has 5 attributes in the grid. However, now Option
1 cannot be selected (this can be seen from the absence of a checkbox to the left
of “Option 1). You may only select one from the following: Option 2, Option 6,
Option 9, Option 13, or Option 15. Which options are available will vary between
periods. Also note that the value of each option is calculated as in the first example.
For example, the value of Option 2 is 14 ECU (or - four - two + eight + seven +
five = 14 ECU).
In each of the 40 periods, the number of attributes per option will vary. How-
ever, in some periods, some of these attributes may be multiplied by zeros instead
of being added or subtracted when calculating the value of each option. Consider
the following example:
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Note that all displayed options are available (you can see this from the check-
box to the left of each option label). However, there are additional attributes for
each option (now there are 15). In contrast to the previous examples, some of these
attributes are now multiplied by 0 instead of being added or subtracted when de-
termining the value of each option. This can be seen from the zeros in the column
header. For example, the value of Option 1 is 12 ECU (-six + four + two + seven
+ five = 12 ECU). Notice that in this calculation, the first and second attributes
(nine and two) were not included because they have a 0 in the column header. The
same is true for any value for which there is a zero in the column header. Which
attributes have zeros (and pluses or minuses) will vary by period.
Finally, in some periods there will be additional attributes and unavailable
options. Consider the following example:
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Note that Option 1 is unavailable (you can see this from the absence of any
checkbox to its left). Also note that there are several columns with zeros in the
column header. The value of Option 4 is 9 ECU ( -five + two + eight -three +
seven= 9 ECU). Notice that the 1st through 5th attributes were not included for
Option 4 (seven, eight, one, three, and seven) since these have zeros in the column
header. The same is true for any column of attributes for which there is a zero in the
column header. Again, which columns have zeros (and pluses/minuses) and which
options are unavailable will vary by period.
Time Limit
In each period, you have 1 minute and 15 seconds (75 seconds) to submit your
choice of option. You must submit your option by checking the checkbox to its left
and clicking the OK button at the bottom right of the screen. If you do not submit
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your selection by clicking the OK button prior to the end of the period (i.e. within
75 seconds of the period starting), your selection will not be submitted and you
will be paid nothing for that period. Only by selecting an option and clicking
OK prior to the end of the period will your choice be submitted for the period.
Earnings
In each period, your per-period payoff is simply the value of the option you
have chosen. In each of these periods, the values for each option have been chosen
so that despite being the sum of both positive and negative numbers, the value of
each available option is positive. That is, no matter which option you choose,
money will never be taken away from you. 10 periods will be chosen at random and
your cash earnings will be the sum of the per-period payoffs for these 10 periods,
converted to US Dollars. The exchange rate will be as follows: $1 USD = 10 ECU.
Your total cash earnings will be added to your show-up fee of $7.00 and your earnings
from Part II of this experiment.
You will be paid your earnings privately in cash before you leave the lab.
Part II
Thank you for participating in Part II of the experiment.
You will be faced with 3 periods in which you make decisions: 1 period in
which you will be asked to submit two numbers (explained in detail below), and
2 periods of decision environments where you will choose from among a number
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of options, each described by a number of attributes. Some of these options will
be unavailable for you to select and some of the attributes will not have value (as
indicated by the presence of a zero in the header row). However, you will have the
opportunity to pay some amount (in ECU) to get rid of these unavailable options
and attributes.
In period 1, you will be asked to complete two tasks which will affect what
you see in periods 2 and 3: Task 1 is to enter the maximum amount you are willing
to pay (in ECU) to get rid of the unavailable options to be presented in period 2,
and Task 2 is to enter the maximum amount you are willing to pay to get rid of the
attributes that have no value (as indicated by the zeros in the column header; these
will be referred to as unavailable attributes for the remainder of the instructions)
to be presented in period 3. Note that decisions in each task will correspond to
outcomes in two separate subsequent periods: Task 1 affects what you see in period
2 and Task 2 affects what you see in period 3.
The screenshot below displays what this environment will look like in period
1:
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For Task 1 and Task 2, two random numbers will be drawn from 0 ECU to
15 ECU. These two numbers may not be the same. These will be the selling prices
for getting rid of the unavailable options or unavailable attributes, respectively. If
the maximum amount you are willing to pay to get rid of unavailable options that
you entered for Task 1 is above the selling price for Task 1, you pay the selling price
and you will not see these unavailable options in period 2. If the maximum amount
you are willing to pay to get rid of unavailable attributes is higher than the selling
price for Task 2, you pay the selling price and you will not see these unavailable
attributes in period 3. However, if either (or both) of the selling prices are above
the maximum amount you are willing to pay, entered in period 1 for Task 1 and
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Task 2, you pay nothing and the unavailable options or unavailable attributes will
be shown in the respective period.
Note that you enter both of these numbers indicating your maximum willing-
ness to pay to simplify the environments at the same time and before you know
the result of either random number draw. That is, when you enter the maximum
amount you are willing to pay to get rid of unavailable options, you will not know
whether you have been able to get rid of unavailable attributes, and when you enter
the maximum amount you are willing to pay to get rid of unavailable attributes, you
will not know whether you have been able to get rid of the unavailable options. Also
note that it is in your best interest not to overstate (or understate) the maximum
amount you are willing to pay in either Task 1 or Task 2. Suppose you are willing
to pay at most 5 ECU to get rid of either unavailable options or attributes. If the
random is drawn and you enter exactly 5 ECU, there are two potential outcomes:
either the number is higher than 5, in which case you pay nothing and the unavail-
able options or attributes will be displayed in the respective period, or the number
is less than 5 , say 4 ECU. In this case, you pay the 4 ECU and the unavailable
options or attributes are not shown. Note that you were willing to pay at most 5
ECU, but only had to pay 4 ECU.
Suppose instead that you overstate this amount in either Task 1 or Task 2 by
entering, say, 6 ECU. Then it could be the case that the number drawn is 5.5, for
example, which is less than 6 (which you have entered) but greater than 5, the true
maximum amount that you are willing to pay. Because you have entered 6, you will
pay the drawn amount, 5.5 ECU, which is more than you originally were willing to
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pay - you will have gotten rid of unavailable options or attributes, but paid more
than the maximum amount you were willing to pay. On the other hand, suppose you
understate this amount by entering 4 ECU. Then if the random number drawn is,
say, 4.5 ECU, you will not be able to get rid of the unavailable options or attributes,
but would be willing to pay this amount. Only by entering the actual maximum
amount you are willing to pay in Task 1 and Task 2 will you both a) prevent having
to pay more than this amount (by overstating) and b) prevent missing out on paying
a lesser amount when it is profitable to do so (by understating).
Decision Environments
These decision environments will appear exactly as you have seen them in Part
1. Again, you will have 75 seconds to submit your decision. If you do not submit
your chosen option by that time, no option will be submitted and you will be paid
nothing for that period.
By default, in period 2 there will be 15 options, each with 15 attributes. Only
5 of these options will be available for you to select and only 5 of these attributes
will have value (as indicated by the presence of a + or - in the column header).
You can pay to have the 10 unavailable options not displayed in this period. No
matter what, each of the displayed options will have 15 attributes, 10 of which will
have zeros in the column header. Whether the 10 unavailable options are displayed
depends on the result of your choice in Task 1, described in detail above.
By default, in period 3 there will be 15 options, each with 15 attributes. Only
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5 of these attributes will have value - the rest are unavailable (as indicated by the
presence of zeros in the column header) and only 5 of these options will be available
for you to select. You can pay to have the 10 unavailable attributes not displayed
in this period. No matter what, there will be 15 options displayed (5 of which will be
available for selection). Whether the 10 unavailable attributes are displayed depends
on the result of your choice in Task 2, described in detail above.
Payoff Calculation
In each of periods 2 and 3, your per-period payoff is simply the value of the
option you have chosen. In each of these periods, the values for each option have
been chosen so that despite being the sum of both positive and negative numbers,
the value of each available option is positive. That is, no matter which option
you choose, money will never be taken away from you.
Choices in all periods contribute to your payoffs for this part of the experiment.
In the first period, if you are able to get rid of either unavailable options or attributes
or both, the relevant random number that was drawn is subtracted from your payoffs.
In each of the decision periods, the value of the option you have chosen will be
added to your payoffs, with the value of each option calculated as in Part I of this
experiment. The exchange rate will be as follows: $1 USD = 10 ECU. Your total
cash earnings will be added to your show-up fee of $7.00 and your earnings from
Part I of this experiment.
You will be paid your earnings privately in cash before you leave the lab.
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C.10 Robustness Checks
In this appendix, we present the relevant results used for robustness checks for
the 8× 8 Treatment and the Alt-High Information Treatment.
C.10.1 Aggregate Results








Std Error 0.021 0.022
N 62 62
p < 0.01 for O5A8 → O8A8, O8A5 → O8A8, O5A5 → O8A8
p > 0.10 otherwise








Std Error 0.021 0.021
N 62 62
p < 0.10 for O8A5 → O5A8
p < 0.05 for O5A5 → O8A8 and O5A5 → O5A8
p < 0.01 for O8A5 → O8A8 and O5A8 → O8A8
p > 0.10 otherwise
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Std Error 1.276 1.180
N 62 62
p ¡ 0.10 for O5A5 → O5A8
p ¡ 0.05 for O5A8 → O8A8
p ¡ 0.01 for O8A5 → O8A8 and O5A5 → O8A8









Std Error 1.266 1.180
N 62 62
p ¡ 0.05 for O5A8 → O8A8 and O5A5 → O5A8
p ¡ 0.01 for O8A5 → O8A8 and O5A5 → O8A8









Std Error 1.207 1.279
N 61 62
p ¡ 0.10 for O8A5 → O5A8
p ¡ 0.05 for O5A8 → O8A8 and O5A5 → O5A8











Std Error 0.006 0.009
N 62 62
p ¡ 0.10 for O5A5 → O8A8
p ¡ 0.05 for O5A5 → O5A8
C.10.2 Alt-High Info Results






Excludes one observation where WTP = 70 ECU








C.11.1 Additional Aggregate Results
Table C.25: Mistake Rates: Excluding Timeouts
O5 O15
Mean 0.193 0.201
A5 Std Error 0.013 0.013
N 222 222
Mean 0.193 0.299
A15 Std Error 0.012 0.016
N 222 222
p = 0.000 for O15A5 → O15A15, O5A15 → O15A15, and O5A5 → O15A15
p > 0.100 otherwise.
Table C.26: Time: Timeouts Treated as Maximum Time
O5 O15
Mean 49.200 50.405
A5 Std Error 0.713 0.677
N 222 222
Mean 53.769 57.374
A15 Std Error 0.779 0.782
N 222 222
p = 0.00 for O5A5 → O5A15, O15A5 → O15A15,
O5A15 → O15A15 , O5A5 → O15A15, and O15A5 → O5A15
p > 0.10 for O5A5 → O15A5
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Table C.27: Time: Correct
O5 O15
Mean 48.240 49.641
A5 Std Error 0.727 0.662
N 222 220
Mean 52.615 56.613
A15 Std Error 0.769 0.776
N 222 222
p = 0.00 for O5A5 → O5A15, O15A5 → O15A15,
O5A15 → O15A15 , O5A5 → O15A15, and O15A5 → O5A15
p > 0.10 for O5A5 → O15A5
Conditional on Correct
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C.11.2 Time Cost Results
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Table C.28: Robustness: Time Thresholds
t < 73 t < 70 t < 65
model
Options -0.830 0.433 1.719
(-0.69) (0.36) (1.37)
Attributes 4.078∗∗∗ 3.494∗∗∗ 2.836∗∗
(3.52) (2.93) (2.26)
Options * Attributes 1.392∗∗ 0.958 -0.515
(2.07) (1.41) (-0.74)
Period -0.254∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗
(-17.32) (-15.81) (-13.97)
Cognitive Score 10.30∗∗∗ 11.06∗∗∗ 12.01∗∗∗
(10.80) (11.38) (12.11)
Female -2.605∗∗∗ -2.429∗∗∗ -2.484∗∗∗
(-7.72) (-7.11) (-7.13)
Economics/Business -2.269∗∗∗ -2.469∗∗∗ -2.186∗∗∗
(-5.82) (-6.25) (-5.46)
English -3.206∗∗∗ -2.587∗∗∗ -2.533∗∗∗
(-7.70) (-6.07) (-5.79)
Position 0.132∗∗ 0.0945∗ 0.0455
(2.48) (1.77) (0.84)
Positive -1.270∗∗∗ -0.955∗∗∗ -0.871∗∗∗
(-3.86) (-2.88) (-2.59)
Option Complexity 0.606∗∗ 0.259 -0.0289
(2.05) (0.86) (-0.09)
Attribute Complexity 0.116 0.144 0.108
(0.37) (0.45) (0.32)
Constant 53.81∗∗∗ 49.84∗∗∗ 46.05∗∗∗
(34.73) (31.85) (29.12)
sigma
Constant 15.06∗∗∗ 14.53∗∗∗ 13.64∗∗∗
(127.82) (121.97) (112.36)
Observations 8169 7438 6312
t statistics in parentheses
All specifications exclude timeouts
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.29: Robustness: Time Thresholds, Correct
t < 73 t < 70 t < 65
model
Options -0.888 0.377 1.413
(-0.72) (0.30) (1.11)
Attributes 5.049∗∗∗ 4.802∗∗∗ 3.803∗∗∗
(4.22) (3.92) (2.98)
Options * Attributes 3.119∗∗∗ 2.906∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗
(4.58) (4.24) (2.40)
Period -0.200∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗
(-13.36) (-12.62) (-11.73)
Cognitive Score 6.580∗∗∗ 7.024∗∗∗ 8.251∗∗∗
(6.79) (7.20) (8.38)
Female -1.263∗∗∗ -1.061∗∗∗ -1.244∗∗∗
(-3.70) (-3.11) (-3.62)
Economics/Business -2.419∗∗∗ -2.794∗∗∗ -2.522∗∗∗
(-6.18) (-7.11) (-6.43)
English -2.118∗∗∗ -1.466∗∗∗ -1.344∗∗∗
(-5.07) (-3.47) (-3.14)
Position 0.191∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗
(3.51) (2.62) (2.23)
Positive -0.938∗∗∗ -0.808∗∗ -0.759∗∗
(-2.83) (-2.44) (-2.29)
Option Complexity 0.529∗ 0.169 -0.118
(1.73) (0.54) (-0.37)
Attribute Complexity -0.0952 -0.217 -0.126
(-0.29) (-0.65) (-0.36)
Constant 52.97∗∗∗ 50.46∗∗∗ 46.95∗∗∗
(34.09) (32.48) (30.27)
sigma
Constant 13.48∗∗∗ 12.94∗∗∗ 12.01∗∗∗
(113.42) (108.75) (100.36)
Observations 6432 5913 5036
t statistics in parentheses
All specifications exclude timeouts
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.11.3 GPA Robustness Checks
Table C.30: Mistake Rate Regressions with GPA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Timeouts as Mistakes
Options 0.00969 0.0127 -0.0202 -0.0532∗ -0.0740∗∗
(0.84) (1.07) (-1.49) (-1.84) (-2.48)
Attributes 0.000268 0.00364 -0.00355 -0.0143 0.0127
(0.02) (0.29) (-0.28) (-0.49) (0.44)
Options * Attributes 0.0871∗∗∗ 0.0785∗∗∗ 0.0852∗∗∗ 0.0869∗∗∗ 0.0923∗∗∗
(4.82) (4.28) (4.61) (4.67) (4.96)
Period 0.000314 0.000276 0.000288 0.000283 -0.00100∗∗
(0.71) (0.61) (0.63) (0.62) (-2.10)
GPA -0.246∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.251∗∗∗
(-3.98) (-3.99) (-3.99) (-4.04)
Female 0.0935∗∗∗ 0.0935∗∗∗ 0.0935∗∗∗ 0.0909∗∗∗
(4.13) (4.13) (4.13) (3.94)
Economics/Business 0.00577 0.00560 0.00559 0.0228
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.83)
English -0.00139 -0.00147 -0.00147 -0.0128
(-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.51)
Position 0.00452∗∗∗ 0.00499∗∗∗ 0.00598∗∗∗
(3.62) (3.89) (4.43)
Positive -0.0304∗∗∗ -0.0325∗∗∗ -0.0314∗∗∗
(-3.66) (-3.84) (-3.63)
Option Complexity 0.00904 0.0134∗
(1.26) (1.83)
Attribute Complexity 0.00300 0.000322
(0.39) (0.04)
Observations 8555 8121 8121 8121 8440
t statistics in parentheses
Marginal effects from logit regression specifications
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.31: Time Regressions with GPA
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Correct Timeouts as Time = 75
Options 2.255∗∗∗ 2.211∗∗∗ 1.230∗∗∗ -1.270 -1.284 -2.024∗∗
(6.38) (6.01) (2.67) (-1.38) (-1.31) (-2.05)
Attributes 5.108∗∗∗ 5.188∗∗∗ 4.919∗∗∗ 4.133∗∗∗ 5.066∗∗∗ 4.988∗∗∗
(12.00) (11.85) (11.10) (4.40) (4.52) (5.26)
Options * Attributes 1.483∗∗∗ 1.473∗∗∗ 1.720∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗ 3.297∗∗∗ 2.109∗∗∗
(3.01) (2.88) (3.37) (3.56) (5.95) (4.05)
Period -0.263∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.294∗∗∗
(-10.26) (-9.61) (-9.60) (-9.62) (-9.79) (-10.05)
GPA 8.896∗∗ 8.888∗∗ 8.886∗∗ 5.341 8.071∗
(2.11) (2.11) (2.10) (1.56) (1.84)
Female -2.652∗ -2.655∗ -2.655∗ -1.302 -2.541∗
(-1.89) (-1.89) (-1.89) (-1.13) (-1.80)
Economics/Business -1.702 -1.706 -1.708 -1.961 -0.946
(-1.09) (-1.10) (-1.10) (-1.42) (-0.60)
English -3.369∗∗ -3.372∗∗ -3.373∗∗ -2.311∗ -3.676∗∗
(-2.25) (-2.25) (-2.25) (-1.68) (-2.46)
Position 0.130∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(3.19) (3.84) (4.45) (4.61)
Positive -1.221∗∗∗ -1.380∗∗∗ -0.957∗∗∗ -1.355∗∗∗
(-4.60) (-5.11) (-3.40) (-4.81)
Option Complexity 0.694∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗
(3.23) (2.48) (3.65)
Attribute Complexity 0.220 0.00633 0.128
(0.94) (0.02) (0.55)
Observations 8555 8121 8121 8121 6332 8440
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.32: WTP Regressions with GPA
WTP WTP > 0
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Mistakes 0.198∗∗ 0.219∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.205∗ 0.212∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗
(0.0882) (0.0864) (0.111) (0.108) (0.0914) (0.146)
Time -0.00187 -0.00165 0.000841 -0.00177 -0.00145 0.00180
(0.00180) (0.00192) (0.00287) (0.00187) (0.00204) (0.00256)
Attributes 0.311∗∗ 0.311∗∗ 0.431 0.0817 0.0727 0.147
(0.149) (0.156) (0.275) (0.144) (0.159) (0.310)
High Info 0.0656 0.150 4.279 -0.167 -0.0936 6.195∗∗
(0.475) (0.490) (2.647) (0.396) (0.448) (3.127)
Female -0.112 -0.214 0.565 0.397
(0.439) (0.447) (0.414) (0.419)
GPA -0.890 -0.682 -1.411 -1.218
(1.149) (1.161) (0.970) (1.034)
High Info * Mistakes -0.218 -0.358∗
(0.175) (0.215)
High Info * Time -0.00528 -0.00813∗
(0.00401) (0.00445)
High Info * Attributes -0.370 -0.347
(0.331) (0.340)
Constant 4.485∗∗∗ 4.949∗∗∗ 3.168∗ 2.539∗∗ 3.167∗∗ 0.868
(1.092) (1.296) (1.735) (1.252) (1.414) (1.634)
sigma
Constant 3.225∗∗∗ 3.192∗∗∗ 3.177∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.212) (0.209)
Observations 444 422 422 444 422 422
Standard errors in parentheses
Models 1 - 3: Tobit regression specifications with lower limit of 0 and upper limit of 15
Models 4 - 6: Logit regression specifications
Robust standard errors reported are clustered at the Subject level
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C.11.4 Additional Welfare Measures
In order to investigate whether our main result was robust to specifications
of welfare loss other than the mistake rate, we additionally conducted aggregate
analyses on the rank of the final choice. The variable Rank runs from 1, indicating
the worst available option, to 5, indicating the best available option. We replicate
our main result, that both unavailable options and irrelevant attributes are necessary
to generate a welfare loss.
Because in some decision problems multiple available options (other than the
best) had the same payoff, this Rank variable results in some ties. To ensure that our
results are not sensitive to these ties, we present below tables with i) ties included, ii)
ties rounded to the next highest rank, and iii) observations with ties being dropped.
Our main result is robust to all specifications.








Std Error 0.018 0.021
N 2124 2095
O5A5 → O5A15: p = .65
O5A5 → O15A5: p = .239
O15A5 → O15A15: p = 0
O5A15 → O15A15: p = 0
O5A5 → O15A15: p = 0
O15A5 → O5A15: p = .452
Additionally, we can measure the amount of ECU lost as a result of a mistake.
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Std Error 0.017 0.020
N 2124 2095
O5A5 → O5A15: p = .554
O5A5 → O15A5: p = .163
O15A5 → O15A15: p = 0
O5A15 → O15A15: p = 0
O5A5 → O15A15: p = 0
O15A5 → O5A15: p = .405








Std Error 0.017 0.020
N 2124 2095
O5A5 → O5A15: p = .554
O5A5 → O15A5: p = .163
O15A5 → O15A15: p = 0
O5A15 → O15A15: p = 0
O5A5 → O15A15: p = 0
O15A5 → O5A15: p = .405
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Because the data generation process results in significant variance across decision
problem types in terms of “possible loss” (i.e. distance in ECU of each available
option relative to the best option), we first present the average values of potential
loss for each option, defined as the Maximum Value in the choice set minus the
Value of the available option below applied to the value of the available options
themselves (i.e. not to choices of our subjects). From Table C.36, we can see
that there are significant differences in potential loss from sub-optimal choice across
decision problem types.








Std Error 0.749 0.847
N 50 50
O5A5 → O5A15: p = 0
O5A5 → O15A5: p = 0
O15A5 → O15A15: p = .177
O5A15 → O15A15: p = 0
O5A5 → O15A15: p = 0
O15A5 → O5A15: p = 0
We therefore normalize this loss variable by taking the actual loss for the choice
of a subject (i.e. Maximum Value - Value of Choice) and dividing it by the Maximum
Value minus the Mean Value of available options in the given decision problem.
Again, we replicate our main result, with the exception that this Normalized Loss is
somewhat higher in O15A5 than in O5A5, though this difference is only marginally
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significant.








Std Error 0.009 0.010
N 2124 2095
O5A5 → O5A15: p = .334
O5A5 → O15A5: p = .096
O15A5 → O15A15: p = 0
O5A15 → O15A15: p = 0
O5A5 → O15A15: p = 0
O15A5 → O5A15: p = .495
Normalized by dividing by v∗i − v̂i for each question i
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Mark Dean, Özgür Kıbrıs, and Yusufcan Masatlioglu. Limited attention and status
quo bias. Journal of Economic Theory, 169:93–127, 2017.
Armin Falk. Gift exchange in the field. Econometrica, 75(5):1501–1511, 2007.
Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher. A theory of reciprocity. Games and economic
behavior, 54(2):293–315, 2006.
212
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